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Introduction 
Opening Statement 
The Second World War was the deadliest and most widespread conflict in 
human history. It resulted in a huge loss of human life, massive material destruction and 
brought about a rearrangement of the world’s geopolitical landscape. While Ireland 
remained neutral during the Emergency (Ireland’s vernacular for the Second World 
War), the country and its population could not escape the knock-on effects of the 
conflict. Although spared the human and material losses endured by other nations, 
Ireland’s economy was severely dislocated. Securing imports for agriculture and 
industry became difficult; industrial production was reduced and the nature of 
employment affected. The inventory of consumer goods available on the open market 
was drastically cut and shortages led to price increases. Consequently, the standard of 
living fell and the prevalence of diseases associated with malnutrition increased. 
Extraordinary times called for extraordinary measures; the Irish government assumed an 
exceptional set of dictatorial-like powers under the Emergency Powers Act (EPA), 1939. 
This act formed the basis for government control which extended to all facets of life in 
Emergency Ireland including censorship, internment, travel restrictions, and rationing 
measures. Although repealed in September 1946, many of the controls introduced under 
the EPA (as well as the conditions which necessitated their introduction) remained in 
force for many years afterwards. Poverty increased in Ireland during the Emergency, 
and in urban areas it was endemic. This elicited a whole host of responses from 
governmental, institutional, and public quarters and produced new ways of thinking 
about food, health, and the state’s responsibility to its citizens. A rich social history that 
is reflective of the wider wartime experience thus emerges from the period. 
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Literature review 
A series of articles by Professor Thomas D. Williams published in the 1950s, 
and a collection of essays he edited together with Kevin B. Nowlan, in Ireland in the 
war years and after, 1939-51 (1969), initiated the historical examination of Ireland’s 
Emergency. Ireland in the war years and after, through its examination of issues of 
both social and political significance, represented a promising start for the period’s 
historiography. While the sources available at this time were limited, Nowlan and 
Williams insisted that ‘a beginning... must be made’.1 Much of the scholarship which 
followed however, has been largely coloured by F.S.L. Lyons’ use of the ‘Plato’s Cave’ 
allegory in his landmark socioeconomic work, Ireland since the Famine (1971). Using 
the metaphor of ‘Plato’s Cave’ to describe life in Ireland during the Emergency, Lyons 
suggested that: 
The tensions – and the liberations – of war, the shared experience, and 
comradeship in suffering, the new thinking about the future, all these things had 
passed her by. It was as if an entire people had been condemned to live in 
Plato’s cave, backs to the fire of life and deriving their only knowledge of what 
went on outside from the flickering shadows thrown on the wall before their 
eyes by the men and women who passed to and fro behind them. When after six 
years they emerged, dazzled, from the cave into the light of day, it was to a new 
and vastly different world.
2
 
 
Lyons invoked an image of Irish society totally cut off from the rest of the world, 
unaware of and unaffected by the momentous events of the Second World War, one 
which belies the reality of life in Ireland during the Emergency. 
 The dominance of Lyons’ ahistorical interpretation is reflected in the histories of 
the Emergency published (most notably) in the following two decades. Sparse attention 
was paid to issues of social and economic significance. Instead, top-down high political 
analysis dominated. The diplomatic minefield negotiated by Ireland’s Taoiseach Eamon 
                                                          
1
 Kevin B. Nowlan and Thomas D. Williams (eds), Ireland in the war years and after, 1939-51 (Dublin, 
1969), ix. 
2
 F. S. L. Lyons, Ireland since the Famine (Dublin, 1971), p. 551. 
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de Valera (and his government) vis-à-vis the threat posed to Ireland by both the Allies 
and Germany emerged as a key theme.
3
 The role of the treaty ports also figures 
prominently. So too has the very anatomy of neutrality itself been scrutinised with a 
debate over its nature ensuing. Within these top-down histories, a narrative of neutrality 
which suggests that the policy was biased towards the Allies has developed.
4
 Dermot 
Keogh, the principle proponent of this view, highlights the joint planning between the 
Irish and Allied military authorities; the intelligence exchange between G2 and its 
equivalents in the Allied services; the forwarding of meteorological data and reports of 
sightings of German naval and aircraft off Irish waters to the relevant British authorities; 
and the Irish government’s secret agreement with the British to allow its seaplanes 
based in Lough Erne to fly through Irish airspace to reach the Atlantic.
5
 More recent 
studies have challenged the conventional narrative of Ireland’s neutrality and questioned 
its moral basis. The work of Geoffrey Roberts and Brian Girvin stands out.
6
 The issue 
of espionage and counter-intelligence in Ireland has garnered significant interest with 
recent studies benefiting greatly from wider access to source material.
7
 Bearing in mind 
the extent to which Ireland was viewed as a ‘hotbed of espionage’ this focus is 
justifiable. Bernard Share’s admirable study, The Emergency and Neutral Ireland, 
1939-1945 (1978) was an exception to this trend. Exploring issues of social, cultural, 
and economic importance as well as the more traditional themes, Share concluded that 
                                                          
3
 See: Joseph T. Carroll, Ireland in the war years (New York, 1975); T. Ryle Dwyer, Irish neutrality and 
the USA, 1939-47 (Dublin, 1977); Robert Fisk, In time of war, Ireland, Ulster and the price of neutrality, 
1939-45 (London, 1983); John P. Duggan, Neutral Ireland and the Third Reich (Dublin, 1985). 
4
 T. Ryle Dwyer, De Valera’s finest hour (Dublin, 1982); Dermot Keogh, Ireland and Europe, 1919-1948 
(Dublin, 1988). 
5
 Dermot Keogh, Twentieth century Ireland, nation and state (Dublin, 1994), p. 120. 
6
 Brian Girvin, The Emergency: neutral Ireland 1939-45 (Dublin, 2006); Geoffrey Roberts, ‘Three 
narratives of neutrality: historians and Ireland’s war’ in Brian Girvin and Geoffrey Roberts (eds), Ireland 
and the Second World War, politics, society and remembrance (Dublin, 2000), pp 165-79. 
7
 Carolle J. Carter, The shamrock and the swastika (Palo Alto, 1977); Mark Hull, Irish secrets: German 
espionage in Ireland, 1939-45 (Dublin, 2003); Eunan O'Halpin, Spying on Ireland: British intelligence 
and Irish neutrality during the Second World War (New York, 2008). 
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the period brought about significant developments in each of these respects.
8
 This was a 
conclusion which ultimately stood in opposition to the idea of Emergency Ireland being 
akin to ‘Plato’s Cave’. Share noted that important practical steps were taken during the 
Emergency both voluntarily and out of necessity such as in the fields of health and 
welfare, an idea which warrants further inquiry. 
 In the 1990s, while the top-down histories of the Emergency persisted, the scope 
of historical inquiry into the Emergency began to broaden. Gerard Fee’s doctoral thesis, 
‘The effects of World War II on Dublin’s low-income families, 1939-1945’, marked the 
beginning of a new departure.
9
 Viewing the Emergency from a sociological vantage 
point, Fee illustrates the extent to which Dublin’s poor – the largest and most vulnerable 
group in Irish society – suffered. Examining the roles played by church and state, Fee 
shows how social issues were propelled to the fore of Irish politics. Hardship was 
widespread in Dublin and therefore cannot be ignored in any social history of the 
Emergency, however this thesis will seek to shed light on the experience of Ireland’s 
poor in general. 
Clair Wills’ 2007 study, That neutral island, a history of Ireland during the 
Second World War, represents a significant addition to the period’s historiography. 
Through an examination of a wide range of topics using varied sources, Wills shows 
that neutrality was not synonymous with a global peacetime existence. In the process 
Wills demonstrates how Ireland existed both inside and outside the war. Wills suggests 
that: 
One version of Ireland’s wartime story is that it is all about absence – the 
absence of conflict, of supplies, of social dynamism, of contact with the ‘outside 
world’.10 
                                                          
8
 Bernard Share, The Emergency and neutral Ireland, 1939-1945 (Dublin, 1978), p. 142. 
9
 Gerard Fee, ‘The effects of World War II on Dublin’s low-income families 1939-1945’ (PhD thesis in 
history, University College, Dublin, 1996). 
10
 Clair Wills, That neutral island, a history of Ireland during the Second World War (London, 2007), p. 
10. 
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This narrative, Wills argues, has masked the ‘material and psychic impoverishment that 
the war wrought in Ireland’, the effects of which it is suggested persisted like a ‘silent 
damage to the culture throughout the 1950s.’11  Through reference to the growth in 
strength and confidence of women’s organisations, Wills hints at another narrative of 
neutrality in which social deprivation was a catalyst for positive action and change. 
Mary Muldowney’s cross-border oral history, The Second World War and Irish women 
presents Irish women as active as opposed to passive characters during the war.
12
 
Muldowney’s work is also reflective of an increasing trend in the historiography 
whereby formerly marginalised topics are being investigated, and the unheard are given 
voice. Peter Rigney’s study of trains and fuel during the Emergency, and Michael 
Kennedy’s history of the Coast Watching Service are other relevant examples of this 
trend. This is also mirrored in the broadening scope of the historiography of the Second 
World War to include topics peripheral to the major sites of conflict. Researchers have 
begun to look into the shadows to less traditional subjects. The roles played by the 
neutrals have been increasingly examined as have topics such as food, science and 
technology.
13
 Lizzie Collingham’s illustration of the central role that food policy played 
during the Second World War is particularly relevant.
14
 David Edgerton’s and Lizzie 
Collingham’s works are also important to this thesis both comparatively and to 
contextualise Ireland’s supplies difficulties within the wider narrative of production and 
consumption during the Second World War. 
 Bryce Evans’ 2014 publication, Ireland during the Second World War, farewell 
to Plato’s Cave − a product of his doctoral research − represents another substantial 
                                                          
11
 Ibid., pp 10-11. 
12
 Mary Muldowney, The Second World War and Irish women, an oral history (Dublin, 2007). 
13
 Neville Wylie (ed.), European neutrals and non-belligerents during the Second World War (London, 
2002); for science and technology see: David Edgerton, Britain’s war machine, weapons, resources and 
experts in the Second World War (London, 2011). 
14
 Lizzie Collingham, The taste of war, World War Two and the battle for food (London, 2011). 
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addition to the period’s historiography.15 Through his examination of the black market 
and themes such as profiteering, Evans offers an alternative to the narrative of absence 
identified by Wills. He traces how shortages coupled with illicit activities led to the 
emergence of forms of moral economy, and demonstrates how the government actually 
evoked moral economy in an effort to buttress its policies. The phenomenon whereby 
the Irish government attempted to convey an impartial account of the war to the 
population through censorship was termed ‘moral neutrality’ by Donal Ó Drisceoil.16 
Evans extends the idea of Irish neutrality as ‘moral’ into the economic realm. In a blend 
of high political and bottom-up analysis, Evans explores the often fraught relationships 
which existed between the government, the church, and the various classes. Instead of 
dwelling on poverty and privation, Evans focuses on the social impacts of the war 
economy. Evans suggests (in reference to the work of Alan Milward) that ‘in doing so it 
reflects a shift in the broader historiography of the war, where a focus on military 
histories in which ‘armies and navies come or go, commanded by greater or lesser 
figures deciding momentous historical issues’ has given way to a focus on productive 
forces.’ 17  In War, economy and society, 1939-45, Milward argues that it was the 
‘productive forces’ behind wars which give them meaning and make them possible.  
Bryce Evans cites labour and agrarian unrest, inspectors, enforcement, the black 
market, compulsory tillage and coercion to illustrate the reluctance of ordinary people to 
comply with the Government’s regulations.18 The increasing number of prosecutions for 
                                                          
15
 Bryce Evans, Ireland during the Second World War, farewell to Plato’s Cave (Manchester, 2014). 
16
 Donal Ó Drisceoil, Censorship in Ireland 1939-1945, neutrality, politics and society (Cork, 1996), p. 
288. 
17
 Evans, Ireland during the Second World War, p. 8; Alan S. Milward, War, economy and society, 1939-
1945 (London, 1977), xii. 
18
 Bryce Evans ‘‘Notorious Anarchists?’ The Irish smallholder and the Irish state during the Emergency, 
1939-45’, in William Sheehan and Maura Cronin (eds), Riotous assemblies, rebels, riots and revolts in 
Ireland (Dublin, 2011), pp 191-209. 
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infringements of Emergency legislation is also suggestive of this.
19
 Clair Wills has 
demonstrated how Ireland endured home front conditions without the morale-raising 
and economy-boosting influence of a war front. This situation existed in Britain where 
government controls were altogether more successful.
20
 While Evans demonstrates how 
the government’s attempt to stir up notions of moral economy was unsuccessful, the 
government’s necessary revision to policies of self-sufficiency, although flawed, 
preserved the population and the state through the Second World War. This could have 
been achieved only with a certain amount of compliance, voluntary effort, and sacrifice. 
In providing a different narrative of neutrality, Evans like Wills, Girvin, and Fee before 
him has helped to demonstrate the complexity of the Emergency. 
In Health, medicine and politics in Ireland 1900-1970, published in 1987, Ruth 
Barrington stated: 
It is a paradox that war-time should be a stimulant to the development of health 
services. Like the Great War and the War of Independence, ‘the Emergency’ 
during the Second World War was the dividing line in the development of health 
services.
21
 
 
During the Emergency, there was a definite divergence of health and welfare services  
in Ireland as new ways of thinking emerged. Under the Ministers and Secretaries 
(Amendment) Act, passed on the 24 December 1946, separate Departments of Health 
and Social Welfare were established to assume the functions of the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health.
22
 This was stimulated by a general dissatisfaction with 
the health services and recognition that access would have to be widened. Throughout 
the world governments were becoming more socially aware and more concerned with 
                                                          
19
 Bryce Evans, Seán Lemass, democratic dictator (Dublin, 2011), pp 137-141; Seosamh Ó Longaigh, 
Emergency law in independent Ireland, 1922-1948 (Dublin, 2006). 
20
 Wills, That neutral island, pp 237-2. 
21
 Ruth Barrington, Health medicine and politics in Ireland 1900-1970 (Dublin, 1987), p. 137. 
22
 Mel Cousins, The birth of social welfare in Ireland, 1922-52 (Dublin, 2003); Harold O’Sullivan, A 
history of local government in the county of Louth, from earliest times to the present time (Dublin, 2000). 
8 
 
the health of their citizens.
23
 Mary Daly ascribes these developments in Ireland to the 
awareness of politicians and the public, of developments in Britain, most notably the 
Beveridge proposals for a welfare state.
24
 This does not sit well with the image of the 
inward-looking country that springs to mind when one thinks of ‘Plato’s Cave’. 
Barrington also described how there was: 
A great burst of administrative zeal directed at eliminating the black spots on the 
nation’s health, tuberculosis, other infectious diseases and infant mortality.25 
 
The increase in Ireland’s rates of both tuberculosis and infant mortality during the 
Emergency also bucks the idea that life in Ireland went unaffected by the Second World 
War. Malnutrition is a major risk factor for the progression of tuberculosis while infant 
mortality rates have traditionally been viewed as being amongst the most sensitive 
indicators of the standard of living.
26
  
Lizzie Collingham’s calorie-centric history, The taste of war, World War Two 
and the battle for food, brings the history of food to the fore, and achieves the near 
impossible by demonstrating a new way of thinking about the heavily-studied conflict. 
Collingham illustrates how the combatant governments were eager to harness the new 
science of nutrition to maintain the health of their armies and populations.
27
 This 
enthusiasm for nutrition had its basis in developments which occurred as a result of the 
First World War, and even more so, the Great Depression.
28
 In Feast and famine: a 
history of food and nutrition in Ireland, 1500-1920, Leslie Clarkson and Margaret 
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Crawford argue that food and nutrition should be part of mainstream history.
29
 Beyond 
the work of Clarkson and Crawford however, the history of food and nutrition in 
twentieth century Ireland remains spectacularly under examined, especially when one 
takes into account Ireland’s nineteenth century experience of famine.30 Similarly, the 
history of food and nutrition in the context of the Emergency, aside from anecdotal 
references to the ‘black bread’ and the ‘black tea’, has remained marginalised. Various 
historians have referenced the existence of widespread malnutrition during the 
Emergency but only minor analysis is provided.
31
 Comparatively little care was also 
shown for the new science of nutrition by contemporaries in pre-Emergency Ireland. 
Yet, Margaret Ó hÓgartaigh’s asserts that during the Emergency there was a noticeable 
increase in concern about the links between malnutrition and illness.
32
 The fact that 
Ireland’s National Nutrition Survey was initiated in 1946 also seems significant.33 
These developments mirror those that took place in other countries during the interwar 
years and are suggestive of a growing interest in nutrition in Ireland. In ‘The chemistry 
of famine, nutritional controversies and the Irish Famine, c.1845-7’ Ian Miller contends 
that ‘the famine opened up avenues for advocates of the social value of nutritional 
science to engage with politico-economic discussion regarding Irish dietary’.34 Miller’s 
work thus has similarities with this thesis, and his assertion that nutritional science 
became tied to anti-union sentiment (due to its ineffective application) offers an 
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explanation as to why developments in nutritional science in Ireland lagged behind 
those of other countries.
35
 
The restrictions on imports led to an approximate twenty-five percent reduction 
in Ireland’s industrial production during the Emergency. 36  This coupled with the 
disparity between the increases in the cost-of-living against real wages plunged many 
into poverty.
37
 The Emergency put into focus the desperate living conditions in which 
large sections of the population lived, and the demand for aid from both the government 
and voluntary organisations increased. At the same time, the wind of change was in the 
air, but in Ireland, national health reform and the provision of social welfare proved to 
be contentious issues. As has been illustrated in various works, the debate was heavily 
influenced by advocates of the differing ideologies of Catholic Action and the welfare 
state.
38
 The well-documented pitched battle between these opposing camps in the early 
1950s known as the ‘mother and child controversy’ had its genesis in the Emergency.39 
The existence of poverty together with the desire to keep pace with developments in 
Britain heightened the appeal (for some) of Beveridge’s proposals which advocated the 
centralisation of the welfare services. Conversely, proponents of Catholic social 
teachings grew in strength and confidence. Their belief in the principle of subsidiarity 
was at odds with the centralised welfare state.
40
 Don O’Leary illustrates the popularity 
of vocationalism as an alternative social order among advocates of Catholic social 
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teachings.
41
 Participation in voluntary organisations devoted to serving the welfare of 
the community was a core principle of vocationalism. O’Leary highlights the role 
played during the Emergency by parish councils and Muintir na Tíre, voluntary 
organisations which aspired to the vocationalist ideal.
42
 This thesis will examine the 
activities of voluntary organisations, both Catholic and non-denominational, which 
administered material aid during the Emergency. It will also critically asses welfare 
schemes implemented by the government in response to shortages. In doing so it will 
highlight the extent to which Ireland was affected by the Second World War and 
through the exploration of the activities of voluntary organisations it will offer an 
alternative narrative to that of coercion, inspection, and the black market. 
The focus of this study extends beyond 1945 to include the post-war years up 
until 1948, or what Bryce Evans terms the ‘Long Emergency’. This is a distinguishing 
feature of this thesis. Evans argues that while shortages and rationing continued up until 
1948, ‘the unique cocktail which Emergency measures represented had been diluted by 
that point.’43 Censorship was lifted on 11 May 1945, and the wage restrictions were 
repealed in mid 1946.
44
 So too was the Emergency Powers Act lifted on 2 September 
1946. It was from this piece of legislation that the Emergency got its name. Spared from 
the destruction of the Second World War, Ireland emerged into the post-war world 
intact and financially stable.
45
 Ireland also escaped the turmoil that engulfed much of 
Europe in the aftermath of the conflict.
46
 In common with the rest of Europe however, 
life in post-war Ireland did not revert to its pre-war state upon the conclusion of the war. 
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Many of the regulations enacted under the Emergency Powers Act remained in force 
well after it was revoked. Bread, which had not been rationed at any point during the 
war, was rationed for the first time in January 1947. Ireland’s tuberculosis and infant 
mortality rates did not return to their pre-war levels until 1948 and actually spiked in 
1947. Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska’s examination of rationing, controls, and 
consumption in Britain extending from 1939 until the end of rationing in 1955 
illustrates the extent to which rationing became an issue of political significance post-
war. This highlights the importance of studying rationing beyond its original wartime 
context.
47
 
Aims and objectives 
By examining the Emergency through the lens of food, rationing, and supplies, 
this thesis aims to demonstrate the extent to which everyday life in Ireland was affected 
by the Second World War. The thesis therefore stands in opposition to F.S.L. Lyon’s 
contention that life in Emergency Ireland was akin to ‘Plato’s Cave’, is distinct from the 
largely high-political histories which followed, and can be aligned with more complex 
narratives of the Emergency. Through the use of a bottom-up approach, public, medical, 
organisational, clerical, and governmental responses to shortages will be explored. By 
investigating the multifaceted relationships between various actors, and by 
demonstrating how privation fostered engagement, cooperation, and conflict, it is hoped 
to illustrate the complexity of Ireland’s Emergency.  
This thesis will seek to demonstrate the practical, political, economic, legislative 
underpinnings of rationing in Ireland. Ireland’s supply difficulties were first and 
foremost a product of the international situation. Thus in an attempt to convey a clearer 
image of domestic issues, the thesis will contextualise Ireland’s shortages within the 
                                                          
47
 Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska, Austerity in Britain: rationing, controls, and consumption, 1939-1955 
(New York, 2000); Also see: David Kynaston, Austerity Britain, 1945-51 (London, 2007). 
13 
 
international situation. While much has been made of Britain’s use of economic 
pressure against Ireland, additional factors which influenced Ireland’s negative trade 
position will be explored. So too the Irish government’s preparations for the war in 
relation to supplies will be analysed. 
The most critical shortages will be discussed, as will the most important controls 
introduced by the government to ameliorate them. While Dublin constitutes the 
geographic focus of the thesis, efforts will be made to illustrate the impacts of shortages 
and rationing in both rural and urban contexts. 
Writing in 1945, Professor Theobald Wolfe Tone Dillon who was well 
acquainted with the plight of the poor as well as rents and prices in the city estimated 
that it would cost an adult living in Dublin an absolute minimum of 6s. weekly, or 2s. 
4d. for a child to live in Dublin at the prices prevailing at that time. This was what 
Dillon called the ‘Starvation Standard’ and it made no allowance for a nutritious and 
varied diet. On this allowance, one’s meals would have consisted primarily of bread and 
spread. This sum left little for rent and did not take into account the purchase of clothing 
or additional expenses a family might incur in the case of illness, pregnancy, child birth 
or the raising of children. In order to avail of a healthy, varied diet, or to obtain what 
Dillon called the ‘Health Standard’, he calculated that the weekly expenditure necessary 
for a man or woman would have been 21s., 23s. for an adolescent, less than 10s. for a 
child under fifteen, and about 5s. for a child of five years or less. However Dillion again 
left the allowance for rent and other expenses at an absolute minimum.
48
 Therefore, 
according to Professor Dillon’s calculations, it would have cost £2 18s. weekly to 
provide a family of two adults and three children with a nutritious diet or as much as £4 
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12s. to maintain a family of two adults and five children between the ages of five and 
fifteen at the same standard.  
In 1938 Dublin Corporation’s Housing Committee examined 10,500 of city’s 
33,411 working class families in respect of their income. Its findings showed that 
twenty-five percent of the families had an income which was under £1 per week and a 
further twenty percent had a weekly income of under £2.
49
 Even at 1938 prices, the 
families in Dublin who were at the bottom end of the scale, the ones dependant on state 
welfare (for the rates of welfare see Chapter III) and others throughout the country who 
were in a similar socio-economic position would have struggled. Hardship would have 
been especially common among larger families and Dublin was inhabited by 6,000 
working class families with five or more members. It stands to reason that a great many 
of these would have lived an existence well below Dillon’s Health Standard even before 
the austere living conditions of the Emergency set in.
50
 However, the increase in the 
cost-of-living that was a product of the Emergency (see Figures 2.8 and 3.1) rendered 
meagre incomes totally inadequate. Indeed the Emergency was most keenly felt by the 
poorer classes, and Ireland’s poorest were those dependent on state welfare mechanisms 
for their maintenance. This thesis considers the plight of those persons in particular, a 
large percentage of which inhabited the country’s principal cities (see Figure 0.1 and 
0.2). 
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Table 0.1 Comparison between the total number of people paid Unemployment 
Assistance in Ireland with the figures for Dublin, Limerick, Cork and Galway, 
1939-48 
  
UA total Dublin Limerick Cork Galway City’s % 
of total 
Dublin’s % 
of total 
Feb. 1939* 69,262 12,410 2,653 3,987 1,910 30% 18% 
Feb. 1940 83,105 14,425 2,787 4,162 1,899 28% 17% 
Feb. 1941 70,771 12,070 2,579 4,374 1,195 29% 17% 
Feb. 1942 60,348 11,225 1,966 3,312 2,082 31% 19% 
Feb. 1943 51,825 10,255 2,123 2,968 2,112 34% 20% 
Feb. 1944 43,864 9,295 1,742 2,643 1,513 35% 21% 
Feb. 1945 49,879 9,568 1,791 2,622 2,014 32% 19% 
Feb. 1946 48,484 8,682 1,765 2,469 2,166 31% 18% 
Feb. 1947 47,056 8,746 1,733 2,439 2,227 32% 19% 
Feb. 1948 50,030 7,107 1,913 2,067 2,124 26% 14% 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1939-49 
*.Note: There was considerable variation in the numbers paid Unemployment Assistance at certain times of the year due 
to the availability of seasonal work in rural Ireland. It is also not clear from the evidence whether or not the figures 
provided pertain to unemployed persons or unemployed persons and their dependents. 
 
Table 0.2 Total numbers of people in receipt of Home Assistance in Ireland as 
well as well as the combined total of Home Assistance and Unemployment 
Assistance recipients, 1939-45 
Home Assistance 
Total number of 
persons claiming 
HA & UA 
Mar. 1939 59,270 128,532 
Mar. 1940 67,244 150,349 
Mar. 1941 70,716 141,487 
Mar. 1942 62,076 122,424 
Mar. 1943 55,329 107,154 
Mar. 1944 56,316 100,180 
Mar. 1945 53,278 103,157 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 1939-
45; Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1939-46 
*.Figures for Home Assistance are for able-bodied persons and those temporarily disabled by sickness or accident along 
with their dependents. This table does not account for those in institutions, orphans, or those suffering from mental 
disorders all of which were also catered for under the Home Assistance scheme. 
The economic impacts of the Emergency plunged this section of the population 
into an acute state of poverty and welfare dependence, and it highlighted the awful 
conditions in which substantial sections of the population subsisted. The existence of 
tailored welfare measures and the establishment of voluntary welfare organisations such 
as the Catholic Social Service Conference (CSSC) suggest that the Emergency entailed 
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significant social impacts.
51
 The nature of such mechanisms will be illustrated with a 
view to determining their success. The ‘step together’ spirit, synonymous with 
volunteering for the emergency services such as the army and the Local Defence Force 
is also apparent in the activities of voluntary and philanthropic organisations which 
mobilised support and expanded their activities.
52
 The role that these voluntary 
organisations played, with particular attention to food, fuel, and clothing provision, will 
be examined in this thesis. The focus on voluntary welfare schemes both Catholic and 
non-denominational is intended to highlight the complexity of the Emergency with a 
view to offering an alternative narrative to that of coercion, inspection, and the black 
market. 
The impact of the Emergency upon levels of nutrition will be investigated. In 
Britain, the Second World War brought about an improvement in the nation’s diet and 
generated interest in the science of nutrition; this thesis aims to discover whether or not 
this trend was reflected in Ireland. Margaret Ó hÓgartaigh’s unsubstantiated assertion 
that during the Emergency there was a noticeable increase in concern about the links 
between malnutrition and illness will also be tested.
53
 
By extending the examination to the ‘Long Emergency’, this thesis posits that 
although the military, and diplomatic emergency may have ended following the 
cessation of hostilities in Europe in May 1945, as shortages and rationing continued 
beyond this date, so too did the Emergency in the popular sense. Post-war rationing is 
understudied; its significance has not been illustrated, and the severity or post-war 
austerity has not been acknowledged. This thesis aims to rectify this. 
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Sources and methodologies 
This thesis is based upon both qualitative and quantitative data brought together 
from a variety of sources. As suggested by John Tosh, ‘historical research is not a 
matter of identifying the authoritative source and then exploiting it for all it is worth’, 
instead the best practice is to amass all the evidence possible from as wide a range of 
sources as is available and is practical that are relevant to the question at hand.
54
 In 
doing so, the inaccuracies and distortions of particular sources are more likely to be 
revealed. Thus as all sources have their strengths and weaknesses, it is in cross-
referencing them against each other, as well as seeking to understand the context of 
their creation, that one is more likely to reveal the ‘historical truth’. It must also be 
noted that while much of the manuscript material used is not unique to this thesis, 
having viewed it through the prism of food, rationing and shortages, new insights have 
been obtained. 
The departmental papers held in the National Archives of Ireland and the various 
official publications kept in the National Library of Ireland represent the most important 
archival sources for this thesis. Papers created by the Departments of the Taoiseach, 
Foreign Affairs, Local Government and Public Health, and Supplies were consulted to 
provide a cross-departmental view of the Emergency. The Department of Industry and 
Commerce: Emergency Files which cover the period 1921-58 were particularly 
important to the thesis. Varied in content, the government papers provide crucial 
insights into how the government responded to the economic difficulties Ireland and its 
faced. Government surveys, inquiries, and reports demonstrate how the ordinary Irish 
citizen was affected by the Emergency. Likewise, associated letters, petitions, and 
surveys convey the grievances of interested parties. The state papers thus provide 
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valuable top-down as well as bottom-up windows through which to analyse the period. 
Although not subjected to censorship, one must be mindful of a bias in preservation. 
Paper rationing, the use of the telephone, and poor record keeping has left the record 
patchy in places. Certain files also appear to have been lost. Official government 
publications such as the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin and the Annual 
Report of the Department of Local Government and Public Health proved essential 
sources of official information. Typically rich in statistical data, such information was 
used to plot trends and allowed for comparison. This was of crucial importance to this 
thesis. 
The manuscript material generated by the Catholic Social Services Conference 
(CSSC) held primarily in the Dublin Diocesan Archive was valuable to the thesis but 
also presented problems. Within the documents, titles of departments and acronyms lack 
uniformity. What is referred to in the thesis (and the source material) as the welfare 
department is also called the maternity welfare department and the pre-natal and post-
natal welfare department. The use of varied terminology by the CSSC is reflective of an 
organisation in its infancy. 
The Irish parliamentary debates are a key source for this study. They are 
especially vital for the years during which censorship was in force. Due to censorship, 
the Dáil and Seanad became important public fora where censored issues could be 
raised. The parliamentary debates thus provide vital insights and are used to flesh out 
the censored sources. The way in which the parliamentary debates provide windows 
through which to view issues of international, national, and local significance is also 
beneficial to this study. Publications referenced by deputies in their contributions 
sometimes proved valuable; in general this sources-based approach to the material was 
pursued throughout the research. The frequency of reference to topics in the houses was 
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also used as a barometer of their political significance with certain issue having definite 
valley and trough periods. Ambiguity in references to weights and measures in deputy’s 
contributions can be problematic. One has to differentiate between statute and Irish 
acres when not stipulated in the debates. The lack of internationally standardised 
measurements for containers such as sacks and barrels also poses a problem. Cross-
referencing such figures with those provided in official publications can provide clarity. 
Extensive use throughout the thesis has been made of contemporary newspapers 
and periodicals. Daily and regional publications have been consulted in order to view 
the crisis from both national and local perspectives. Censorship however, diminishes the 
value of these sources. Introduced in September 1939, and not lifted until May 1945, the 
censorship forbade publication of any material which it was felt might jeopardise 
internal political stability. In the interest of ‘keeping the temperature down’, ‘articles 
which dealt with unemployment, emigration, poverty and hunger... described as 
‘atrocity stories and defeatism’ were often stopped by the censor’.55 While publications 
such as the Irish Times and The Torch were heavily censored, other publications seem 
to have enjoyed greater freedom of expression. The nature of the reporting in the 
regional press is perceptibly less sensitive. Similarly, the suffocating influence of the 
censors is less apparent in journal publications. Journals such as Studies, an Irish 
Quarterly Review; The Irish Journal of Medical Science; The Journal of the Statistical 
and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland; Irish Ambulance Gazette; and the Irish Red Cross 
Monthly Bulletin – in spite of their various distinctions – all offer important insights into 
life in Ireland during the Emergency. In any periodical, criticisms when levelled had to 
be discreet enough to pass the censor, but at the same time, to be effective, the message 
had to be obvious to the reader. Notable examples here are Dublin Opinion through its 
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use of the satirical cartoon and the more literary Bell magazine. Although some material 
may have slipped the censor’s net, paper rationing was another limiting factor which 
meant that the publications themselves were far less voluminous than those printed in 
peacetime. 
Thesis structure 
This thesis is primarily concerned with the period from 1939-48, but it also 
acknowledges the importance of historical precedent to the narrative and therefore 
certain relevant pre-war developments are highlighted at the beginning of Chapters I, III, 
IV and V. While the period from September 1939 to the end of the war is usually 
described as the ‘Emergency’, here, the term is also applied to those immediate post-
war years under examination. 
The thesis is divided into six chapters. The first considers the political, economic 
and legislative underpinnings of rationing. An illustration of Ireland’s special economic 
relationship with Britain within both the pre-war and wartime geopolitical context is 
provided with issues such as trade and shipping discussed. It also deals with the 
establishment of the Department of Supplies, and its precursor, the Emergency Supplies 
Branch. Chapter II explores the most significant shortages, their impacts and the 
government’s efforts to combat them. The socio-economic impacts of the Emergency 
heightened the importance of both government and voluntary welfare mechanisms. The 
role these played in the fight against privation will be discussed in chapter III. While the 
effects of rationing were experienced nationwide, suffering was greatest in Dublin. 
Chapter IV will therefore consider the response of the Catholic Church under the aegis 
of the Catholic Social Service Conference to austerity in the country’s capital. Through 
reference to infant and tuberculosis mortality, Chapter V will investigate the impact of 
the Emergency on nutritional standards. In order to give this material some context, 
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important pre-war advances in nutritional science will be illustrated as will the nature of 
the appreciation for the science in Ireland. The final chapter extends the analysis to the 
‘Long Emergency’ in order to examine rationing in its post-war context. The nature and 
impact of continued rationing will be discussed along with the significance of 
geopolitical and environmental factors. 
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Chapter I 
 
The practical, political, economic, and legislative underpinnings of rationing in 
Ireland 
 
Upon the outbreak of the Second World War, Ireland along with many other 
states (including the US) adopted a policy of neutrality.
1
 Ireland’s population was thus 
largely spared from the horrors of war. Neutrality, however, did not preserve Ireland 
from the economic, social and political consequences of the war. Ireland’s geographical 
proximity to and shared border with the UK along with her economic, historic and 
cultural ties to that country meant that the knock-on effects of the war were inescapable. 
In spite Ireland’s attainment of independence in 1922 and Fianna Fáil’s drive towards 
self sufficiency initiated ten years later, the country remained critically dependent on 
Britain for trade and shipping. Economically, Ireland was thus highly sensitive to 
external influences. This chapter will explore the following questions: In what way did 
Ireland’s historic, political, and economic relationship with Britain influence the Irish 
government’s preparations for the coming of war? To what extent was Ireland’s 
supplies position affected by the International context? 
Emergency Supplies Branch 
 
In the years preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, the Irish 
government began inquiring into the security of the country’s supplies position in the 
event of a European war. These inquires began in 1935 under the direction of Minister 
Frank Aiken, head of the Department of Defence. Bryce Evans illustrates how in 
November 1937: 
Lemass, other ministers, and high-ranking officials were informed by the British 
Food Department that ‘complete economic control’ would be exercised by the 
British government in the event of the outbreak of war, which would lead to the 
‘absence of a free market in the UK.2 
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This information led to the establishment of the Emergency Supplies Branch, a 
subsection of the Department of Industry and Commerce and the precursor to the 
Department of Supplies. The section proceeded to – among other things – encourage 
manufacturers and importers of essential goods to lay in at least six months’ reserve 
stocks as a security.
3
 Meetings to this end were held in September 1938 with 
representatives of organisations such as the Irish Flour Millers’ Association and the 
Irish Wholesale Tea Dealers’ Association, but they yielded limited results. Difficulties 
obtaining supplies of certain commodities were encountered while in some cases the 
commodities were unsuitable for lengthy storage.
4
 
The to-and-fro between the Emergency Supplies Branch and the Irish Flour 
Millers’ Association is typical of the problems the branch encountered in its efforts to 
encourage importers and manufacturers to stockpile essential materials. The millers 
were unwilling to bear the additional cost of building a reserve. Not only would the 
wheat have to be purchased, there was shipping, handling, and storage costs; regular 
‘turning’ while in storage was also necessary to prevent decay.5  Normally six to seven 
weeks’ supply was maintained by the millers at any one time, but the government 
sought the creation of a minimum six months’ reserve.6 The lack of storage space was 
the biggest problem, and the erection of new storage facilities would have been 
expensive. The millers wanted the government to cover the cost of the programme. 
They wanted guaranteed prices for their produce and insurance against loss while they 
argued that heavy purchasing would drive up prices for the consumer.
7
 The Irish 
Wholesale Tea Dealers’ Association was similarly resistant. Having regard to the 
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widespread consumption of tea, it was one of the first commodities to be brought under 
review by the Emergency Supplies Branch. Between September 1938 and August 1939 
representatives from the branch encouraged the Irish Wholesale Tea Dealers’ 
Association to increase its purchases and lay in stores. Like the millers, the tea 
merchants raised the question of compensation against potential losses. However, 
between September and the end of December 1938 total stocks actually decreased by 
2,000,000 lbs which showed a disregard for the wishes of the Department of Industry 
and Commerce.
8
  By the eve of the Emergency, the position had improved, albeit 
slightly, as fourteen weeks’ worth of a reserve was held in Ireland. 
In order to encourage Irish traders to establish stocks of essential supplies, the 
government arranged for credit to be offered by the banks to suitable cases. But this is 
where government aid ended as it was loath to provide securities to manufacturers who 
it had protected during the economic war.
9
 Lemass, Minister for Industry and 
Commerce was an interventionist by nature and is often depicted (justifiably) as the 
great moderniser, the maker of modern Ireland and the pivotal figure in the transition 
from the conservatism of de Valera’s Ireland to a more progressive and outward looking 
society.
10
 As such one might expect that he would have acted here, intervened, however 
he was not infallible. As demonstrated by Bryce Evans, the decision not to cede to the 
demands of the Irish traders was Lemass’ for he felt it was a matter of ‘patriotic duty’, 
and that the idea of granting securities to businesses he had helped nurture was 
unconscionable.
11
 Perhaps both parties should have met half way as was the case in 
                                                 
8
 Mr Maguire to John Leydon, Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce, 4 Mar. 1939 (NAI, 
INDC/EMR/5/25). 
9
 Memorandum as to the present position in regard to supplies of essential commodities, 24 Aug. 1939 
(NAI, INDC/EMR/5/1). 
10
 Brian Girvin and Gary Murphy, The Lemass era, politics and society in the Ireland of Seán Lemass 
(Dublin, 2005); Tom Garvin, Judging Lemass, the measure of the man (Dublin, 2009); John Horgan, Seán 
Lemass, the enigmatic patriot (Dublin, 1997). 
11
 Evans, Sean Lemass, p. 110. 
25 
 
Belgium. During the Munich Crisis, the Belgian government stored 40,000 tons of 
wheat at a cost of 4,000,000 Belgian Francs. However, as the crisis was averted, it did 
so at a loss of 200 francs per ton. In this case the loss was split fifty-fifty between the 
government and the millers.
12
 Critically, this reluctance to support the manufactures 
either rightly or wrongly hindered the stockpiling of essential supplies in Ireland. John 
Leydon, Secretary of the Department of Industry and Commerce, was also very aware 
of the political implications of the government financing with taxpayers’ money the 
stockpiling of reserves. In a letter to James McElligott, Secretary of the Department of 
Finance, he argued that: 
The public will put up with it at the hands of the traders much more readily than 
they would at the hands of the government. 
 
But added: 
 
If, however, we have been proceeding on a wrong assumption and if the 
Minister for Finance is prepared to provide the necessary funds, we can consider 
the matter again.
13
 
 
He knew that such expenditure would hardly find support from Finance. 
 
Munich Agreement, 1938 
 
Tempering the manufacturer’s enthusiasm and the government’s resolve for a 
scheme of stockpiling of essential commodities was the belief that the war could be 
avoided, but also that if it did take place it would be concluded quickly. Either scenario 
would make redundant large stockpiles of commodities leaving those who built them 
susceptible to loss. The idea that the war would be swift in nature was widely held. 
During the Anglo-Irish trade negotiations held in early 1938, the British Minister for 
Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, explained: 
What was expected from Germany, if that country became our opponent, was an 
attempt to force a decision by means of a short sharp war.
14
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The British Home Secretary, Samuel Hoare, remarked that the war would be ‘entirely 
different from that of 1914/18’ adding that ‘if Germany was involved she was expected 
to stake everything on bringing the war to an end within a few weeks or months.’15 A 
letter dated 24 May 1938 from Francis Cremins, permanent representative to the League 
of Nations, to Joseph Walsh, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs, reported 
on a conversation Cremins had in Geneva with a Polish delegate, M. Komarnicki. 
According to Cremins, Komarnicki did not expect an immediate war and he felt a 
peaceful settlement was still possible. The signing of the Munich Agreement, 30 
September 1938, reinforced the idea that war could be avoided. This act of appeasement 
allowed Hitler to annex the ethnically German Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia 
and was supported by the Irish government who believed in the principle of self 
determination.
16
 For Ireland domestically, the agreement engendered a false sense of 
security and did much to thwart the endeavours of the Emergency Supplies Branch to 
stockpile essential commodities. 
In January 1939, Michael Mac White, head of the Irish legation in Italy, 
communicated the sense he got of the international situation to Joseph Walsh. He noted 
that: 
Italy could not fight a long war and Germany is probably in the same situation. 
There are observers who are convinced that both these countries would be in the 
throes of a revolution within ninety days after the outbreak of hostilities.
17
 
 
MacWhite obviously did not rate the ability of Germany and Italy to wage war. 
Conversely, he felt France was in a better position stating: 
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The determined steps taken by France during the last fortnight have given the 
dictators food for reflection... the French have the only army in Europe that is 
ready for war. They have a strong reserve of material and munitions and their 
naval and air forces will be able to give a good account of themselves should the 
occasion arise. 
18
 
 
France had invested heavily in its defences during the inter-war period. The most 
striking example of this was the line of concrete fortresses, obstacles and weapons 
installations known as the Maginot Line constructed along its border with Germany. Put 
into this context Michael MacWhite’s opinion is unsurprising.  
Figure 1.1 British troops enter Fort de Sainghain, a fortification on the Maginot 
Line, 3 November 1939 
 
Source: Troops of 51st Highland Division march over a drawbridge into Fort de Sainghain on the Maginot Line, 3 
November 1939 (IWM, War Office Second World War Official Collection, O 227) 
 
Such information reinforced the idea that the war (if it broke out) would remain far 
away from Ireland. As tensions continued to build, the hope that the war might be 
avoided remained. Just days before the German invasion of Poland, Cremins reported 
back to Dublin: 
Practically everyone clings to the hope that, despite the measures which are 
being taken in Germany against Poland, and the counter-measures in other 
countries, the actual outbreak of war may even yet be avoided.
19
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A ‘quick war’ from which France and Britain were expected to emerge victorious was 
expected in Ireland and elsewhere. Such a war – contested on the European continent – 
it was thought, would be of little consequence for Ireland and the international trade she 
engaged in. This perception engendered a false sense of security among the government 
and those members of the business class who were responsible for importing essential 
supplies and manufactured goods into the country. This was to the absolute detriment of 
the country’s pre-war stockpiling efforts and was responsible for the lack thereof.  
Shipping 
 
During the revolutionary period, Sinn Féin prioritised the establishment of an 
Irish merchant navy.
20
 Yet, little was achieved in the period between independence and 
the start of the Second World War to make this aspiration a reality. During the Anglo-
Irish Trade War (1932-38), officials from the Department of Finance warned that the 
dispute was a threat to Ireland’s food supply, but their fears were ignored. Even when in 
1935-36 the leading company in the Irish shipping trade, the British and Irish Steam 
Packet Company (B&I) came up for sale, the Irish government declined its purchase.
21
 
Illustrative of the official attitude towards Irish shipping was the case of the Imperial 
Shipping Committee which Ireland first subscribed to in 1933. When the issue of 
continued membership was up for review in 1938, Lemass indicated that little positive 
advantage had been derived from the committee adding that it ‘may have some 
importance from the point of view of the development of aviation.’22  Even British 
Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain’s comment on 17 January 1938, during the Anglo-
Irish trade negotiations, that trade in a time of ‘crisis’ might ‘depend on the extent to 
                                                 
20
 Bryce Evans, ‘A semi-state archipelago without ships, Seán Lemass, economic policy and the absence 
of an Irish mercantile marine’ in Working Papers in History and Policy, no. 6 (2012), p. 3. 
21
 Ibid., pp 5-8. 
22
 Memorandum to the government by the Department of Industry and Commerce on continued 
membership of the Imperial Economic Committee and the Imperial Shipping Committee, 12 July 1938 
(NAI, DT/S9377). 
29 
 
which this country [will be] allowed facilities for submarine hunting’ seemed to fall on 
deaf ears.
23
 The government, informed by the precedent of the First World War, held 
too high an opinion of the value of Irish agricultural produce to Britain in a time of war. 
Cheap chartering rates in the interwar period and the easing of tensions following the 
1938 Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement enabled the government to continue on its path of 
blissful ignorance as far as shipping and stockpiling of supplies was concerned. 
As the war approached the potential repercussions of the neglect of Ireland’s 
shipping industry started to become clear. In early 1939, John Leydon, Assistant 
Secretary to the Department of Industry and Commerce, ordered the Emergency 
Supplies Branch to examine the extent of Ireland’s dependence on other countries in 
connection with imports, exports and shipping. The results made for sombre reading. In 
1938 there were 11,027 entries by vessels to Irish ports. Their aggregate net tonnage 
was 8,248,434 tons; this was the total shipping space required to carry Ireland’s imports 
and exports for 1938.
24
 Of these ships, thirty-two percent were of Irish nationality – 
meaning they were registered in Ireland – while thirty-seven percent were of British 
nationality. The figure of thirty-two percent included the British-owned vessels of the 
L.M. & S. Railway and the B&I Steam Packet companies. When these are removed, just 
five percent of the ships engaged in Ireland’s sea trade were actually Irish-owned, while 
sixty-four percent were British-owned.
25
 Ireland was also totally dependent on foreign 
shipping to carry bulk cargoes (wheat, maize, petrol, timber). Colliers were the most 
common vessels to ply their trade between the UK and the approximately 100 ports or 
creeks in Ireland.
26
 Only nine of the colliers were Irish-owned and their combined 
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tonnage was 1,884 tons. If they completed two trips weekly between the UK and Ireland 
they would have been capable of importing approximately 200,000 tons of coal to 
Ireland annually, but this represented just eight percent of normal requirements.
27
  
While Ireland strove for self-sufficiency, imported raw materials, manufactured 
goods and parts and machinery were vital to Ireland’s manufacturing and agricultural 
industries as well as the consumer market. As summarised internally in early 1939, 
Ireland was very much dependent on the UK. The combined value of Irish imports for 
1937 was £44,000,000, while the value of exports was £22,500,000; in 1938 
approximately fifty percent of Irish imports came from the UK while ninety percent of 
exports were destined for the UK market (see Table 1.1).
28
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Table 1.1 Source of Irish imports, and 
destination of Irish exports, 1938 
Imports 
Country of origin Percentage of 
total imports 
United Kingdom 50 
Belgium, Netherlands, 
France, Germany, Sweden, 
Russia (together) 11 
Canada & USA 11 
Argentina 5 
Australia 4 
India 4 
Other countries 15 
  
Exports 
Destination of Irish produce Percentage of 
total exports 
United Kingdom 90 
Germany 4 
USA 1 
Other countries 5 
Dependence on other countries in connection with 
essential imports, exports, and shipping, 19 Apr. 1939 
(NAI, INDC/EMR/8/89, pp 1-2) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 Quantity of imports 
to Ireland, 1937 
Commodity Tons 
    
Coal 2,562,999 
Wheat 324,395 
Maize 304,925 
Fertilisers 171,436 
Iron & steel 119,289 
Paper pulp, paper, 
cardboard, etc. 90,694 
Ores 39,878 
Cattle feeding stuffs 39,037 
Chemicals, etc. 35,973 
Salt 35,137 
Tea 11,273 
Aluminium, copper, 
lead, zinc, ect. 7,278 
Oil seeds, fats, etc. 7,115 
  Petroleum Oils Gallons 
    
Motor spirit 39,057,093 
Lamp oil 19,162,918 
Gas oil & Fuel oil 9,673,996 
Lubricating oil 2,645,902 
Dependence on other countries in connection 
with essential imports, exports, and shipping, 
19 Apr. 1939 (NAI, INDC/EMR/8/89, p. 3) 
The memo very clearly illustrated the precarious position in which Ireland would find 
herself in the event of war: 
If war should break out we are very largely at the mercy of other countries, and 
particularly of the United Kingdom, in respect of our external trade, and the 
economic activities of this country could in such circumstances be completely 
paralysed.
29
 
 
Despite the bluntness of the language employed it was not seen as necessary to rectify 
this position. During 1938-9 Leydon made several visits to London during which he 
was assured that Irish interests would be treated on the same basis as their British 
counterparts in relation to supplies and shipping.
30
 This served to reinforce the 
government’s inaction in terms of preparing for the coming of a potential war. 
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Following the outbreak of war, many of the foreign-owned vessels registered in 
Ireland switched over to the British registry putting themselves beyond the reach of the 
Irish government and into the service of Britain.
31
 This left Ireland with just fifty-six 
ships, but none of these were ocean-going vessels, but were instead designed for short 
sea trades such as those conducted between Ireland and Britain.
32
 On top of all of this, 
the British authorities refused from the outset to provide any British or British-
controlled tonnage for the shipment of ‘bulk cargoes’ despite the assurances given prior 
to the war.
33
 This did not pose too grave a problem during the Phoney War (September 
1939 to early May 1940) when shipping loses at sea were minor and neutral shipping 
was available for charter which further reinforced the lack of urgency about supplies 
and shipping.
34
 Although it was available, competition for this tonnage along with a 
whole host of other reasons related to the war such as the increased price of insurance 
ensured that this was no cheap enterprise. During early May 1940, trade negotiations 
were held between the Irish and British governments at the behest of the Irish. These 
talks were motivated by a desire to realise increased imports of fertilisers and animal 
feeding stuffs and to obtain a market for Irish agricultural produce at guaranteed prices. 
While the British would have paid almost any price for iron, copper and timber, they 
were not keen on importing Irish food and were adamant that they would not give 
Ireland prices for agricultural products equal to those they gave to their own farmers.
35
 
On shipping, the British proposed a scheme under their administration of amalgamated 
charters and combined purchasing of commodities in order to prevent competition for 
                                                 
31
 Frank Forde, The long watch, the history of the Irish Mercantile Marine in World War Two (Dublin, 
1981), p. 24. 
32
 Ibid., p. 1. 
33
 Report on difficulties encountered on outbreak of war, n.d., p. 1. 
34
 Mary E. Daly, The first department, a history of the Department of Agriculture (Dublin, 2002), p. 215. 
35
 Joseph P. Walsh to Eamon de Valera, 1 May 1940 (UCDA, P150/2571); Brian Girvin, The Emergency: 
neutral Ireland 1939-45 (Dublin, 2006), p. 162. 
33 
 
contracts, to lower prices, and to promote efficiency.
36
 The Irish government had little 
choice but to accept. Britain was increasingly tying down neutral shipping; following 
the invasion and fall of Norway, 8 April to 10 June 1940, a major source of neutral 
shipping previously available for charter was lost.
37
 Importantly, this agreement was 
made just prior to the Battle of France, 10 May to 22 June 1940 and the intensification 
of the war in Europe. As 1940 progressed, British attitudes towards Ireland hardened, 
exports of essential commodities were incrementally reduced and by the end of 1940 the 
Ministry of Shipping ceased to provide any charters to Ireland.
38
 Lemass considered this 
to be a ‘double cross’.39 
On 5 November 1939 US President, Franklin D. Roosevelt, signed a 
proclamation under the American Neutrality Act barring American ships from entering 
European waters north of Spain and south of Norway. This area became known as the 
combat zone. Pre-war trade with the US represented only a small fraction of Ireland’s 
total, therefore at first glance Ireland’s inclusion within the zone might seem marginal. 
In light of the war however, the value to Ireland of this source of trade would have 
increased considerably, especially considering the fact that many of the commodities 
imported from the US such as wheat and petrol were exactly the ones that were in short 
supply. Eamon de Valera therefore pressed the Irish legation in Washington to use 
whatever means were available to reverse the decision, also believing it would represent 
the fullest possible recognition by the United States of Irish neutrality.
40
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Figure 1.2 Map of the area into which US shipping was barred from sailing, 
known as the combat zone, 1939 
 
Source: New York Times, 5 Nov. 1939 
 
Even before the demarcation of the combat zone, Robert Brennan, head of the Irish 
legation in Washington, voiced his concern over the proposals emphasising Ireland’s 
neutral status and arguing that most of Ireland’s seaboard was removed from the centre 
of European hostilities.
41
 With total US trade to the larger neutrals inside the combat 
                                                 
41
 Robert Brennan to Cordell Hull, 25 Oct. 1939 (NAI, DFA 227/100). 
35 
 
zone (Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, and Sweden) amounting to more than 
$410,000,000 in 1938, this was obviously a decision that was not taken lightly.
42
 The 
US State Department justified the move on the basis of attacks within the area on US 
shipping and the fear that this might jeopardise US neutrality. Germany was also happy 
with Ireland’s inclusion fearing the transhipment of US munitions or other contraband 
through Ireland to Britain.
43
 Surprisingly, Ireland was the only neutral to express 
official concern at its inclusion, and the Irish legation’s representations received much 
publicity in the American press even making front page news on 13 November 1939 of 
Washington D.C.’s Evening Star. The legation made enough of an impression to have 
the request considered by the US Interdepartmental Neutrality Committee, but the 
committee ‘reluctantly’ came to the conclusion that Ireland could not be excluded.44 
The act was not repealed until November 1941, but this was of no consequence to 
Ireland’s supplies position.45 
After the fall of France on 22 June 1940, Britain’s position became increasingly 
desperate. The landscape of the war was completely changed. While the British 
Expeditionary Force escaped from France largely intact from a personnel point of view, 
it was forced to leave much of its equipment behind. Britain’s great modern army had 
been defeated. The Royal Navy also suffered substantial losses of armoured ships 
during the evacuation. During the inter-war period, Britain had invested heavily in air 
power and air defence.
46
 This helped the RAF to emerge victorious from the Battle of 
Britain, 10 July to 31 October 1940.
47
 The Blitz though can be counted as another 
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failure. From late 1940 to mid 1941, London and many other industrial centres and 
ports ‘were bombed with near impunity by the Germans’. 48  Night raids rendered 
Britain’s air defence system useless and at the same time German bombers were 
equipped with electronic navigation aids which enabled them to bomb their targets 
successfully.
49
 Luftwaffe bombers dropped some 58,702 tons of bombs on Britain 
during 1940-41.
50
 On the economic front, the Wehrmacht’s conquest of Western Europe 
isolated Britain from the European market and left the country dependent on long 
distance trade. German U-boats acted as ‘agents of economic warfare’ sinking millions 
of tons of British shipping which directly affected everyday life in Britain.
51
 166 Allied 
and neutral ships were sunk, damaged or captured by German U-boats in 1939, this 
figure increased to 564 in 1940 and only dropped slightly to 500 in 1941.
52
 During the 
course of the war, British owners lost the equivalent of 1,500 Liberty-ships at a loss of 
hundreds of millions of pounds. The British Merchant Navy suffered heavy losses 
losing about the same number of British seamen as the RAF did members of bomber 
command. Proportionately it lost a higher number of personnel than any of the armed 
services.
53
 The early setbacks conspired to dissipate the confidence Britain and her 
allies had exhibited prior to the war and during the ‘Phoney War’. All of this had a very 
real impact upon the nature of everyday life in Ireland during the Emergency. 
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Figure 1.3 Contemporary Irish school map of Europe (coloured in by a pupil), 
August 1941 
 
 Source: August 1941 (OLC, SJ/8/3, no. 1) 
 
For German U-boats, the occupation of the Biscay ports eliminated the long 
journeys to and from bases which doubled the number of U-boats in operational areas.
54
 
From 31 October 1940 to 2 January 1941, 157 allied and neutral vessels totalling 
682,338 tons were lost to enemy attack. Of this number, 114 ships (510,736 tons) were 
British.
55
 ‘By February 1941 Britain was losing ships three times as fast as the shipyards 
could build them’ and in 1940 alone almost 6,000 British, African and Indian seamen 
were lost at sea.
56
 In total, Britain lost approximately seven million dwt (deadweight 
tonnage), or thirty-six percent of its merchant fleet between June 1940 and December 
1941, a figure which does not take into account losses of neutral or Allied shipping 
under British control.
57
  In December 1940, Richard Mulcahy of Fine Gael noted:  
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A large number of sinkings are taking place up and around Malin Head. This 
apparently is the main stream of traffic. The next largest is a widespread area 
about two hundred miles of the Mayo coast.
58
 
 
During the course of the war, 857 or twenty-five percent of all Allied and neutral ships 
that were sunk, damaged or captured (together defined as “hits”) by German submarines 
were done so in grid references AL, AM, BE and BF (see Figure 1.4).
59
 299 or 
approximately nine percent of all ‘hits’ occurred in grid reference AM.60 Losses of the 
western and southern coasts of Ireland were heavier than in any other part of the world. 
Figure 1.4 The Kriegsmarine Grid System, 1939-45 
 
Source: ‘The grid system’, available at uboat.net, front page, the U-boats, the war in maps, 
(http://uboat.net/maps/grid.html) (20 January 2014) 
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In December 1940, Churchill stated: 
 
The decision for 1941 lies upon the seas.… It is... in shipping and in the power 
to transport across the oceans, particularly the Atlantic Ocean, that in 1941 the 
crunch of the whole war will be found.
61
 
 
Churchill was quick to blame the Atlantic losses on ‘the fact that we cannot use the 
south and west coast of Ireland to refuel our flotillas and aircraft.’62 In doing so he 
catapulted the issue of the ports and Irish neutrality into the public and political 
consciousness and an intensive anti-neutrality and anti-Irish propaganda campaign 
commenced both in Britain and the US. 
France’s capitulation left Britain reeling, the German Blitzkrieg there had been 
devastating and the country was overwhelmed by fears of invasion. The British 
government, military planners, and press looked nervously at Britain’s ‘backdoor’, 
Ireland. Neutral Ireland was considered to be a security threat to Britain. This was made 
clear to de Valera by Malcolm MacDonald, the former Dominions Secretary, over the 
course of several meetings they had during mid to late June 1940. MacDonald explained 
that the British government expected the poorly-trained and poorly-equipped Irish 
Army to be rapidly overrun following a German invasion with the result that Ireland 
could then be used as a launching pad to attack Britain.
63
 It was in this context that 
Britain attempted to bring Ireland into the war on the side of the Allies. MacDonald 
argued that Hitler who had already shown little regard for the neutrality of countries 
such as Belgium would have little regard for Ireland’s neutrality. He implored de Valera 
to act decisively in allowing the Royal Navy to secure the ports and the Army to 
establish defensive positions at strategic locations throughout the country. De Valera 
argued that any such move in the context of partition would be divisive for a people 
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united behind neutrality and would lead to the resurgence of the IRA. He also pointed 
out that such an alteration of neutrality would invite aggression from Germany for 
which Ireland was poorly prepared. According to MacDonald, de Valera noted that: 
Dublin was practically an undefended town; they had only a few anti-aircraft 
guns, there were not even any air raid shelters in the city and the people had not 
got gas masks.
64
 
 
Considering the destruction caused by Germany’s bombing of Belfast in the spring of 
1941, de Valera’s fears were well founded. 65  Then, on 27 June 1940, MacDonald 
presented a most astonishing document to de Valera which is indicative of Britain’s 
desperation at that moment in the war. Foremost among several proposals from the 
British government was that: 
The United Kingdom would make a declaration forthwith accepting the 
principle of a United Ireland.
66
 
 
In previous meetings MacDonald had argued the point that the union would be best 
sealed by ‘comradeship in arms’ and co-operation on matters of joint concern would be 
a firm step in the direction of a united Ireland.
67
 However de Valera was unconvinced 
by this vague offer and opted to reject the proposal. 
It is true that Britain’s wish to use the ports became a vital element in Anglo-
Irish relations during the war, particularly so after the fall of France, and it was very 
much tied up in the wider issue of Irish neutrality. Bases in Ireland would have allowed 
Britain to project its forces farther out into the Atlantic in order to protect its convoys. 
Even before America’s entry into the war, Robert Brennan, head of the Irish legation in 
Washington reported that the typical opinion of the ‘man on the street’ was that Britain 
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should have Ireland’s ports.68 There were those who felt the ports should be seized by 
force such as the Prime Minister of South Africa, Jan Smuts.
69
 Seizing the ports would 
have been a relatively simple exercise, Britain’s military, naval and air superiority 
would have ensured this. Though as Maffey latter pointed out: 
We must remember, in assessing the disadvantages we shall incur from an 
Ireland split into violent factions, from the opening of many doors to sabotage 
and espionage and from a long coast line and a sky no longer held in friendly 
surveillance.
70
 
 
A British violation of Irish neutrality would have incited public opinion in Ireland 
against Britain. The Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Viscount Cranborne, 
explained that it would ‘not be very edifying’ and that it would ‘arouse a considerable 
opposition among Irish elements in the United States’.71 In Ireland it would turn the 
people and the government towards the IRA, and worse still might provide an invitation 
to Germany. 1916 illustrated how damaging unrest in Ireland could be while military 
operations in Ireland during 1920-21 had proved extremely difficult to conduct.
72
 If 
German forces were to move into Ireland with Irish support, dislodging them would 
have been more difficult. To prevent this, it was suggested that after capturing the ports 
a ‘measure of control over the greater part of the country’ would be required 
necessitating a commitment of about ten divisions.
73
 
Cranborne and Maffey appreciated the value of a neutral Ireland. Intervention in 
Ireland would have drained resources, holding Ireland even more so. On the other hand, 
in neutral Ireland the IRA was under control. The Irish intelligence service, G2, 
exchanged information with their British counterparts. There was a confidential 
working relationship between the British and Irish military commands which provided 
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joint plans to meet a German attack upon Ireland. The Irish coast watching service 
notified the British of sightings of German aircraft and submarines. Most importantly, 
neutral Ireland existed as a source of manpower for both Britain’s labour and armed 
forces.
74
 It was widely accepted, even by Churchill, that to obtain Ireland’s ports, the 
use of force should be a last resort.
75
 Having failed to persuade Ireland to end neutrality 
and enter the war on the side of the Allies, the British War Cabinet altered its approach. 
It was proposed that Britain would subsidise Irish fat cattle exports to the tune of 
£500,000 annually in return for transhipment and storage facilities in Ireland. Tempting 
though this proposal may have been, on 24 August 1940 the Irish government rejected it 
not wishing to incur German reprisals.
76
 The belief in Ireland that Irish agricultural 
produce and the Irish market was indispensible to Britain reinforced the immovable 
position of the Irish negotiators. 
In light of Ireland’s steadfast determination not to allow Britain access to the 
ports (for military or even transhipment purposes), the British government’s attitude to 
Ireland hardened.  On 22 November 1940 Viscount Cranborne forwarded a 
memorandum to Churchill which had been sent to the Dominions Office by Maffey. 
According to Cranborne it was:  
Written by a man who Maffey describes as a hundred percent Irishman who was 
a rebel and who certainly believes what he says.
77
 
 
Crucially, this man suggested of Ireland that: 
 
 No country in the world will react more readily to economic pressure.
78
 
 
This unidentified person argued that if Britain took a ‘firm line’ with Ireland by 
restricting trade, massive unemployment would result which would alienate de Valera’s 
                                                 
74
 Maffey, Memorandum on Irish policy, 2 Feb. 1942, p. 2. 
75
 Girvin, The Emergency, p. 173. 
76
 Viscount Cranborne, Trade relations with Éire, 20 Nov. 1940 (TNA, CAB/67/8/104, p. 304). 
77
 Viscount Cranborne, Memorandum to Winston Churchill, 22 Nov. 1940 (TNA, CAB/16/14/2, p. 9). 
78
 Memorandum, n.d. (suspected Nov. 1940), (TNA, CAB/16/14/2, p. 10). 
43 
 
support base and ruin his reputation.
79
 The next day Churchill instructed the Minister of 
Food, Lord Woolton to illustrate the effect upon Britain of cutting off Irish supplies of 
food ‘for say six months.’80 Responding three days later on the 26 November 1940, 
Woolton indicated that reduced trade with Ireland would free up shipping space and 
reduce port congestion in Liverpool. While Woolton conceded that such a course would 
have only a slight impact upon the British meat ration, he concluded: 
I believe that such a step would profoundly disturb Irish agriculture during the 
next three months as to render negotiations possible... on our terms.
81
 
 
According to Cranborne, the Irish people were 
 
Living in a world of illusion. They consider that a prosperous Éire is 
indispensible to Britain. They think that their products are essential to our 
existence, and that we are bound, in our own interest, to protect their trade, to 
keep them fat.
82
 
 
The Irish government’s pursuit of favourable terms of trade for Irish agriculture while 
resolutely refusing to budge on Irish neutrality or the ports is evidence of this. 
Cranborne suggested that:  
Quietly, unostentatiously, without any public declaration of policy, we should 
employ every method within our power to keep her lean.
83
 
 
Through such a policy Cranborne argued that Ireland could be brought to her knees 
within a matter of months.
84
 
Churchill was particularly vexed when on 3 December 1940 the Irish 
government banned all warships from entering Irish ports, a move which in reality was 
aimed solely at the British. Lambasting this he stated: 
Nine-tenths of her imports and exports are carried in British-controlled ships 
under protection of British warships and at considerable sacrifice and 
inconvenience to ourselves.
85
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Indeed some forty British-controlled ships of 8,000 tons each were then engaged 
exclusively in shipping bulk cargoes to Ireland.
86
 In addition, much of Ireland’s trade 
passed through British ports which added to congestion in those ports. Writing to US 
President Roosevelt on 13 December 1941, Churchill indicated that due to her own 
troubles that Britain would be unable to carry on favourable trade with Ireland. Careful 
not to portray this shift in relations as a policy of economic sanctions, he requested 
Roosevelt’s opinion on the matter.87 On 2 January 1941, the War Cabinet agreed to 
impose what Cranborne had earlier described as a set of ‘silent sanctions’ upon 
Ireland.
88
 Exports to Ireland of food, animal feeding-stuffs, fertilisers, agricultural and 
other machinery, spare parts, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, electrical 
goods, and paper and cardboard would henceforth be subject to licences.
89
  However, 
these licences were to be withheld by the departments concerned. Exports of food were 
not to be cut off all at once; rather they were to be subject to a policy of ‘gradual 
diminution.’90 Although a calculated policy, it was not to be revealed as such. Instead, 
the press was to be informed that the government viewed the measures with regret and 
that they were taken because the ‘pressure on our own shipping space was so severe.’91 
It was also decided that Britain would cease to charter ships to Ireland; however, Ireland 
would be made free to charter neutral shipping. At the same time, the Norwegians and 
Greeks were informed that they should not charter ships except to the Allies or ‘co-
operators.’92 Thus Ireland was effectively barred from chartering any ships. Again this 
was to be justified on the grounds of Britain’s own shipping difficulties with particular 
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reference to ‘the increasing toll on shipping by reason of enemy action.’93 This was a 
win-win situation for Britain, for as Churchill acknowledged: 
Whether or not economic pressure leads to naval and air bases or induces in Eire 
a greater spirit of co-operation we still stand to gain. In depriving Eire of 
shipping, we not only increase our own carrying capacity, but relieve our 
western ports of the transhipment of Éire cargoes. Moreover, less of our convoy 
effort will be wasted on unproductive shipping.
94
 
 
Britain’s shipping losses have often been singled out as motivation for its 
government’s hardening attitude towards Ireland. For example, Dwyer cites Churchill’s 
correspondence with Roosevelt of 8 December 1940 in which the Prime Minister 
depicted the Royal Navy as being stretched to its limit due to their lack of bases in 
Ireland.
95
 This was merely a smokescreen, an excuse to justify the impending restriction 
on trade to Ireland. The War Cabinet had repeatedly demonstrated its sensitivities to 
Irish opinion in the US.
96
 Mounting shipping losses were also highlighted in the British 
and American press which soured public sentiment towards Ireland.
97
 According to 
Clair Wills: 
The Atlantic battle had a profound effect on Britain’s war capabilities, and also 
on Britain’s attitude to Ireland during the war.98 
 
While the second part of this statement is sound, the first part is questionable. In fact 
recent research has demonstrated that the British economy performed very well during 
the war. This would suggest that the Battle of the Atlantic did not have the crippling 
effect upon Britain as is often suggested. Weir shows that in spite of falling imports 
both domestic and military production as well as calorie consumption increased during 
the war. Weir states: 
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The German submarine blockade was responsible for only a small fraction of the 
already small impact of lost imports on British war production.
99
 
  
David Edgerton explains: 
 
Although there were great Allied losses at sea... the British Isles were never 
seriously under siege by U-boats; it is quite inappropriate to think of Britain as 
having been blockaded, even though this is the impression that could be got 
from some of the literature.
100
 
 
While the British-flagged and British-owned fleet never recovered from the losses 
sustained during the war, the tonnage controlled by the British actually increased. ‘In 
the case of tankers British-controlled DWT increased from five million in late 1939 to 
no less than 6.8 million by September 1941.’101 Replacements were on hand from the 
neutrals and the US. As illustrated by Weir and others, Britain’s shipping performance 
was limited by factors other than the effects of U-boats on merchant shipping. 
Of crucial importance to the way Britain approached the war was the air of 
uncertainty, dashed confidence and lost initiative that consumed both military and 
domestic planning following the fall of France. 
The estimates of Britain's shipping prospects were peculiarly susceptible to the 
uncertainties that pervaded life in the summer and autumn of 1940. The enemy 
powers held the initiative. Would they concentrate their attacks against shipping? 
Where and in what numbers would U-boats, E-boats, aircraft and surface raiders 
attack? Where would mines be sown? How heavy and prolonged would the 
strain on the Royal Navy be? Would the east coast ports be immobilised and the 
west coast ports bombed? What new military demands for shipping would arise? 
What new help in ships and crews would come from the countries overrun by 
the Germans?
102
 
 
These uncertainties made it extremely tricky to determine even roughly the quantity of 
shipping at Britain’s disposal, or its likely performance. Italy’s entry into the war on 10 
June 1940 complicated matters further, as it effectively closed the Mediterranean to 
Allied vessels. With the extension of the conflict to North Africa, men and material 
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destined for this theatre had to make the 20,000 kilometre journey around the Cape of 
Good Hope and up the Red Sea. Refrigerated ships which normally carried frozen meat 
and dairy products were among the fastest merchant vessels and were thus withdrawn 
from shipping civilian cargoes and converted into troop carriers in order to quickly ferry 
troops to their destinations.
103
 Throughout the war British planners consistently 
overestimated the necessary level of stocks Britain required.
104
 All of this increased 
competition for tonnage between civilian and military planners and in this context it is 
unsurprising that Britain became unwilling to facilitate Irish trade as she had done in 
normal times. 
Convoying also reduced the performance of British shipping. During the First 
World War the British realised that losses were reduced when ships sailed in convoy. 
As a result the British Admiralty immediately introduced convoying upon the outbreak 
of the Second World War, but this strategy had its drawbacks. Convoys had to travel at 
the speed of the slowest ship in the group and ships were often inconveniently re-routed 
in order to join a convoy. Insufficiency of escorts made evasive routing a principle 
means of defence which also kept ships longer at sea.
105
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Figure 1.5 A British convoy under the protection of Royal Air Force 
coastal command, 1943 
 
Source: 1943 (IWM, Air Ministry Second World War Official Collection, C 2644) 
 
The global nature of the conflict stretched the British Navy. It was necessary to keep 
sufficient forces in the home waters for defence against invasion, but British naval 
vessels were required all over the world in order to defend the empire. This meant that 
convoys became fewer and larger in order to economise on escorts, but in consequence 
ships had to travel longer distances to and wait for longer periods at convoy assembly 
points. 
 The most significant factor which inhibited shipping performance was 
congestion in Britain’s ports. The ports on Britain’s eastern and southern seaboards 
were closed, proximity to German naval and air bases made them susceptible to attack. 
Their closure however placed immense pressure on the ports on the western seaboard 
such as those on the Mersey and Clyde rivers. The diversion meant that every west 
coast port began to receive cargoes in much higher quantities than was normal. The 
discharge of unfamiliar cargoes tried port facilities; convoys arriving in bunches didn’t 
49 
 
help matters either, and on top of all of this the western ports were subject to heavy 
bombing.  
Figure 1.6 Aerial view of a portion of Liverpool’s waterfront showing extensive 
damage to the commercial area, 1940-45 
 
Source: Aerial Reconnaissance view of Liverpool, Great Britain, n.d. (IWM, Air Ministry Second World War Official 
Collection, C 5428) 
 
The quays became blocked where imports lay about due to lack of storage and transport. 
Diversion to the western ports completely dislocated the normal channels of distribution. 
Prior to the war less than twelve percent of Liverpool’s imports were distributed by rail, 
this increased to over forty percent by 1944. Normally more than half Britain’s meat 
imports were shipped to London which possessed the bulk of cold storage 
accommodation. However refrigerated vans now had to be employed to transport the 
meat to London, and what’s more, the storage facilities in London were designed to be 
fed from the waterfront.
106
 Transport and storage problems prevented ships discharging 
their cargoes which lengthened turnaround times. Large blocks of tonnage were also 
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immobilised under repair as a result of enemy action which further congested the 
ports.
107
  
The shipping problems in Britain meant the British government sought Ireland’s 
ports not only with defence in mind, but with an eye to transhipment facilities to relieve 
congestion in its own ports. During one discussion in late 1940 on a proposed trade 
agreement, the Department of Foreign Affairs was informed that there could be no 
agreement unless there was transhipment.
108
 The comments made at a dinner on 22 
April 1941 held in the American legation and attended by several Irish ministers 
including Lemass, demonstrates how important Irish transhipment facilities were 
considered to be. One Thomas Campbell, an American expert on wheat and transport 
and friend of President Roosevelt claimed: 
 Transportation was the greatest problem before Great Britain. 
 
Going on to add that he would advise Roosevelt that: 
 
The best way to bring stuff to England was to land it at the south-western tip of 
Ireland. This could be done without infringing Ireland’s neutrality.109 
 
This the Department of External Affairs argued that this was unacceptable to Ireland as 
it was thought it would have a negative impact upon Ireland’s relationship with 
Germany and thus lead to the end of neutrality.
110
 However, Sweden – another 
European country which remained neutral throughout the war – on several occasions 
allowed Germany to move war materials and men across its territory, an act which was 
not considered a breach of neutrality.
111
 
Britain’s shipping problems extended beyond the losses caused by enemy action. 
With ships spending longer at sea, and ships spending longer at port, there was an 
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alarming decline in shipping performance. Hancock and Gowing, authors of British war 
economy (published in 1949) stated: 
The shipping positions had been foremost among the anxieties that had beset the 
British Government in the months between Dunkirk and Pearl Harbour. 
 
It was crucial for Britain to adequately allocate shipping space between military and 
civilian requirements while at the same time endeavouring to make the most economical 
use of it. This was a problem for Ireland, and one that would unravel from mid 1940 
onwards. Even before the fall of France, Joseph Walsh informed de Valera that the 
British were less keen to buy food than any other commodity.
112
 Britain concentrated on 
importing dense foods; bulky cattle and other expensive Irish agricultural produce were 
simply not high on the list of priorities for Britain’s Ministry of Food. 113 A high 
percentage of Ireland’s imports were essential supplies which could not be produced 
domestically. For the most part these goods were first imported to Britain, and then re-
exported to Ireland. However re-exporting imports was not an economical use of 
shipping space and so it was reduced to a ‘negligible fraction of total imports during 
World War II.’114 Importing from the nearest source was not always possible; Britain 
was forced to take imports from destinations to which her ships carried military supplies. 
‘Economies that looked valuable in terms of distance often did not [always] fit 
conveniently into the existing pattern of ship-routing.’115 
Political and strategic considerations dominated Britain’s decision to turn the 
economic screw on Ireland, yet it is also clear that practical reasons figured into this 
decision making process. In a letter which predated Britain’s decision to pursue the 
policy ‘silent sanctions’, Fredrick Boland, Assistant Secretary to the Department of 
Foreign Affairs demonstrated that he understood that Britain’s reduced trade with 
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Ireland was out of necessity for Britain. Writing on 19 September 1940 to H. C. Brady, 
Private Secretary to the Minister of Defence, he explained: 
The British have had already to reduce their purchases of cattle and sheep from 
this country, owing to the interruption of transport, distribution, and other 
facilities. That a similar measure has been imposed on their own producers 
indicates that the British action is the result of sheer physical necessity.
116
 
 
Similarly, in October 1940 John Leydon, Secretary of the Department of Supplies was 
informed by a E. W. Ravenshear of the British Mines Department that: 
The partial suspension of house coal shipments to Éire is due solely to internal 
transport difficulties in Great Britain.
117
 
 
Both these incidents occurred while Britain remained on cordial terms with Ireland. In 
January 1941, John Dulanty, the Irish High Commissioner in London in a letter to 
Joseph Walsh illustrated some of the difficulties being faced by the governments in 
Britain’s dominions. According to Dulanty, South Africa had been promised 30,000 
tons of shipping for its fruit trade, but it received just 10,000. Britain had promised to 
take 140,000 tons of meat from New Zealand each year, but they took just a third of this 
in 1940 while their petrol ration was below that of Britain. Likewise, fifteen ships 
normally engaged in trade between Australia and Britain were withdrawn ‘with the 
result that their canned food and their wine industries had been ‘completely 
torpedoed’.118 At the same time Dulanty noted that the meat ration in Britain was totally 
inadequate even when available. The Dominion’s troubles further masked Britain’s true 
intention towards Ireland, but that they existed illustrates that the Allie’s trade 
infrastructure was indeed under pressure. The Bengal famine in which 3,000,000 
Indians died is another case in point; the British government were hostile to Indian 
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requests for aid knowing that it would consume shipping space meant for the war effort 
and the British home front.
119
  
Irish Shipping Limited 
 
In Ireland, the deteriorating supplies position forced the government to address 
the issue of shipping and so on 21 March 1941 Irish Shipping Limited, a centrally 
controlled company, was founded.
120
 The primary goal of the company was to obtain 
cargo vessels capable of making deep-sea voyages.
121
 Yet, as a result of the war, there 
was a massive global increase in the ‘demand for ships regardless of their condition, 
while speculation led to inflation of prices’.122 In fact 167 ships from various sources 
were inspected by the company with a view to purchase but just fifteen vessels of 
various sorts totalling 46,255 tons were actually obtained.
123
 Due to market pressures it 
simply was a case of having to take whatever could be got and so the condition and 
quality of these ships often left much to be desired. Once acquired it was far from plain 
sailing for the vessels and crews of Irish Shipping. The poor quality ships were 
punished by the harsh North Atlantic weather; malfunctions were common and they 
constantly needed repair. This along with the difficulties finding steel and spare parts 
necessary for maintenance work lengthened turnaround times.
124
 In April 1941, press 
reports on a strike by Dublin dockers in solidarity with the dismissed crew of the Irish 
Elm were censored on the request of the Department of Supplies. The Department felt it 
was not in the public interest’ to allow publicity to claims about the unseaworthiness of 
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Irish ships.’ 125  The vessels also faced the threat of belligerent activity. They were 
strafed by machine gun fire from belligerent aircraft and two vessels, the Irish Pine and 
the Irish Oak were torpedoed and sunk. In total 138 lives were lost aboard the 
company’s ships during the course of the Emergency.126 Initially, Irish ships had sailed 
in Allied convoys but in the process they came under attack. So in early 1942 it was 
decided that Irish ships would be better off making their own way. Unlike belligerent 
merchant ships, Irish Shipping vessels sailed brightly lit at night and were painted with 
highly visible neutrality insignia, the most prominent being the words EIRE painted in 
bold white lettering and the tricolour. 
Figure 1.7 The Irish Pine (5,621 tons) with its Irish neutrality insignia clearly 
displayed, 1941-2 
 
Source: Frank Forde, The long watch, the history of the Irish Mercantile Marine in World War Two, (Dublin, 1981). p. 
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In an attempt to ensure their safe passage, neutral vessels were allocated particular 
shipping lanes through otherwise dangerous waters.  These lanes, however, were a far 
cry from the most direct routes and so journey times were lengthened which further 
reduced the productivity of the fleet.
127
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Irish Shipping Ltd was a vital asset to neutral Ireland. A section of the 
Department of Supplies was dedicated to its management as it was imperative to make 
the best possible use of the small fleet. Annual inter-departmental conferences were 
held each September (once information was available as to harvest prospects) in order 
to consider the issue of shipping in relation to the supplies position. Importers applied to 
the Department of Supplies for shipping space and applications were considered on the 
merit of a priority list drawn up at the annual conference.
128
 By April 1941 the wheat 
position had become so acute that its importation took precedence over all other 
supplies. By 9 July 1941 however, Irish Shipping had secured nine ships for the fleet, a 
greater number than expected, and so on this date the priorities list was re-evaluated.
129
 
Ministers were encouraged to refrain from making any public statements about the 
provision of shipping space for any particular commodity as such statements would 
inevitably give rise to an undue optimism on the part of the public. The censors were 
also asked to withhold reports on the arrival of cargoes.
130
 While the Irish government 
sought to make the best use of its plucky little fleet, the Allies aimed to keep it down. 
From August 1940, it was required that merchant vessels possess warrants to pass 
through Allied waters and to enter Allied ports. These controls were introduced to 
ensure that any shipping not under Allied control would be restrained from engaging in 
trade detrimental to the war effort. Warrants were granted to Irish ships on the Irish 
register at the time the system was introduced. 
Thereafter warrants were procured for ships which Irish Shipping Ltd. wished to 
acquire, only with the utmost difficulty and much concession.
131
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In September 1941 it was found that the Ministry of Shipping was refusing outright to 
grant warrants for any vessels Irish Shipping wished to purchase such as Norwegian, 
Italian and German ships tied up in Mediterranean ports. However, the Portuguese were 
granted warrants for a number of ships in similar circumstances.
132
 
The Department of Supplies 
 
On 1 September 1939 German forces crossed the Polish border. Two days later 
on 3 September both Britain and France, allies of Poland, declared war on Germany 
plunging the European continent into war. Back in Ireland, two days previously both the 
Dáil and Seanad were summoned by telegram to an emergency meeting on 2 
September.
133
 The next day Eamon De Valera declared in the Dáil that: 
Arising out of the armed conflict now taking place in Europe, a national 
emergency exists affecting the vital interests of the State.
134
  
 
As a result of this declaration, the constitution was amended to provide that ‘time of war’ 
included war in which Ireland was not actually a belligerent.
135
 This recognised that a 
regional war would affect the vital interests of the state.  On the following day, Sunday 
3 September 1939, the Emergency Powers Act was passed. First drafted in September 
1938 and entitled ‘The Defence of the State (Emergency Powers) Act’, it was enacted 
by the government in order to: 
Make provision for securing the public safety and the preservation of the state in 
time of war and, in particular, to make provision for the maintenance of public 
order and for the provision and control of supplies and services essential to the 
life of the community.
136
 
 
The act was wide in scope and granted the government dictatorial like powers that were 
unprecedented in the history of the Irish state. The government was empowered to make 
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an emergency order when ever and so often as it saw fit. Considered necessary ‘for 
securing the public safety... [and] for the preservation of the state’, it was argued that 
the wide scope was needed as it was ‘impossible to foresee all the circumstances that 
may arise... during the progress of a European war.’137  The act provided for the ‘control, 
regulation, restriction, or prohibition of the import or of the export of particular kinds or 
classes of goods.’138 It granted powers to control and regulate land, currency, shipping, 
aircraft, travel, and the courts. It enabled censorship and empowered the authorities to 
search, arrest, and detain without warrant.  The Emergency Powers Act remained in 
force until 2 September 1946.
139
 
To meet the problems created by the war, the government hurriedly assembled a 
cabinet emergency committee to streamline decision making.
140
 Two new ministries 
were established; one to deal with issues concerning defence and the other with supplies. 
Frank Aiken was given charge of the newly created Department of the Co-ordination of 
Defensive Measures.
141
 The Emergency Supplies Branch, originally a subsection of the 
Department of Industry and Commerce was ‘upgraded to a department of state.’142 Seán 
Lemass was moved from his post as Minister for the Department of Industry and 
Commerce and was appointed Minister for Supplies. Created on 8 September 1939 
under the Ministers and Secretaries (Amendment) Act, 1939, the department’s remit 
was wide ranging.  It was made responsible for the regulation, control, maintenance, 
and provision of supplies and services considered essential to the life of the 
community.
143
 The department was ‘empowered to control the prices, import and export 
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of all commodities’ and was permitted to dictate the ‘methods of treatment, keeping, 
storage, movement, distribution, sale, purchase, use and consumption of all goods.’144 
Lemass recognised that: 
The most immediate difficulty that will arise for this country is that of 
maintaining supplies and it is evident that some of these difficulties will be 
incapable of being overcome... It will be the responsibility of the Government to 
try to minimise that effect of a European war upon our people, but it will not be 
possible to avoid it altogether.
145
 
 
At this point however Lemass deemed it unnecessary to introduce a rationing system 
arguing: 
It is impossible to be definite on that matter because no one can foresee the way 
a European war will develop, or the extent to which it will interfere-with the 
normal communications, or with the normal supplies of the country. We have 
only had experience of one European war, and inevitably our minds tend to 
conceive the conduct of this war as following closely upon the conduct of the 
last war. That may prove to be an entirely fallacious assumption.
146
 
 
In spite of Lemass’ declaration, the government allowed its decision making process to 
be informed by historical precedent. The high opinion it held of the importance of Irish 
agricultural produce to Britain in a time of war allowed it to take a complacent attitude 
towards supplies. It was thought that Irish agricultural produce could be used as a 
bargaining chip in trade discussion with Britain, but this assumption proved to be false. 
The inextricably linked issue of shipping, another matter which came under the remit of 
Lemass was treated with the same degree of complacency. This complacency was in 
part engendered by the wide availability of neutral shipping for charter during the early 
months of the war. Particularly damaging to the efforts of the Emergency Supplies 
Branch to encourage the country’s manufactures and importers of essential goods to 
establish reserve stocks was Lemass’ refusal to offer them securities. He simply did not 
want to offer such incentives to the very businesses he had previously helped to nurture 
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feeling that it was a matter of ‘patriotic duty’.147 As demonstrated here and elsewhere, 
this way of thinking predominated through the pre-war years, into the period of the war 
known as the ‘Phoney War’ and right into the latter months of 1940. 148  This 
miscalculation aside, the Department of Supplies would remain in existence until the 1 
August 1945 when it was abolished and its functions transferred to the Department of 
Industry and Commerce with Lemass becoming minister for the said department.
149
 
Amid complaints of profiteering, on 7 September 1939, the day prior to the 
establishment of the Department of Supplies, the Emergency Powers (Control of Prices) 
(No. 1) Order was passed.
150
 This was in effect a stand-still order which froze the price 
at which certain commodities could be sold by manufacturers, producers, and 
wholesalers or retailers by limiting the maximum retail price of the commodity to that 
of the 26 August 1939.
151
 The commodities to which the order applied to were regarded 
as being essential goods, those that were in everyday use.
152
 Introduced as a means to 
prevent rapid inflation, the original order would be amended many times throughout the 
Emergency and subsequent post-war years as it became necessary to bring additional 
items under control and to adjust the price of items already under control. 
Responsibility for the administration of the price control machinery along with the 
power to pass prices orders was vested in the Minister for Supplies, Seán Lemass.
153
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Price control machinery in the form of the Prices Commission had been in existence in 
Ireland since 1932, a product of the Anglo-Irish Trade War. The former Prices 
Commission would become the nucleus of the Prices Division of the Department of 
Supplies.
154
 The stage was soon reached when all commodities were exempted from the 
original order, and were made subject to the control of specific orders which regulated 
the price of the commodity on an individual basis. The plethora of prices orders were 
confusing to follow for consumer and trader alike, so a second all-encompassing stand-
still order was introduced in June 1944.
155
 As regards enforcement, the government first 
and foremost relied on the public to report infringements of the prices orders. Though, 
under-counter dealings must have been fuelled by the fact that it was not made an 
offence to purchase goods in excess of the maximum retail price. In addition, a corps of 
sixty plain clothes inspectors operated throughout the country while the Garda Síochána 
were also tasked with reporting violations.
156
 Although no substitute for a coherent 
rationing framework, it was a clear effort to ensure equitable distribu4tion. 
Ireland’s historic, political, and economic relationship with Britain conditioned 
the nature of the government’s preparations for the coming of the Second World War. 
Anglo-Irish relations consumed the government during the pre-war years while 
delusions concerning the perceived value of Irish agriculture to Britain (informed by 
historical precedent) lulled Ireland’s economic planners into a false sense of security 
which was ultimately to the country’s detriment. Indeed the story of Ireland’s 
Emergency can be viewed as a series of miscalculations. It was widely assumed that the 
war would be a sharp one in which the Allies would not be seriously threatened. The 
fall of France however, and its knock-on-effects, coupled with the unexpected length of 
the conflict seriously wrong-footed Ireland’s economic planners. The war showed how 
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Britain’s shipping problems were of consequence to Ireland, a reality which was 
brought home to the Irish people by Britain’s policy of ‘silent sanctions’. While 
diplomatic motives were undoubtedly the cornerstone of this policy, it is also clear that 
the British government was motivated by practical considerations. Ireland’s supplies 
position can been seen as being tied to the Allies’ fortunes during the Second World 
War and thus very much a part of the international context. Through the use of the 
allegory of Plato’s Cave, F.S.L. Lyons created the impression that Ireland and its 
population were largely unaffected by the Second World War and as a result the social 
history of the period has been largely neglected. Yet the shortages experienced in 
Ireland were an everyday expression of the country’s position within a war torn world. 
In spite of neutrality, Ireland was massively dependant on British trade and was totally 
affected by the war that waged around her. Neutrality may have spared Ireland from the 
worst horrors of war, but as will be shown in the following chapters, the shortages 
experienced fostered many social ills which in turn demanded a response. 
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Chapter II 
 
Shortages and rationing in Ireland, 1939-45 
 
We always seem to be late – we were late with coal and tea – and we are not 
keeping ahead of things. 
Mr Jesop, Chairman of the Dublin Chambers of Commerce, Irish Times, 26 Feb. 1941. 
 
In the days immediately following the start of the Second World War, the Irish 
government, anticipating economic dislocation on a global scale, created the 
Department of Supplies. It also appointed the Minister for Supplies, Seán Lemass, and a 
scheme of price control was put into effect. These initiatives were taken to maintain 
‘supplies and services essential to the life of the community’.1 This however, proved to 
be just the tip of the iceberg. As the Emergency progressed, Ireland’s supplies position 
grew worse, especially after the fall of France on 22 June 1940. It then became 
necessary to institute additional controls (including a rationing framework) to meet the 
supplies crisis as even basic essentials – food, clothing and fuel – became scarce. This 
chapter will explore the most important of these controls and will consider the following 
questions. What impact did rationing controls have upon life in Emergency Ireland?  
What were the most critical shortages, and how successfully were they ameliorated by 
the government? Rationing controls were introduced to ensure the equitable distribution 
of scarce commodities, so to what extent was the population’s experience of rationing 
uniform? 
Price control was an integral part of the rationing framework. However, 
shortages, the rising price of imports, shipping costs, along with the necessity of 
maintaining domestic agricultural and industrial production made it impossible to 
preserve prices at their pre-war levels. Within the short period from August 1939 to 
February 1941, the cost-of-living rose from 173 to 218 points (from a base of 100 at 
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July 1914), an increase of forty-five points or twenty-six percent (see Figure 2.8). 
Frequent appeals were made to the government for a scheme of national registration, the 
prerequisite of a coherent rationing system. Comprehensive rationing, it was hoped, 
would ensure equitable distribution and offset the impact of inflation. The Minister for 
Supplies, Seán Lemass, was against the introduction of wholesale rationing, believing a 
nationwide voluntary curtailment of consumption would suffice.
2
 Lemass argued that 
such a scheme would be prohibitively expensive. Unfortunately, the deficiencies of the 
ad hoc system of rationing implemented in the early years of the Emergency were felt 
most keenly by the poor.
3
 This situation was highlighted in the ‘Housewives’ Petition’, 
signed by 640 women and delivered to the government on the eve of the budget, 5 May 
1941.
4
 The petition was drafted by a group of young Dublin housewives led by Hilda 
Tweedy (1911-2005). Tweedy was an activist for women’s rights and consumer affairs 
and later would become the joint honorary secretary of the Irish Housewives’ 
Association upon its founding in 1942.
5
 Among the recommendations were the national 
registration of essential foodstuffs and the implementation of an efficient rationing 
scheme.
6
 The housewives were of the opinion that only serious rationing would 
safeguard the lot of the poorer people.
7
 This view was echoed in an editorial in The 
Standard, a weekly newspaper which reflected the attitudes of the Catholic Church.
8
 
The publicity generated by the petition coupled with complaints of shortages, 
profiteering, and hoarding eventually led the government to carry out a scheme of 
national registration. 
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National Registration 
 
The foundation of the rationing system was the national register, compiled by 
the Statistics Branch of the Department of Industry and Commerce with the aid of over 
3,500 members of An Garda Síochána. ‘Registration night’ took place on 16 November 
1941.
9
 The full name, address, date of birth, sex, and conjugal condition of each person 
resident in the county on that night was recorded, this information being deemed a 
sufficient basis to institute a general scheme of rationing.
10
 As it was thought the 
preparation and issue of approximately 3,000,000 ration books would be a difficult task, 
the decision to undertake it was postponed for as long as possible.
11
 By early 1942 
however, as the supplies crisis deepened, it became clear that a formal scheme of 
rationing would have to be introduced and so the writing of the ration books was begun. 
The Hospitals’ Trust was given the contract worth £17,000 to the write the ration books 
within an eight-week period.
12
 As it was not known over what period and in respect of 
what commodities rationing would be necessary, the coupons of the ration books were 
marked with letters and numbers. The books were completed and delivered to 
households by the end of May 1942 with an explanatory leaflet concerning their use.
13
 
In 1943 a fresh register of population was carried out in order to minimise fraudulent 
applications and a second issue of ration books that were larger and designed to last 
longer than the 1942 issue was carried out in April 1944. 
Petrol 
 
Before the Emergency, petrol consumption in Ireland was growing rapidly with 
imports increasing by 5,500,000 gallons between 1936 and 1938. For the year ending 31 
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August 1939 Irish petrol consumption totalled 50,000,000 gallons, 44,500,000 gallons 
of which was imported directly from Britain.
14
 Following the outbreak of the war, petrol 
rationing was introduced to Ireland in October 1939. Retailers and motorists wishing to 
obtain supplies were forced to register with the Department of Supplies. For private 
motorists, the ration was fixed at twelve gallons per month for a vehicle of ten h.p. 
which was almost twice the amount of the British ration.
15
 This generous ration was 
maintained until the beginning of January 1941 and was made possible due to the fact 
that in 1940 Ireland received almost two-thirds her normal supply.
16
 An appreciation for 
the liberal petrol ration can be seen in an Irish Times editorial of 10 January 1941 which 
stated: 
Although for some time past petrol has been rationed, the motorists in Éire have 
been far better off in respect of supplies than those of any other country in 
Europe. Visitors to Ireland have been astonished at the density of private motor 
traffic on our roads; and it hardly is too much to say that, despite the official 
rationing of petrol, nine motorists out of ten scarcely have felt the pinch.
17
 
 
This situation was made possible in 1938 when seven 14,000 dwt German built tankers 
registered under the Irish flag in the ownership of Liffey Transport and Trading Co. Ltd 
and entered into the Irish petrol supply trade.
18
 When the war broke out, the Irish 
government allowed these ships to switch to the British registry on the understanding 
that they would continue the transit of petrol to Ireland.
19
 In late December 1940, as the 
British government’s attitude towards Ireland hardened, Dublin was informed that in 
spite of the previous agreement, the delivery of petrol supplies would be cut back.
20
 On 
a side note, the existence of large stocks of petrol in Ireland would have provided a 
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logistical advantage to the Germans in the event they invaded the country. This may 
also have factored into British thinking.  
With the petrol supply uncertain, Lemass prohibited its delivery to retailers; 
petrol pumps throughout the country ran dry. Motorists who had made their way to 
Dublin from the country for Christmas were reportedly left stranded in the city; their 
petrol coupons could not be honoured.
21
 Then on 1 January 1941, 1,000,000 gallons of 
petrol were delivered to Ireland on account of desperate appeals made by Lemass to the 
British Petrol Control.
22
 The shipment enabled Lemass to fix the ration for private 
motorists of an eight h.p. vehicle at one gallon per coupon or eight gallons per month.
23
 
This was, as Bryce Evans illustrates: 
A serious underestimation of demand and an overestimation of the extent to 
which people adhered to his orders. The Irish Press reported that garages were 
openly defying the order by offering one and a half gallons per coupon. Three 
days later stocks were exhausted.
24
 
 
On 9 January 1941 Lemass reduced the ration to a quarter gallon per coupon, or two 
gallons per month with a gallon of petrol costing the motorist 2s. 2d.
25
 Provision was 
also made to grant special allowances to vehicle owners whose work was considered 
essential to the community. Priests, doctors, midwives, vets, and members of the 
Oireachtas all received a twelve-gallon monthly ration.
26
 Taxi and commercial goods 
vehicle drivers were also granted a preferential allowance.
27
  
Private motorists were hit worst by the order; the two gallon ration was useless 
and effectively put them off the road. Worse still was the way in which the ration was 
cut without prior warning. Many motorists were left aggrieved, especially those who 
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had purchased their motor licences for 1941 which in light of the new ration were 
practically worthless.
28
 Even when on 29 April 1941 the ration was raised to four 
gallons per month, it brought little satisfaction.
29
 Irish business was also adversely 
affected by the petrol shortage and almost immediately, garages and mechanics were 
forced to make do with reduced trade.
30
 The rigidity of the petrol rationing scheme and 
its supplementary allowances were criticised, but Lemass felt it would be impractical to 
examine the circumstances of individual cases.
31
 The flat rate severely curtailed the 
medical service, largely confining doctors to the towns; in rural areas the prevalence of 
diseases like diphtheria increased as children went unimmunised.
32
 Dispensary doctors 
and general practitioners received the same allowance as their counterparts who were 
employed in hospitals and who never had to leave the building on account of their 
employment. Similarly, clergy were entitled to the same allowance whether they served 
large rural or the geographically smaller but more densely populated urban parishes. 
The flat rate imposed upon commercial goods vehicle drivers contributed to shortages 
in rural areas as drivers attempted to make the most economical use of their ration. 
Sport was affected by the difficulties of road travel and the GAA’s National League and 
National competitions were suspended.
33
 The League of Ireland provincial football 
clubs and junior clubs throughout the country were hit particularly badly.
34
 Sport in 
Emergency Ireland became a much more local affair. Even the defence forces were 
hampered by the fuel shortage as personnel were often forced to use bicycles for 
transport (see Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1 Members of the Irish Defence Forces with bicycles parade on 
O’Connell Street, Dublin, 1939-45 
 
Source: Hanley photographic collection, n.d. (MA, 090/005) 
 
Some private motorists tried to circumvent the domestic rationing order by 
converting their cars and vehicles into commercial vehicles. Allowances to these 
persons were suspended unless they could prove that their vehicles were engaged in 
essential work.
35
 Others had their vehicles fitted with gas propulsion equipment which 
relied on coal and charcoal fuel. This practice was objected to in the ‘Housewives’ 
Petition’ and it was soon banned in light of the coal shortage.36 In April 1942 private 
motoring was finally forbidden and it was made illegal for commercial vehicles to carry 
passengers.
37
 Thus travel by bicycle and horse became common once more. As Clair 
Wills describes:  
In some areas stagecoaches were resurrected, such as the service between 
Limerick and Rathkeale which began operating in May 1942.
38
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While many countries were engaged in an increasingly technological war, Ireland was 
returning to the eighteenth century in so far as transport was concerned. 
Figure 2.2 The implications of the petrol shortage as depicted in Dublin Opinion, 
1941 
 
 Source: Dublin Opinion, Apr. 1941, p. 29; Dublin Opinion, Mar. 1941, p. 6 
 
 Instead of accumulating a petrol reserve following the outbreak of the war, 
motorists were granted a liberal ration. This made necessary the imposition of the severe 
1941 ration and its eventual withdrawal in 1942; in 1941 Ireland secured just forty 
percent of normal requirements.
39
 Along with rationing, the government urged economy 
in the use of petrol. The supplementary allowance granted to those who provided 
essential services along with those engaged in commercial driving were granted on the 
condition that it wouldn’t be used for private motoring. Leading by example, Taoiseach 
Eamon de Valera took to walking to church on Sunday mornings.
40
 In spite of rationing 
and the shortage of petrol, the presence of private vehicles on the roads and at public 
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places was widely reported.
41
 Those who had been granted supplementary allowances 
were clearly ignoring government orders. Then there was a rampant black market where 
according to Dr O’Higgins, Fine Gael Deputy for Laois-Offaly, ‘oceans of petrol’ could 
be bought and sold. O’Higgins felt this was in some way due to the forgery and the 
illegal sale of official coupons.
42
 The problem lay in the flat rate ration for commercial 
goods vehicle drivers: 
Any man who has a lorry had merely to say “turf” and, once he said “turf”, 
coupons were issued.
43
 
 
O’Higgins also blamed: 
 
 Bogus lorry owners... bogus timber men [and] bogus hackney men.
44
 
 
Depending on the size and horsepower of their vehicles, these drivers obtained 
anywhere between twenty and sixty gallons of petrol monthly. Yet no account was 
taken of the distances they intended to travel or of the mileages they actually clocked up. 
This left the system wide open to abuse and abused it was with the dishonest lorry 
driver flogging any fuel he had to spare. So aggrieved was O’Higgins that he moved to 
have a select committee appointed by the Dáil that would have the power to: 
Investigate and report on the position of the petrol supply, the basis of the 
present distribution of petrol, and to make recommendations.
45
  
 
This motion was defeated. 
 
 By May 1942 the petrol supply position had deteriorated to the extent that it 
became necessary to remove all non-essential private vehicles from the road. After 
private motoring was banned the basic allowance in respect of commercial goods 
vehicles was reduced by twenty-five percent and the granting of supplementary 
allowances restricted. Commercial travellers, drapers, painters, electricians, live-stock 
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dealers, plumbers, touring cinemas, hawkers, and travelling shops to name but a few 
were all put off the road.
46
 At the same time special provision was made for vehicles 
engaged in the transit of essential commodities. The Controlled Area Scheme was 
another initiative introduced to economise on fuel. Pioneered in north county Mayo, it 
involved the suspension of supplementary allowances to privately-owned commercial 
goods vehicles. The responsibility for the transit of essential commodities to and from 
the railheads was transferred to the Great Southern Railway (GSR) Company. So 
successful was the scheme in North Mayo that it was extended to the entire county 
along with counties Clare, Galway, Kerry, Leitrim, Limerick, Offaly, and Westmeath.
47
 
While this was a setback for the private hauliers, the insufficient petrol imports (see 
Table 2.1) necessitated this drastic measure. 
 Table 2.1 Petrol imports (gallons) to Ireland, 1939-45 
Year 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Gallons 44,500,000 32,250,000 18,000,000 13,000,000 9,250,000 13,500,000 15,500,000 
 Source: History of motor spirit rationing, 1952 (INDC/EMR/7/28, p. 1) 
 
After the introduction of the 1942 economies, little alteration was made to the petrol 
rationing scheme until imports began to improve in late 1945. 
Coal and turf 
 
Prior to the Emergency, Ireland burned approximately 2,500,000 tons of coal 
and 3,500,000 tons of turf annually.
48
 While turf was produced domestically, an average 
of just 200,000 tons of coal was mined in Ireland every year with the remainder 
imported from Britain.
49
 Within Ireland, there was a roughly fifty-fifty split between 
industrial and domestic use of coal.
50
 Coal was preferred to turf in industry as it was 
more compact and had a higher calorific value, it fuelled Irish trains and was used by 
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the gas companies to carbonise gas. In 1939, 120,000 out of 140,000 households in the 
city of Dublin had a gas supply.
51
 Paraffin and candles provided lighting throughout the 
country with electric lighting common in the larger urban areas.  
On 5 September 1939, just two days after the outbreak of the war, the Dublin 
Coal Office was forced to close at 1p.m. as a result of panic buying; by 11 September 
1939 the price of coal had increased by fifty percent.
52
 This was a worrisome trend and 
its price was quickly fixed at its pre-war level. However, as Ireland relied on British 
coal, the government in reality had very little control over the price the Irish consumer 
was forced to pay. The price for a stone of coal increased from 4½d. in 1939 to 6¼d. in 
early 1941.
53
 As the price rose there was a corresponding decline in the quality of the 
imported coal. The coal Britain exported to Ireland was reject coal and often contained 
more than fifty percent duff (fine coal or slack) which was difficult to burn.
54
 The poor 
quality of Emergency coal was alluded to in the May 1941 edition of Dublin Opinion 
(see Figure 2.3). 
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Figure 2.3 A satirical image from Dublin Opinion depicting a man who used 
‘Emergency coal’ to put out a house fire, 1941 
 
 Source: Dublin Opinion, May 1941, p. 55 
This inferior coal was reportedly responsible for several near-lethal gas explosions in 
the Dublin gasworks one of which caused damage estimated at £10,000.
55
 Price 
increases affected the urban poor and their meagre budgets most of all, but aside from 
this Ireland did not experience a shortage of coal until the start of 1941. In a similar 
fashion to petrol, the British government began reducing exports of coal to Ireland in 
late 1940 which forced the Department of Supplies to introduce coal rationing on the 25 
January 1941.
56
 Under the Emergency Powers (Sale of Coal) Order, 1941 the ration was 
fixed at half a ton per month per household and it was made mandatory for consumers 
to register with a single fuel merchant that was licensed by the government. In early 
1941 the semi-state company Fuel Importers Éire was also established and given sole 
licence to import coal to Ireland. It was hoped this would obviate competition for 
limited supplies and thus keep prices down. 
 
                                                 
55
 W. J. Grey to John Leydon, n.d. (suspected April to May 1941), (NAI, DFA/P 23/1). 
56
 E. W. Ravenshear to John Leydon, 28 Sept. 1940 (NAI, DFA/P 23/1); ITJSB (1941), p. 13. 
74 
 
 Table 2.2 Coal imports (tons) to Ireland, 1938-45 
Type of 
coal 
Year 
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Household 1,570,841 1,854,075 1,624,211 483,773 53,333 7,545 2,169 9,473 
Anthracite 79,325 83,413 92,434 81,797 83,818 87,546 16,052 22,229 
Gas 301,820 309,329 337,870 230,466 155,462 156,487 119,363 205,612 
Steam 534,379 622,956 702,803 691,747 756,023 763,793 597,070 683,259 
Total 2,486,365 2,869,773 2,757,318 1,487,783 1,048,636 1,015,371 734,654 920,573 
 Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from: Trade and Shipping Statistics, 1938-45 
 
On 5 February 1941 the Slievardagh coal deposit in County Tipperary was brought into 
production, but Ireland’s minimal coal deposits left little scope for further 
development.
57
 The shortage of pit pipes, timber and other equipment were also 
obstacles to the development of untapped deposits or existing mines such as those at 
Arigna and Castlecomer.
58
 As early as the spring of 1940 the Turf Development Board 
(TDB), established in 1934, began encouraging the public to produce turf.
59
 The 
deteriorating coal position however forced the government to get serious about turf with 
de Valera announcing in 1941 that an extra 3,000,000 tons would have to be cut to 
secure Ireland’s fuel needs.60 Hugo Flinn, Parliamentary Secretary for the Department 
of Finance was given the charge of the TDB and was made responsible for the 
development of native fuels.
61
 He became known as the ‘Fuel Controller’ and his 
primary directive was to encourage the production of turf by any means. The TDB had 
been engaged in the research and development of mechanised peat production since its 
establishment. Although the projects proved expensive and achieved limited success, 
the TDB’s operations at Turraun County Offaly, Clonsast County Offaly, and 
Lullymore County Kildare were earmarked for expansion.  
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On 25 March 1941, Emergency Powers (No. 73) Order, 1941 was passed. This 
granted the local authorities compulsory powers to acquire, work and let turf banks. 
They were entitled to both cut turf (called national turf) for their own use (in county 
institutions) and to sell it to others.
62
 Counties such as Louth which had long ceased to 
be considered turf-producing areas were required to look to the bogs for their needs.
63
 
Provision was also made for an arbitration procedure to determine compensation. The 
control of these schemes was appointed to the county surveyors and was supervised by 
the Department of Local Government and Public Health.
64
 The decentralisation of turf 
cutting into the hands of the county councils mirrored how the country would have been 
administered more generally in the event of invasion or a serious dislocation of 
transportation. While best placed to produce turf in their localities, granting this power 
to the local authorities also had a major drawback. Even though the aim of the scheme 
was to produce as much turf as possible, they were careful to keep costs down and avoid 
unnecessary risks.
65
 Producing over 700,000 tons of national turf in 1941, their output 
would subsequently decline due to labour and transport difficulties (See Table 2.2). 
Table 2.3 Quantity of turf produced by and number of persons employed in 
Ireland's county council turf schemes, 1941-43 
Year Production Peak numbers 
employed 
1941 700,000 34,000 
1942 550,000 26,000 
1943 417,000 22,000 
Table created by Ciarán Bryan using data from: Memo from the Department of Supplies to the Taoiseach, 11 Sept. 1943 
(NAI, TAOIS/97/9/408); Donal Clarke, Brown Gold, a history of Bord na Móna and the peat industry in Ireland (Dublin, 
2010), p. 54 
 
The other side of the campaign was aimed at the production of hand-won turf by private 
producers, businesses, voluntary bodies, parish councils, and families residing in the 
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vicinity of bog land who normally purchased their fuel. These classes of fuel consumer 
were granted turbary rights, encouraged to become self sufficient in their fuel needs, 
and were guaranteed a market for any surplus they produced. The Featherbed blanket 
bog located in the Dublin Mountains was reportedly transformed into a hive of activity 
as Dubliners from diverse backgrounds and occupations worked side-by-side and 
helped each other to secure their fuel needs.
66
 Private turf production in the Dublin 
Mountains averaged about 8,000 tons annually.
67
 The army was also employed in turf-
cutting operations (see Figure 2.4) and large numbers of soldiers spent their ‘summer 
months under canvas on the bogs.’68 The turf scheme was also viewed as a means of 
generating badly-needed employment. 
Figure 2.4 A group of Irish soldiers cutting turf, 1941-45 
 
 Source: Hanley photographic collection, n.d. (MA, 090/019) 
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In June 1941 the country was divided into turf and non-turf areas.
69
 In the turf 
area which accounted for eighty-seven percent of the land and contained sixty-five 
percent of the population, the sale of coal for domestic use was banned.
70
 As turf is 
bulky and difficult to transport the initial distribution plan was based on the general 
premise that the turf-producing counties would rely on turf, while imports of coal would 
be reserved for the non-turf area. By July it became apparent that imported coal supplies 
would be insufficient to maintain the non-turf area and the scheme was re-evaluated.
71
 
Despite the sale of coal being banned in the turf area, the fuel ration for the non-turf 
area was fixed at a paltry quarter of a ton of coal or a half ton of turf per household per 
month.
72
  
The expansion of turf production in 1941 was a success. By early May there was 
approximately 5,000 employed on the county council schemes. This increased to 30,000 
by July along with a further 15,000 under the auspices of parish councils, businesses, 
voluntary organisations and the army.
73
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Figure 2.5 ‘Turf-cutters from the city’ removing turf from the bog by 
lorry as depicted in Dublin Opinion, 1941 
 
  Source: Dublin Opinion, July 1941, p. 103 
Average production of hand-won turf per man employed was estimated at thirty tons.
74
 
At the peak turf cutting season, approximately 946 bogs were being cut under the 
county council schemes.
75
 It was in counties on the western seaboard such as Kerry that 
the bulk of the surplus turf was produced, but herein was a problem. Special turf trains 
were commissioned to transport turf from the turf area to the non-turf area. The 
principle routes were from the west to Dublin, Kerry to Cork, and Clonsast in Offaly to 
Waterford and Wexford.
76
 Road transport was also availed off and at its peak 2,800 
lorries including 500 army lorries were involved in turf haulage. Transporting turf was 
expensive. The price for turf in the non-turf area, originally fixed at forty-five shillings, 
was increased to sixty-four shillings on 1 November 1941 for the remainder of the 
war.
77
 
Weather wise, 1941 was an exceptionally good year for saving turf; the amount 
of labour available was just about sufficient; although transport was a problem it was 
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not insurmountable and there was a certain patriotic enthusiasm for turf. As a result the 
non-turf area was sufficiently supplied for the 1941-42 winter and an iron ration 
(reserve stock) was established. The position was considered so favourable that the turf 
ration was increased to one ton per month in April 1942, although the sale of coal for 
domestic use was banned.
78
 During 1941, in the region of 900,000 tons of turf were 
moved by lorry within the turf area consuming some 700,000 gallons of petrol in the 
process.
79
 But as the petrol situation deteriorated, this proved to be unsustainable. 
Similarly, the lack of good quality coal crippled the trains; it reportedly took one train 
twenty hours to travel from Cork to Dublin.
80
 In 1941 turf lorries were fitted with gas 
producer equipment, but the coal shortage hindered these too.
81
 Up until September 
1941 an average of 2,000 tons of turf were transported to the non-turf area daily.
82
 
Hereafter this sum declined, and the fact that turf had to compete with other 
commodities (namely sugar beet, wheat and coal) for wagon space on the railways 
exacerbated the problem. As a result of the transport difficulties faced in 1942, turf 
cutting operations in the remoter bog-lands such as those in West Galway, West Kerry 
and the Belmullet area of County Mayo were curtailed and sometimes halted. Donegal’s 
county council scheme was completely stopped owing to the amount of 1941 turf that 
was left deteriorating on the bogs right into 1942.
83
  
Greater use of Ireland’s canal infrastructure was proposed as a solution to the 
transport problem. To this end the government financed the construction of twenty-nine 
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horse-drawn barges called G-boats which were capable of carrying a load of forty-five 
tons (see Figure 2.6).
84
 
Figure 2.6 G-boat no. 9 being transported through Barrack Street, Carlow, 1941-
45 
 
Source: ‘G-Boats’ in Inland Waterway News, 30(4), (2003), p. 1 
 
This fleet together with the existing private hauliers transported in the region of 40,000 
to 50,000 tons of turf from the turf area to Dublin annually between 1941-45.
85
 Beyond 
this, further expansion was impossible due to the limits of the canal system. Robert 
Tweedy, husband of the activist Hilda Tweedy, proposed the creation of ‘road trains’ 
improvised from the chassis of unused cars mounted with turf crates to be hauled by 
tractors and lorries. This he argued was the only ‘practical’ way of getting the turf to 
Dublin, though considering the nature of Ireland’s roads, the poor access to the bogs, 
the lack of spare parts, this idea seems rather impractical.  Not only did transporting turf 
become difficult, but so too did getting to the bogs. The rubber shortage and the 
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resulting dearth of bicycle tyres made sure of this.
86
 Throughout the Emergency there 
was very much more turf available in the turf areas than there was transport to carry it to 
where it was needed. 
Turf schemes were plagued by labour problems, and as early as 1941 Hugo 
Flinn identified this as being the chief difficulty facing the turf drive.
87
 The TDB’s 
midland bog schemes relied upon labour attracted from other parts of the country, the 
majority of whom were unemployed and from Dublin and the west. This necessitated 
the erection of camps to accommodate the workers. Conditions at the camps however 
were a cause of discontent, as one worker stated: 
I’ve worked most places… and I may tell you, when I came here I was most 
surprised... it’s little short of slavery.88 
 
While the newly-erected accommodation was reasonable, the pay was considered too 
low and the food inadequate. In May 1941 Hugo recommended the minimum wage for 
turf workers be raised to 34s. for a forty-eight hour week, but this was ignored.
89
  In 
Edenderry, the weak tea and insufficient bread ration were the main causes for 
complaint. Transport to and from the bogs was also an issue for the Edenderry workers; 
the men were expected to make a twelve mile round-trip by bicycle daily on top of a 
twelve-hour backbreaking shift.
90
 This sort of commute was common to turf workers 
throughout the country. Many of the Dublin recruits were not up to the task, the work 
itself was hard, the countryside was alien, they were used to eating bread and not 
potatoes, and as a result many of them lasted less than a week taking the first train home 
they could. For the people of Edenderry, the Dubliners were an unwelcome addition to 
the area. The local parish priest Fr Killian described how when a group of them came 
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into the town one evening they used rude language and insulted passersby including 
girls and young women. On the other hand he felt the behaviour of the Galway and 
Mayo recruits was beyond reproach.
91
  
After the initial enthusiasm shown for turf cutting in 1941, labour proved 
difficult to retain and as word of the bad working conditions spread it proved equally 
difficult to attract new recruits. In light of the lucrative employment opportunities 
available in Britain, men with turf and agricultural experience were emigrating. These 
factors created a shortage of labour for the government schemes. In May 1942, in an 
attempt to stop the rot, an emigration embargo was placed upon men with three or more 
months’ agricultural work experience.92 Juvenile and female labour was employed for 
the lighter work in order to make up the deficit.
93
 In spite of this, the number employed 
in turf schemes fell as did the yields. Roscommon County Council had 300 fewer 
workers in 1941 than 1942 and Sligo County Council employed 962 in June 1942 as 
compared with 1,344 the previous year.
94
 In 1943 Tipperary County Council announced 
that due to labour shortages it could produce only enough turf for the requirements of its 
institutions.
95
 Robert Tweedy suggested that an extra 60,000 men were needed and that 
these could be sourced from the unemployed. This was hardly a revelatory idea, but 
such labour was often found to be unsuitable. However Tweedy’s recommendation that 
every unemployed man and youth should be restored to ‘able-bodied condition’ via 
‘special feeding’ is revealing of both the poor state of the unemployed as well as a 
growing appreciation for the social application of nutritional science (this last point will 
                                                 
91
 Ibid., p. 1. 
92
 Employment in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1 May 1942 (NAI, TAOIS/ S 13029 A, p. 1). 
93
 DLGPH, Report, 1942-3, pp 33. 
94
 Mary E. Daly, The buffer state, historical roots of the Department of the Environment (Dublin, 1997), p. 
266. 
95
 Nenagh Guardian, 22 May 1943. 
83 
 
be discussed in greater detail in the following chapters).
96
 In 1944, labour shortages 
eased in light of the travel restrictions imposed by the British government in preparation 
for the D-Day landings.
97
 
Figure 2.7 Turf cutting at Annaverna, County Louth, 1930-50 
 
 Source: Turf cutting, Annaverna, Co. Louth, 1930-50 (NLI, Valentine Photographic Collection, VAL 8428) 
 
In 1939 and 1940 Ireland secured above-average imports of coal to the 
combined sum of 760,000 tons; those in a position to do so laid in stocks. By the end of 
1942 there were approximately 200,000 registered turf consumers in the non-turf area. 
Based on the half ton ration re-implemented in June 1942, this necessitated a supply of 
92,000 tons per month. In reality, however, average consumption stood around 40,000 
tons per month.
98
 With just 1,300 tons of turf transported daily to Dublin during the 
harvest, had the full ration been drawn, the supply and more precisely the transport 
system would have been unable to keep pace.
99
 As the Emergency progressed, private 
stocks of fuel ran out and this coupled with gas and electricity rationing increased the 
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demand for turf. For those houses without either a gas or electricity supply, the half-ton 
ration was a meagre one.
100
 Though for the inhabitants of the non-turf area their biggest 
complaint was due not to a lack of supply, but consistently due to the quality of the turf 
they were expected to burn. The long strait in the Phoenix Park constituted Dublin’s 
central fuel dump where the turf was stored in ricks or clamps to keep it dry; the strait 
itself became known as the ‘New Bog Road.’ 101  From this fuel dump and others 
distributed throughout the city, the larger fuel merchants and the bellmen (smaller fuel 
merchants) drew their supply. These dumps were established in urban areas throughout 
the country but their location was often a source of contention. Galway’s Eyre Square 
dump, established in 1941, was relocated to the outskirts the city in late 1943 as a result 
of complaints made about the loss of Galway Race Week revenue.
102
  
When a sod of turf is cut it has a moisture content of about ninety percent; 
before it can be removed from the bog it must be laid out to dry, turned, and then 
stacked (footed) to further aid drying. A combination of bad weather and time 
constraints meant that the turf often didn’t get sufficient drying time on the bog. Wet 
turf handled poorly disintegrated easily, and it became more fragile if it rained when 
transported in open-topped wagons and when badly stacked in the dumps. On one 
occasion, an Independent Deputy for Dublin North East, took a sod at random from the 
Parnell Street dump and had it tested. The results showed water content of seventy-eight 
percent, forty-eight percent higher than the TDB’s machine-produced turf.103 Reports of 
the fuel merchants wetting the turf to increase its weight for sale were common.
104
 One 
company, Tuskar Firelighters, even marketed their firelighters as being specially 
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designed to burn wet turf.
105
 On top of this, the bulky turf was difficult to burn in the 
typically small urban fireplaces. In light of this, the Turf Development Board issued 
pamphlets giving practical advice for both domestic and industrial users of turf.
106
 
Overcharging for turf was also commonplace. While the fixed price was 6d. per 
stone, 8d. and 9d. was often charged for a dozen sods which equated to £8 per ton.
107
 As 
of June 1941 it was made compulsory for bellmen to hold a fuel merchant’s licence. 
Fuel merchants however were not required to keep records of sales of quantities of four 
stones or less leaving those who purchased fuel in small amounts open to abuse.
108
 All 
of this it seems conditioned many inhabitants of the non-turf area to use turf sparingly, 
or even go without. Overcharging also occurred in the turf area where the price of turf 
was not fixed. It had been hoped that unregulated prices would encourage people to cut 
their own turf, but this was not always possible. Certain areas within the turf area itself 
were remote from bogs. Then there was the curious case of Portarlington where it was 
found difficult to secure turf supplies although the town was situated just a few 
kilometres from the Turf Development Board’s flagship bog at Clonsast; TDB turf was 
destined for sale in the non-turf area. Townspeople in the turf area were often held to 
ransom, in 1941 it was reported that in Maynooth turf was sold for 1½d. per sod.
109
 The 
Irish Housewives Association underlined the plight of those living in semi-rural areas in 
their annual report for 1943.
110
 Despite its flaws, the turf scheme tided the country over 
the period of the war but as will be discussed in chapter six, the fuel famine of 1947 was 
far worse than any shortage experienced during the war years. 
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Clothing 
 
Cotton and wool were the most important textiles imported into Ireland for the 
domestic clothing manufacturing industry. Up until early 1941 no difficulty was 
experienced in securing these supplies with combined imports for 1940 equalling 
18,000,000 lbs.
111
 Britain supplied Ireland with 100 percent of her cotton needs, and the 
total sum of wool imported was supplemented with 4,500,000 lbs of home produced 
wool.
112
 This unhindered textile supply did not prevent a rise in prices. Within the short 
period from August 1939 to February 1941, the price of clothing on the cost-of-living 
index rose from 225 to 305 points (from a base of 100 at July 1914), an increase of 
eighty points or thirty-six percent (see Figure 2.8). 
Figure 2.8 Increase in the cost of living in Ireland as represented on the cost-of-
living index, 1938-45 
 
 Graph compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1939-45 
The hike was explainable by the price increase of cotton and wool on the international 
markets; commodities required to clothe the ever expanding armies and workforces of 
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the belligerent nations in particular. The impact of this for the Irish consumer was 
brilliantly illustrated in the September 1940 edition of Dublin Opinion (see Figure 2.9). 
Figure 2.9 The impact of the increased price of clothing as illustrated in 
Dublin Opinion, 1940 
 
  Source: Dublin Opinion, Sept. 1940, p. 301 
 
As clothing became more costly, garments which in normal times might have been 
discarded were retained. This inclination towards hoarding as a result of shortages was 
alluded to in Dublin Opinion in December 1942 (see Figure 2.10). For the poor this was 
a problem as they relied heavily on second-hand clothing sourced from local markets, 
charitable institutions, and the spontaneous generosity of relatives, neighbours and 
friends.
113
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Figure 2.10 Shortages led to hoarding as illustrated in Dublin Opinion, 
1942 
 
  Source: Dublin Opinion, Dec. 1942, p. 176 
This led to pleas from organisations such as the Galway Conference of the St Vincent 
de Paul who appealed to: 
All who have old clothes to spare, not to keep the garments uselessly in their 
homes, but to give them to their ill-clad fellow-citizens.
114
 
 
Poor expectant mothers and their children were worst affected by the shortage of 
second-hand clothing with greatest suffering experienced during the winter months.
115
 
Economies in clothing emerged. To save on the price of stockings, women adopted the 
ingenious practice of ‘colouring the legs with a solution which looks like a cross 
between sunburn and silk’ which had developed in Britain.116 
Between April and August 1941, Britain reduced exports of cotton to Ireland by 
fifty percent of 1940 exports while textile rationing was introduced to Britain on 2 June 
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1941.
117
 This figure was reduced to twenty-five percent in September 1941, and fifteen 
percent in January 1942.
118
  
Table 2.4 Quantities of textiles imported into Ireland, 1939-45 
Source: Gerard Fee, ‘The effects of World War II on Dublin’s low-income families 1939-1945’ (PhD thesis in history, 
University City Dublin, 1996), p. 56 
 
The reductions prompted the government to introduce clothes rationing on 8 June 1942 
under the Emergency Powers (Rationing of Yarn Cloth and Clothing) order, 1942.
119
 
The scheme was based on the exchange of coupons from the ration books, with each 
consumer having a fifty-two coupon allowance which equated to a value of 
approximately £8.
120
 These coupons were passed from the consumer to the retailer, then 
to the wholesaler and finally to the Department of Supplies which granted supplies of 
textiles based upon the numbers of coupons received. The basic value of each coupon 
was one square yard of cloth.
121
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Article 
Unit of 
quantity 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
              
Wool, raw 
greasy 
Cental 5,123 2,070 2 1 32 440 42 
              
Washed, 
scoured or 
carbonized 
Cental 3,285 1,679 672 0 330 1,121 1,121 
              
Cotton 
yarn 
Pound 
(lb.) 
9,526,179 11,983,754 5,541,795 3,112,284 4,286,433 3,274,270 3,223,892 
              
Linen 
Yarn 
Hundred-
weight 
12,366 6,292 451 7 1 355 1,863 
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Table 2.5 Coupon values under the Irish clothes rationing scheme, 9 June 1942 
Article of clothing Man Boy Woman Girl 
    
 
    
Shirt (no collar) / Blouse 13 7 6 4 
Two-piece suit 37 21     
Three-piece suit 40 23     
Trousers unlined (lined) 18(20) 8(12)     
Dress / Frock unlined (lined)   
 
13(21) 7(13) 
Cardigans / jumpers 6 3 4 2 1/2 
Undervest 5 3 4 2 1/2 
Underpants / Knickers 2 1 2 1 
Socks / Stockings 1 1/2 1 1 1/2 1 
Pyjama suit 20 12 20 10 
Coat / Jacket / Blazer unlined (lined) 18(24) 9(12) 16(20) 9(11) 
Overcoat / Raincoat unlined (lined) 29(36) 14(18) 28(36) 14(18) 
Collar / pair of cuffs 2 1     
Tie 1 1     
Hat / Scarf / Sash 1 1/2 1     1 1/2 1 
Gloves 1 1 1 1 
Handkerchief 1 1 1 1 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using information from the Irish Press, 9 June 1942; Connacht Sentinel, 9 June 1942 
 
In Britain utility clothing was introduced; while this was an economic measure it led to 
less variety. In Ireland it was decided instead to eliminate certain decorative effects 
from clothing for both sexes.
122
 Men had to make do with fewer pockets while certain 
frills and cuffs were banned from women’s dresses. Special systems were put in place 
for consumers whose needs could not be met by normal rationing. These included 
uniformed employees, hospital workers, charitable organisations, the army, government 
services, emergency and voluntary services, seamen, and local institutions.
123
 In the 
second year of rationing starting June 1943, certain classes of consumer were, upon 
application, granted an additional coupon allowance (see Table 2.6). 
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Table 2.6 Ireland’s supplementary clothing coupon allowance, June 1943-45 
Classes of consumer Additional 
coupon allowance 
Expectant Mothers 78 
Postulants 78 
Actors 35 
Waiters 20 
Private nurses 20 
Dentists 10 
Vets 10 
Source: Textiles - historical survey of measures taken to control supplies during the Emergency, 1939-45 (NAI, 
INDC/EMR, 7/12), p. 77 
 
Clothing rationing was introduced to eke out supplies rather than being a 
response to a particular shortage, but the general consensus was that it was too harsh 
with one draper described it as ‘eyewash’.124 The Drapers’ Chamber of Trade met on 9 
June 1942 to discuss the scheme. Fearing a reduction in trade by as much as eighty 
percent, it requested de Valera meet their deputation which he refused to do.
125
 Louie 
Bennett of the Irish Women Workers’ Union urged de Valera to scale back the scheme, 
citing its potential to wreak havoc upon employment levels.
126
 The mounting agitation 
prompted the government to revise the scheme with the annual allowance increased 
from fifty-two to seventy-eight coupons.
127
 Yet, the improvement was not enough for 
the drapers and on 15 June 1942 an estimated 8,000 participated in a parade through the 
streets of Dublin culminating in a demonstration at the Mansion House.
128
 The drapers 
argued that they possessed quantities of supplies sufficient to negate the need for 
rationing. While Lemass was of the opinion that these statements were unfounded, it is 
hard to argue with William Cosgrave’s assessment of the clothes rationing scheme.129 
According to Cosgrave: 
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The clothes rationing order was a panic order; it got panic consideration and a 
panic decision, and there were panic blunders and panic changes.
130
 
 
 It did not take long for before a lively black-market trade in clothes coupons 
developed, especially in the capital. The trade was focused around the visitors from 
Northern Ireland, as they disembarked onto the platforms of Dublin’s Amiens Street 
railway station.
131
 Single coupons were sold for as much as five shillings.
132
 As per 
Clair Wills: 
Clothing rations... proved something of a boon to Irish women, many of whom – 
especially the older generation – bought few clothes at the best of times.133 
 
It was also common for the destitute poor to sell their coupons if they couldn’t afford 
rationed clothing. The Department of Industry and Commerce’s historical survey of 
rationing created after the war noted that the imposition of sentences of imprisonment 
for these offences and the use of inspectors in suspected hotspots was thought to have 
considerably reduced the dealings.
134
 However, the practice remained relevant enough 
to warrant reference in the August 1946 issue of Dublin Opinion (see Figure 2.11). 
Figure 2.11 A sketch in Dublin Opinion of woman selling ration books outside a 
Great Northern Railway station, 1946 
 
 Source: Dublin Opinion, August 1946, p. 1 
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Clothes rationing put out of business the travelling outfitters who operated 
primarily in the remoter western districts and who sold clothing village to village and at 
local fairs. Their disappearance was a cause of hardship as they dealt mainly in 
affordable second-hand clothing and were used chiefly by the working and destitute 
classes.
135
 In Connemara, rising prices and clothes rationing brought about a revival of 
the spinning and weaving industry which was encouraged by the Executive Council of 
the Connemara Parish Councils.
136
 School attendance was also affected by the shortage 
of clothes. In ‘People and pawnshops’, Peadar O’Donnell mulled over the issue of the 
pawnshop where clothes were often pawned for short-term loans. Families having 
pawned their Sunday best on the Monday morning, might on the Thursday evening (in 
the event of the cupboards being bare) pawn the children’s clothing for a day in order to 
‘take the edge off a bodies hunger’ for as mothers believed, ‘a day in bed won’t do the 
kids any harm.’137 For Britain, two years of clothes rationing saved in the region of 
500,000 tons of shipping.
138
 In Ireland, rationing ensured equitable distribution of 
available supplies, but it did not reduce clothing poverty. 
Footwear 
 
Under Fianna Fáil, a protected footwear industry experienced rapid growth and 
expansion between 1932 and 1936 and by 1939 the Irish tanning and footwear 
manufacturing industries were capable of catering for domestic needs.
139
 In 1940 (which 
represented a normal year) 4,500,000 pairs of leather shoes and 1,000,000 pairs of 
rubber boots were manufactured. In terms of raw materials for these industries, Ireland’s 
position was not so secure. Ireland imported fifty percent of the hides and 100 percent 
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of the tanning materials and chemicals used in the tanning industries and was 
completely dependent on Britain for rubber supplies.
140
 This did not pose a problem 
until March 1941 when Britain prohibited the export to Ireland of hides and chemicals 
and other materials used in the tanning industry. In 1942 rubber boot manufacture 
totally ceased owing to the rubber shortage resulting from the Japanese invasion of 
South-East Asia.
141
 On 16 July 1942, footwear rationing was introduced to Ireland.
142
  
In the first year of footwear rationing a pair of men’s or women’s footwear could be 
obtained for a mere two coupons. This was a precautionary measure taken to prevent the 
heavy purchases being made by visitors from Northern Ireland as opposed to a critical 
shortage of materials.
143
 The situation was also helped in mid 1942 when the British 
government lifted the ban on the export of leather and the associated manufacturing 
materials to Ireland, albeit in a reduced manner.
144
 
Table 2.7 Irish footwear rationing coupon values, 1942-45 
  Man Boy Woman Girl 
1942 2 2 1 1 
1943 onwards 8 6 4 4 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Times, 16 July 1942: Irish Times, 31 May 1943 
 
In 1943 a more stringent rationing scheme was introduced as hoarding of 
domestically-produced hides and the quantity of imports became acute.
145
 The rising 
price of footwear put new shoes beyond the means of many of those on ‘standard 
wages’.146 Shoes soled with wood instead of leather came onto the market and proved a 
cheaper alternative.
147
 Like clothes rationing, footwear rationing resulted in a restricted 
supply of second-hand footwear.  This compounded the problem for the poor and it was 
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the children who were worst affected. Dublin Corporation reported that out of 90,241 
children attending Dublin primary schools during the 1943-44 academic year, 
approximately 3,650 lacked footwear.
148
 The introduction in late 1944 of the footwear 
scheme for children from necessitous households eased their plight (see Chapter III). 
Compulsory tillage: 
The foundation upon which Fianna Fáil’s Emergency food strategy was built 
was the policy of compulsory tillage.  As has been widely documented by historians 
such as J. J. Lee, Fianna Fáil was ideologically committed to creating a self-sufficient 
Ireland. The promotion of tillage as opposed to livestock farming was central to this aim. 
It was hoped that increasing tillage at the expense of livestock farming would lessen 
dependence on the British export market and at the same time generate employment and 
stem emigration. Upon Fianna Fáil’s rise to power in 1932, ‘De Valera, believing that a 
tillage policy would bind a bold peasantry to the soil, introduced subsidies to encourage 
the production of wheat’.149  
In 1939, the area under tillage in Ireland was about 1,500,000 million acres. Of 
this, 850,000 acres was devoted to corn crops which included 235,280 acres of wheat 
(just 24,000 acres were under wheat in 1932).
150
 A further 400,000 tons of wheat, 
500,000 tons of animal feeding stuffs and 170,000 tons of fertilisers were also 
imported.
151
 High shipping costs and the imperative of ensuring the nation’s food 
supply combined to compel the Irish government to announce on 9 October 1939 the 
introduction of compulsory tillage.
152
 First introduced for the 1940 growing season, 
farmers of ten or more statute acres were required to till one-eighth of their land. The 
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area was increased to one-sixth for 1941 and to one-fifth for 1942.
153
 In 1943 the 
minimum holding size was reduced to five acres and the quota increased to one quarter. 
The Department of Agriculture could also stipulate what section of a farm was tilled so 
as to prevent farmers saving their best land for pasture.
154
 In 1944 the quota was again 
increased, this time to three-eighths. Lands completely unsuited to tillage farming such 
as ‘rough mountain, bog, sand dunes, forest and land subject to flooding were exempted’ 
from the order.
155
 Cultivation of cereal crops, potatoes, roots and other green crops, flax, 
fruit and vegetables was permitted. To encourage the production of wheat and beet, 
farmers received a guaranteed price for these crops. The rate of 35s. per barrel of wheat 
was a considerable increase on the 27s. granted in 1938.
156
 However, farmers who failed 
to comply with the orders were liable to incur fines or prison sentences and to have their 
land dispossessed.
157
 From 1941-45 an average of 305 farmers were convicted annually 
for failing to adhere to the compulsory tillage orders.
158
 
A publicity campaign surrounded compulsory tillage, the press and radio 
broadcasts were used to promote it. Farmers were implored to produce wheat so that the 
poor could have bread.
159
 The Catholic bishops endorsed compulsory tillage.
160
 In 1944 
the Department of Agriculture issued a booklet Why Compulsory Tillage? It was aimed 
at national school pupils who were encouraged to study it and discuss it with adults at 
every opportunity.
161
 Of all the facets of Emergency life experienced by the farming 
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community, compulsory tillage stung the most, and farmers and their representatives in 
the Dáil were quick to express their opposition.  At a meeting of the Kilkenny executive 
of the Irish Farmers’ Federation on 4 November 1939, Mr E. J. Hogan of Gaulstown 
stated: 
Compulsion must be very ugly to every Irishman. In Ireland it had been used for 
700 years. In the last war I tilled up to 30 acres without any compulsion because 
I was paid for it.
162
 
 
During the First World War Irish produce fetched handsome prices in Britain with one 
commentator admitting that: 
Undoubtedly, in the past we have consistently benefited from the misfortune of 
others.
163
 
 
In this respect Irish farmers viewed the onset of the Second World War with a ‘quiet 
optimism.’164 However, Britain’s policy of price control ensured that no such bounty 
was enjoyed during the Emergency. Irish farmers considered it a great injustice that they 
were compelled to till their land following seven years of economic war with Britain 
(Anglo-Irish Trade War 1932-38) during which Irish farmland had been starved of 
fertiliser and with no prospect of improvement.
165
 Patrick Belton, Fine Gael Deputy for 
Dublin County, went as far as to say: 
This country this year is probably unfertile or probably less fertile than it has 
been during the lifetime of the present generation... There is undoubtedly a 
shortage of fertilisers this year, though we are asked to till one-eighth or 12½ per 
cent more than last year.
166
 
 
Indeed many farmers would have agreed with James Dillon’s assertion that: 
Tillage without manure is not farming. It is mining – e.g., taking the fertility out 
of the soil without putting anything back; and no one who is living on the land 
but a fool or a Fianna Fáil minister would willingly do that.
167
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The conditions Irish farmers were facing into in late 1939 contrasted markedly 
with those enjoyed by their counterparts in Great Britain who were provided with credit, 
plentiful supplies of fertiliser and access to farm machinery.
168
 Prior to the Emergency, 
superphosphate and compound fertilisers were manufactured in Ireland, but this 
production was almost entirely dependent on raw materials imported mainly through 
Britain.
169
 In 1938 the Department of Industry and Commerce tried unsuccessfully to 
persuade the principle manufacturers to lay in stocks of raw materials. The 
manufacturers cited the lack of storage space and capital. Crucially, it was not 
anticipated that the area under tillage would need to be massively expanded. In October 
1939, John Leydon, Secretary of the Department of Supplies, was assured by 
representatives of the various British departments concerned that Irish farmers would be 
treated on the same basis as their British counterparts. Imports for 1940 were reasonable, 
but in 1941 the position became critical as Britain drastically cut exports of fertilisers to 
Ireland to just five percent of pre-war purchases.
170
  
Figure 2.12 In the absence of fertiliser a farmer ploughs ‘some of the 
Department’s forms’ into his land, Dublin Opinion, 1940 
 
Source: Dublin Opinion, May 1940, p. 483 
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Ireland could no longer import phosphates, potash and sulphates of ammonia, although 
nitrate of soda continued to be available from Chile and Peru.
171
 The Irish government 
encouraged the use of natural fertilisers such as manure and seaweed but these were less 
efficient, and manure became difficult to obtain due to Ireland’s falling livestock 
population.
172
 Some relief was provided by domestic phosphate and pyrite deposits 
located in counties Clare and Wicklow along with imports of phosphates from Spain 
and Florida, but these only scratched the surface.
173
  
The largest increase in tillage was recorded in those areas formerly devoted to 
dairying and cattle rearing where farmers were far from content to break up their rich 
grasslands.
174
 In other parts of the country, farmers were forced to till land which was 
simply unsuitable for tillage as was alluded to in Dublin Opinion (see Figure 2.13). 
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Figure 2.13 Comic portrayals in Dublin Opinion of the implications of 
compulsory tillage for ‘land holders’, 1941-42 
 
 Source: Dublin Opinion, Feb. 1942, p. 1; Dublin Opinion, May. 1941, p. 56 
Livestock farmers often lacked the technical knowledge needed to till productively 
while they almost certainly were short of the necessary inputs. As Senator Patrick 
Baxter put it on 25 October 1939: 
While they may be the best judges of stock in the world, it will be found that 
very few of them can handle a plough.
175
 
 
Perhaps the most sensational expression of opposition to the order was the case of the 
Meath farmer who used his own private plane to ‘fly over local churches and GAA 
pitches on a Sunday morning dropping thousands of leaflets which carried a message 
opposing compulsory tillage.’176  
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By 1941, the quantities of agricultural machinery imported to Ireland had fallen 
sharply. In 1939, a total of 540 tractors, 211 tractor ploughs, and 105 threshers were 
imported from various sources. For 1941, these totals were reduced to thirty tractors, 
106 tractor ploughs and seventeen threshers.
177
 In Britain, the total area of agricultural 
land under tillage increased from twenty-eight percent in 1939, to forty-one percent in 
1941.
178
 This was an increase of approximately 3,700,000 acres.
179
 This considered it is 
unsurprising that the British were unwilling to export agricultural inputs to Ireland. 
Despite the difficulties and the vociferous opposition from much of Ireland’s farming 
community, the area under tillage was increased from 1,500,000 million acres in 1939 
to almost 2,500,000 acres in 1943. Yet while the price farmers could obtain for a barrel 
of the highest quality wheat was increased to 50s. In 1943, the ever-increasing 
production costs ensured that Ireland’s poorest farmers suffered the most as a result of 
compulsory tillage.
180
 
On 15 October 1943, the Minister for Agriculture, James Ryan, announced in a 
Radio Éireann broadcast that the 1944 tillage order would make it mandatory for every 
farmer of holdings of five or more statute acres to devote a certain portion of his (or her) 
land to the production of wheat.
181
 This drastic measure was taken as Ireland’s total 
wheat acreage for 1943 of 509,000 acres was 75,000 short of the 1942 total; this 
according to Ryan ‘left the position in regard to bread supplies precarious.’182 Ireland 
was divided into three districts. The wheat quota for District No. 1 was one-tenth, 
District No. 2 was one-sixteenth, and District No. 3 was one-twenty-fifth.
183
 With rising 
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production costs and the lack of inputs, wheat tillage became an increasingly 
unattractive prospect irrespective of the government subsidy. By 1943 patience among 
the farming community with compulsory tillage and the government’s drive for self 
sufficiency in wheat production was waning but while the wheat acreage declined the 
total acreage under tillage in 1943 increased. This indicates that many farmers opted to 
hedge their bets by diversifying their tillage as opposed to concentrating on wheat. As 
prices were not guaranteed for other crops eligible under the compulsory tillage order, 
farmers increasingly engaged in the local barter economy. Ryan criticised these farmers 
for neglecting their duty even though in many cases they were making more productive 
use of their land.
184
 The compulsory wheat quota added insult to injury, but the area 
under wheat in 1944 was increased by approximately 130,000 acres over its 1943 level 
to 642,478 acres (see Table 2.8). 
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Table 2.8 Tillage acreages, yields and yields per acre in Ireland, 1939-45 
  
  
Wheat 
Corn 
crops 
total 
Potatoes Beet 
Root and 
green 
crops 
total 
Total 
tillage 
1939 
Total (statute acres) 255,280 867,943 317,169 41,661 611,766 1,492,002 
Total yield (tons) 255,280   2,998,480 410,403     
Yield per acre 20 cwt   9.5 tons 9.9 cwt     
1940 
Total (statute acres) 305,243 1,121,862 366,738 62,915 704,899 1,845,347 
Total yield (tons) 312,874   3,118,280 660,000     
Yield per acre 20.5 cwt   8.5 tons 10.5 cwt     
1941 
Total (statute acres) 463,206 1,413,196 428,146 78,390 798,571 2,211,767 
Total yield (tons) 435,414   3,689,548 719,533     
Yield per acre 18.8 cwt   8.6 tons 9.2 cwt     
1942 
Total (statute acres) 574,739 1,645,900 425,501 54,888 749,962 2,414,400 
Total yield (tons) 511,518   3,120,307 399,146     
Yield per acre 17.8 cwt   7.3 tons 7.3 cwt     
1943 
Total (statute acres) 509,245 1,662,400 407,576 83,056 782,000 2,444,400 
Total yield (tons) 435,405   3,097,578 732,471     
Yield per acre 17.1 cwt   7.6 tons 8.8 cwt     
1944 
Total (statute acres) 642,487 1,767,386 411,946 81,824 758,385 2,567,143 
Total yield (tons) 5,846,114   3,007,206 630,045     
Yield per acre 17 cwt   7.3 tons 7.7 cwt     
1945 
Total (statute acres) 662,498 1,680,300 387,507 84,522 749,800 2,430,100 
Total yield (tons) 573,061   2,983,804 735,341     
Yield per acre 17.3 cwt   7.7 tons 8.7 cwt     
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1939-46 
 
Bread 
 
Twinned with compulsory tillage and the campaign to grow more wheat was the 
controls which existed around that staple of the Irish diet, bread. While official bread 
rationing was not introduced to Ireland until 1947, bread and flour supplies were 
heavily controlled to ensure equitable distribution. Foremost among the regulations 
were those relating to the extraction rate of flour from wheat. Pre-war weekly 
consumption stood at 52,000 sacks of 280lbs of flour of seventy per cent extraction 
which produced a white loaf with the remaining offals being used as animal feed.
185
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wheat imports dwindled, higher than normal minimum extraction rates were introduced 
to ensure the wheat supply stretched as far as possible. 
Table 2.9 Flour extraction rate from wheat in Ireland, 1939-45 
Year 1939 1940 1941
* 
1942 1943 1944 1945 
Rate 70% 75% 95% 100% 95% 95% 90% 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1939-45 
* The extraction rate was first raised to eighty and then ninety percent in 1940 and 1941 before being set at 
ninety-five percent on 21 Mar. 1941. 
 
Flour of high extraction produced a coarse loaf of a brown-grey colour and epithets like 
‘black bread’ were common.186 In printed material, the term ‘black bread’ or the word 
‘black’ in relation to bread was banned by the censor in January 1941.187 So accustomed 
to the taste of white bread had the Irish palate become that some consumers – in an act 
of desperation – purchased flour sieves to sieve the flour to make it whiter. This practice 
along with the sale of the flour sieves was soon made illegal, although this control like 
many others could have been easily ignored.
188
 Irrespective of the minimum extraction 
rates, there persisted throughout the Emergency the belief that the best flour was 
reserved for Dublin, a notion which was completely unfounded.
189
 Wheat supplies were 
stretched and economy and the consumption of substitutes such as vegetables were 
advised. The problem of how to supplement the bread supply with available substitutes 
using scanty fuel supplies was regularly considered. Recipes for potato bread, potato 
cakes, and potato scones which usually entailed mixing mashed potato with the 
wholemeal flour were widely published.
190
 The palatability of the new loaf was not the 
only cause for concern. As will be discussed in Chapter V, bread produced from flour of 
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a high extraction rate was increasingly cited as the reason for the increased incidence of 
rickets.
191
 
Bread was a vital constituent part of the dietary for Ireland’s poor; ‘bread and 
spread’ meals were often consumed three times daily by over half of Dublin’s tenement 
population.
192
 Households with several children frequently ate between twenty and 
thirty-two pound loaves weekly.
193
 The government therefore subsidised flour prices 
during the Emergency to the sum of approximately £2,000,000 annually in order to 
ensure that this basic commodity remained affordable to everyone.
194
 Price 
subsidisation did not prevent a rise in the price of bread, it mitigated it. 
Table 2.10 Average price of a two-pound loaf of bread in Ireland, 1939-45 
Year 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Price 5 1/4d. 5 3/4d. 5 3/4d. 6 1/4d. 6 1/2d. 6 3/4d. 6 3/4d. 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1939-45 
 
On the ground, the production of and the sale of flour and bread was (in theory) strictly 
controlled. Only under licence granted by the Department of Supplies were millers, 
wholesalers, bakers, and retailers permitted to produce and sell flour and bread. This 
facilitated the equal distribution of wheat supplies by Grain Importers (Éire) Ltd to 
millers based on their pre-war purchases. Grain Importers (Éire) Ltd (which was 
representative of millers and grain distributors) was a non-profit company established 
on 14 October 1939 with the sole licence to secure and purchase the country’s 
requirements of imported wheat.
195
 Joint purchasing through companies like Grain 
Importers aimed to prevent existing companies competing for the limited supplies. 
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In 1941, the controls around flour and bread were intensified as was the drive to 
produce more wheat. Just as the minimum compulsory tillage quota was increased from 
one-eighth to one-sixth for 1941, the flour extraction rate from home-grown wheat was 
raised from ninety to ninety-five percent on 21 March 1941. The maximum amount of 
flour to be released by the millers was also reduced by ten percent to 48,000 sacks of 
280lbs.
196
 Other controls were also introduced to conserve flour supplies. Hotels, 
restaurants and clubs were banned from serving more than one portion of bread with 
any meal of two or more courses, or any bread dish exceeding four ounces unless a 
customer requested it and paid an additional charge. All menus had to bear the words ‘it 
is illegal to serve wheaten foods with more than one course.
197
 In March 1941 the use of 
wheat, wheaten flour or wheatmeal for animal feeding was also made illegal as was the 
sale of wheaten foods at race meetings and other sporting events.
198
 Despite the 
increasing regulation, there remained a general sense in the country that Ireland’s wheat 
position was secure.
199
 While government announcements urged economy, the tillage 
quota had been increased and foreign wheat continued to flow into the country albeit in 
reduced quantities. 
1942 was less comfortable than 1941. On 21 February 1942, the Department of 
Agriculture published an announcement in the press stating that ‘the flour and bread 
position is serious.’200 This development was due to the shortfall in the 1941 harvest of 
an estimated 100,000 tons coupled with the difficulties encountered importing sufficient 
wheat supplies which left the country with only enough wheat to last nine months.
201
 
This forced the Department of Supplies to raise the extraction rate to 100 percent.  The 
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government implored the public to cut down their daily bread consumption by 
consuming substitutes, but generally these were more costly and difficult to prepare.
202
 
The announcement made in late February 1942 that a twenty percent reduction in bread 
and flour consumption was being sought caused panic buying and a run on bakers’ 
shops.
203
 Worried Dubliners queued for hours to ensure they obtained their bread supply. 
Alfie Byrne, Independent Deputy for Dublin North-East, reported how queues outside 
bakeries in areas such as Boland’s Mill, Marino, the Coombe, and Wexford Street 
containing hundreds of people formed as early as six o’clock in the morning.204 Some 
who queued were reportedly unable to obtain any bread at all.
205
 Richard Mulcahy 
recounted the situation of a family consisting of three adults and eight children who 
lived on the North side of the city and were dealt with and were known by a local baker. 
This family normally consumed thirty-eight two pound loaves weekly but in the week 
following Lemass’ announcement, they succeeded in getting ‘with a considerable 
amount of difficulty’ just nineteen loaves.206  The poor suffered further when bakers and 
retailers took matters into their own hands, rationing their supplies in an attempt to 
serve as many as possible.
207
 At the same time those with means could purchase what 
flour they wanted on the black market with white flour reportedly being sold openly on 
the streets of Dublin for 1s. 2d. per lb.
208
 
The shortages experienced in Dublin from early to mid 1942 were not in 
isolation. On 4 March 1942, Richard Mulcahy addressed the issue of the supply and 
distribution of bread in Ireland. He explained how he had received communications on 
the matter from places as far apart as Donegal and Tipperary. One letter described the 
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position in Cashel where it was said ‘the poor are like hunted rats looking for bread.’209 
Not wanting to cause a panic, the government decided to censor this debate.
210
 While 
the national press observed the censor’s rules which barred critical assessment of 
Ireland’s supplies situation, the regional press was not so discreet.211 On 18 April 1942 
it was reported in the Southern Star that the bread and flour situation in Glengarriff, 
County Cork was acute.
212
 The Tuam Herald was even more explicit citing shortages in 
locations including Galway, Mayo, Donegal, and Connemara. One article quoted 
Galway county councillors who knew cases of families who travelled up to fifteen miles 
to secure supplies and families who had lived for two weeks on just potatoes.
213
 Back in 
Dublin, Lemass maintained that there were sufficient supplies in the city to meet the 
demand, and blamed any shortages that had developed on greedy consumers and 
unscrupulous retailers. Lemass even suggested that the queues that formed in Dublin 
were unnecessary citing the claims of his department’s inspectors who said that upon 
investigation they found that nine out of ten people were queuing not out of anxiety but 
because they wanted fresh bread.
214
 Lemass attributed shortages in other areas to 
transport difficulties and responded by dispatching extra supplies of flour.
215
  
In spite of Lemass’ assurances to the contrary, by April 1942 a rationing scheme 
had been drawn up and it was anticipated that bread would be the first commodity to be 
rationed.
216
 Prior to its introduction, imports of wheat from Britain were resumed.
217
 In 
March 1942, Lemass banned the export of beer as a result of the scarcity of wheat. 
Ireland was a major exporter of beer to the UK supplying over 900,000 barrels to it in 
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1941. ‘Faced with a thirsty garrison of American and British troops in Northern Ireland, 
the British agreed to release stocks of wheat and coal in return for beer’ and so bread 
rationing in 1942 was averted.
218
 
Sugar 
 
Before the Emergency, average per capita consumption of sugar stood at one 
and a half ponds per week with total national consumption being approximately 100,000 
tons annually.
219
 Comhlucht Siúicre Éireann (the Irish Sugar Company) founded in 
1933, was by 1938 catering on average for eighty percent of domestic sugar demand.
220
 
Displacing the large amount of imported cane sugar was sugar beet both cultivated and 
imported. Sourced primarily from Germany and Holland, sugar beet was processed in 
Ireland’s four sugar factories located at Carlow, Thurles, Mallow and Tuam.221 During 
1938 and 1939, the Irish Sugar Company made no attempt to build up a reserve stock of 
sugar. The folly of this was soon exposed. After the war broke out the British 
government which promptly cancelled all export contracts. This left Ireland short 
44,000 tons of sugar or forty percent of domestic requirements up until September 
1940.
222
 On the ground, there was massive panic-buying and hoarding of sugar as 
retailers and consumers attempted to secure their requirements.  
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Figure 2.14 A well-to-do housewife hoards on the recommendations of the 
Minister for Supplies, Dublin Opinion, 1941 
 
 Source: Dublin Opinion, Feb. 1941, p. 1 
 
In the worst position were the poor who were unable to afford to lay in stocks. 
Compounding their plight were the unauthorised rationing efforts employed by many 
traders typified by favouritism and over-charging. It was reportedly common for 
retailers to withhold sugar from consumers unless they first purchased tea.
223
 Facing a 
crisis, the Irish Sugar Company increased its efforts to secure Ireland’s sugar supplies. 
In mid-October 1940 the company entered into contracts with British brokers, and with 
the British Ministry of Food’s approval arranged for the export to Ireland of both 
processed and raw sugar sourced primarily from Central America. In this way the Irish 
Sugar Company was able to import 88,665 tons of sugar from the end of October 1940 
until the end of 1941. This combined with home-grown sugar beet was sufficient to 
meet domestic requirements. 
224
 While the short-term security of Ireland’s sugar supply 
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was assured, it proved impossible to keep the price of sugar down. Fixed at 3d. in 
September 1939, it was increased by fifty percent to 4 ½d. in early November 1939 on 
account of the rise in prices more generally.
225
 
Table 2.11 Average price of sugar (per lb.) in Ireland, 1939-45 
Year beginning Feb. 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Price 3 1/4d. 4 3/4d. 4 3/4d. 4 3/4d. 5d. 6d. 6d. 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1939-45 
 
Other than wheat, sugar beet was the only other crop for which Irish farmers were 
guaranteed a price during the Emergency. Its cultivation was encouraged under 
compulsory tillage and the area under beet rose from 41,611 statute acres in 1939 to 
78,390 statute acres in 1941 (see Table 2.8). There appeared to be plentiful supplies of 
sugar in Ireland. Aside from its price being controlled, the sale of sugar was largely 
unregulated; the government and Comhlucht Siúicre Éireann encouraged the public to 
‘lay in stores’.226 This lax attitude towards the sugar supply led to substantial losses to 
the black market and encouraged the smuggling of sugar to Northern Ireland. Rationed 
in Britain in January 1940, sugar, along with butter and bacon, was one of the first foods 
to be brought under control.
227
 North of the border black-market sugar could fetch two 
to four times the price it could in the south.
228
 All of this culminated in serious over-
buying of sugar. The knock-on effects of this was soon felt with one Dublin retailer 
claiming that he was receiving only twenty-five percent of his normal supplies. Another 
commenting on the cross-border black-market trade said: 
Granted we are getting flour and tea in exchange... but it is no good telling that 
to a customer who is looking for sugar. He cannot get the tea, and the price of 
smuggled white flour is prohibitive so far as the ordinary artisan is concerned. 
As always, the rich can get what they want.
229
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Complaints of shortages spurred the government to introduce a quota-based rationing 
system. Wholesalers and retailers were licensed; consumers were registered with 
retailers and on 9 August 1941 the ration was fixed at one pound per person weekly 
(amounting to eighty percent of normal consumption).
230
 Then retailers and wholesalers 
forwarded monthly purchases to the Department of Supplies who granted allocations 
based on the submissions.
231
 
In 1942 the total acreage sown with sugar beet was 23,502 acres short of the 
1941 figure (see Table 2.8) although the area under corn crops increased by 200,000 
acres. Average beet yields per acre steadily decreased from 1938, profits were falling, 
fertiliser was in short supply, and un-mechanised beet tillage was hard work. All of this 
made beet tillage unattractive. Anticipating a shortage, the Department of Supplies 
reduced the sugar ration to three-quarters of a pound per person from 4 April 1942, but 
problems with the quota rationing system meant losses continued.
232
 As deliveries to 
traders were based on previous requirements as opposed to actual needs, surpluses could 
be sold on the black market.
233
 The slack regulations around the issuing of sugar to 
catering establishments which were determined by the wholesalers and retailers were 
wide open to abuse and susceptible to favouritism.
234
 Coupon rationing was thus 
introduced on 1 August 1942. All the way up the supply chain from the consumer to the 
Department of Supplies, allocations were based upon the submission of coupons. 
Institutions and catering establishments could obtain sugar on the basis of the number of 
residents or the average number of guests. In 1942, there were approximately 21,000 
retailers, 430 wholesalers, 10,157 catering establishments, and 1,436 institutions 
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registered with the Department of Supplies handling a combined monthly average of 
12,500,000 coupons.
235
 This system ensured that the quantities of sugar granted 
corresponded to actual requirements, but in spite of the new scheme, just a month later 
the ration was reduced to a half a pound per person weekly.
236
 
So grave was the sugar beet shortage following the harvest of 1942 that Tuam 
sugar beet factory almost closed down.  Only under the strenuous efforts of the Roman 
Catholic Archbishop of Tuam, Dr Walsh, and Fianna Fáil Deputy, Mark Killilea, was 
the factory kept open. The farmers felt the price they were getting for beet was too low, 
but the lack of fertiliser was a major problem. To increase yields, farmers in coastal 
areas often substituted seaweed for imported fertilisers, but in late 1942 the Connacht 
Tribune reported that there was very little seaweed available as it had been consistently 
cut in the previous years. The point was made that there was insufficient supply for the 
locals therefore implying that transport of seaweed to inland areas was totally out of the 
question. The Emergency caused a shortage of many commodities, but the fact that 
seaweed was in short supply is astonishing. According to reports, seaweed was in such 
high demand by the spring of 1942 that a load was being sold for more than the price of 
a load of turf.
237
 As seaweed was not regulated under price control it is a perfect 
example of what happened to commodities that went unregulated. To tackle the sugar 
beet problem in the northwest, a joint committee of Tuam Parish Council and Tuam 
Town Commissioners suggested that manure should be distributed by the Irish Sugar 
Company; the price of manure controlled; manure merchants be registered, and the 
weekly export of seaweed from Galway to Britain be stopped.
238
 Not a single one of 
these recommendations was implemented as they would have proven impossible to 
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regulate. The total area under beet expanded during the 1943, 1944 and 1945 growing 
seasons when the price offered to farmers was improved (see Table 2.8). This situation 
coupled with the imposition of the coupon system and the half-pound ration brought 
stability to Ireland’s sugar supply. 
Table 2.12 Ireland's principal rationed foodstuffs, 1941-45 
Commodity Ration Period Amount of ration 
      
Sugar 9 Aug. 1941 1 lb. per head per week 
  4 Apr. 1942 3/4 lb. per head per week 
  29 Aug. 1942 1/2 lb. per head per week 
  5 June. 1943 3/4 lb. per head per week 
  4 Aug. 1945 1/2 lb. per head per week 
      
Butter 19 Sept. 1942 3/4 lb. per head per week in the metropolitan area 
  31 Oct. 1942 1/2 lb. per head per week in the metropolitan area 
  19 Dec. 1942 3/4 lb. per head per week in the metropolitan area 
  2 Jan. 1943 1/2 lb. per head per week in the metropolitan area 
  5 June. 1943 1/2 lb. Per head per week applied to entire state 
  8 Jan. 1944 6 oz per head per week 
  4 Nov. 1944 1/2 lb. Per head per week 
  3 Feb. 1945 6 oz per head per week along with 2 oz. Of margarine 
      
Tea 5 Apr. 1941 1 oz per head per week 
  19 Apr. 1941 1/2 oz per head per week 
  18 Oct. 1941 1 oz per head per week 
  3 Jan. 1942 1/2 oz per head per week 
  5 Dec. 1942 1 oz per head per week 
  3 Apr. 1943 3/4 oz per head per week 
  1 July. 1944 1/2 oz per head per week 
  2 Dec. 1944 3/4 oz per head per week 
  28 Apr. 1945 1/2 oz per head per week 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from: Statement showing the position regarding foodstuffs which were 
rationed during the period between 1939 and 1945 (NAI, IND/EMR/8/54) 
 
Butter 
 
Two types of butter were produced in post-independence Ireland, namely 
creamery and farm butter. The heavily-salted manually-produced farm butter was one of 
Ireland’s largest exports to Britain for two or three centuries before 1900 though it was 
115 
 
often criticised for its inconsistent quality.
239
 Creamery butter was an innovation of the 
late nineteenth century; its manufacture involved the mechanised separation of cream 
from milk which was achieved at much higher proportions than the traditional farm 
butter. A uniform product, it tasted different to farm butter because of its lower salt 
content.
240
 Ireland had a long history of exporting dairy produce, especially to the 
British market; domestic shortages of dairy products were therefore not anticipated 
during the Emergency.
241
 At the same time, dairy products like butter and milk were 
essential commodities, staples of the Irish diet. Like the other essentials then, the 
maximum retail price of butter was quickly brought under control by the Department of 
Supplies, increasing by only 1d. per pound between November 1939 and November 
1941 (See Table 2.13). 
Table 2.13 Average price of creamery butter (lb) in Ireland, 1939-45 
Year Nov. 1939 Nov. 1940 Nov. 1941 Nov. 1942 Nov. 1943 Nov. 1944 Nov. 1945 
Price 1s. 6 1/2d. 1s. 7 1/2d. 1s. 7 1/2d. 2s. 1/2d. 2s. 4d. 2s. 4d. 2s. 4d. 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1938-45 
 
Creamery butter, and the cheaper margarine were consumed largely in urban areas with 
combined consumption for 1939 equalling 563,556 cwt.
242
 Added  to this was an annual 
production of approximately 300,00 cwt of farm butter, most of which was consumed in 
the localities in which it was produced and rarely sold outside these areas.
243
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Table 2.14 Production, export, import and consumption of creamery butter and 
margarine (cwt) in Ireland, 1938-43 
  Butter   Margarine 
  Production Exports Imports Consumption   Production Exports Imports Consumption 
1938 766,460 327,636 5,753 435,288   103,238 11,246 38 92,037 
1939 718,419 223,501 2,200 452,512   116,395 5,392 50 111,053 
1940 657,956 241,988 111 477,936   123,008 1,221 45 121,832 
1941 663,787 104,856 28 466,221   75,910 nil 21 75,931 
1942 614,994 1,149 nil 612,743   nil nil 169 169 
1943 599,650 nil nil 607,457   nil nil 170 170 
Source: Historical survey - butter and margarine rationing, part I, 1942-45 (NAI, Department of Industry and Commerce: 
Emergency Files, 7/25), p. 1 
 
In 1942, a number of factors combined to place the security of Ireland’s butter 
supply into doubt. The bulk of Ireland’s creamery butter production was conducted in 
the rich dairying counties of Limerick, Kerry, Cork and Tipperary where the majority of 
the country’s 168 central creameries were located.244 Coincidently, the largest increases 
in the area under tillage took place in these counties which lacked a tradition of tillage. 
In counties such as Tipperary, compulsory tillage consumed land formerly devoted to 
dairying. In a similar fashion to wheat, the price farmers could obtain for their milk of 
7d. per gallon was considered an insufficient incentive to encourage them to produce 
milk for the butter industry.
245
 Farmers even opted to feed their calves on their cows as 
opposed to selling their milk.
246
 The scarcity of imported feeding stuffs damaged yields, 
while rising labour and transport costs made it uneconomic to produce milk in large 
quantities.
247
 Of a more serious nature was the temptation to divert butter to the black 
market where it could fetch higher as much as 7s. 6d. a pound north of the border.
248
 
While it is impossible to ascertain just how much butter was sold on the black market, 
prosecutions for the illegal trafficking and sale of butter were frequently reported and 
Louie Bennett was ‘told on good authority that quantities [of butter] were going across 
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the border all the time.’249 Poor weather also hampered production and rather than pay 
the extra transport costs to Dublin, creameries increased their business closer to the 
source of production.
250
  These factors contributed to bring about a decline in 
production of creamery butter (see Table 2.14). Added to this was Irish margarine 
production which ceased in 1942 owing to the lack of raw materials (primarily 
vegetable oils) and was not revived in Ireland until 1945 (see Table 2.13).
251
 The lack of 
margarine and other fats boosted demand for butter; consumption increased from 
452,512 cwt in 1939 to 612,743 cwt in 1942 (see Table 2.13). 
 In 1941 the butter shortage really began to manifest itself, particularly in Dublin. 
With demand for butter increasing and the supply decreasing, creameries, wholesalers, 
and retailers took it upon themselves to ration their supplies. The impact that this was 
having was illustrated when Labour Deputy for Carlow-Kildare, William Norton, 
described the case of one Dublin shopkeeper, whose shop was situated in a built-up 
working-class area. In 1940, the shopkeeper’s purchases of butter amounted to 144 lbs. 
per month, but in January 1941 the shopkeeper secured just 45 lbs., an amount which 
dropped to 12lbs. in February 1941.
252
 At the same time, Irish creamery butter 
continued to be exported with 104,856 cwt leaving Irish shores in 1941 (see Table 2.13). 
In 1942 the butter shortage deepened. The Department of Supplies required butter sales 
to be reduced by twelve and a half percent, but in reality creameries, wholesalers, and 
retailers rationed supplies at their own discretion.
253
 The inequality of distribution was 
apparent in Galway where it was reported that one shopkeeper, Mr Lenihan of Eyre 
Square, received eighty-five percent of his normal order, but in contrast Mr 
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McCambridge of Shop Street, received just one-eighth.
254
 On 21 April 1941, 
Independent Deputy for Dublin South, Dr Joseph Hannigan, described the situation in 
the capital:  
Butter has practically completely disappeared from shop windows. We have 
now not alone the depressing spectacle of bread queues, but the spectacle of 
butter queues as well.
255
 
 
Alfie Byrne depicted a scarcity which affected both the poorer and more affluent parts 
of the city. While some could obtain about a quarter of their normal supplies, he 
explained that in the tenements not even the smallest quantity of butter could be got, 
going on to add: 
There is no dripping... no lard, no margarine.
256
 
 
It was the poor and casually employed with small wages who suffered the worst 
hardships. The shortage of other fats forced them onto the more expensive butter which 
further depleted their budgets. Then they were faced with the problem of having to 
obtain butter from shopkeepers in whose interest it was to serve their regular customers 
first. The more affluent classes could turn to the black market, the poor were not so 
fortunate, and yet it was they who were most reliant on ‘bread and spread’ meals.  
The summer of 1942 brought with it a seasonal increase in the butter supply and 
thus a brief respite, but towards its end as creamery butter started to become scarce once 
more it became apparent that it would have to be rationed. The scheme introduced on 19 
September 1942 applied to the County Borough of Dublin, the Administrative County 
of Dublin, and the Urban District of Bray. It was reasoned that rationing need not be 
extended further as the rest of the country would be able to draw on supplies of farm 
butter.  Wholesalers and retailers were licensed and consumers instructed to register at a 
single retailer with the domestic ration being fixed at three-quarters of a pound per 
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person per week.
257
 Just over a month later the ration was reduced to a half pound per 
week.
258
 From 25 November 1942 it was made illegal to serve butter at lunch or dinner 
in catering establishments and it had to be indicated as such on the menu.
259
  
Once butter rationing was introduced to Dublin and Bray, the complaints made 
throughout the country about the shortage of creamery butter increased. On 6 February 
1943, the Nenagh Guardian reported that there had been no butter in Killaloe county 
Clare for two weeks, while Fine Gael Deputy for Meath-Westmeath, Captain Giles, 
stated in the Dáil on 10 March 1943 that it was common for agricultural workers to eat 
dry bread.
260
 The case of Killaloe situated on the Clare/Tipperary border is interesting; 
here was famine in the midst of plenty for Tipperary was a rich dairying county. 
Rationing and the transportation of creamery butter to Dublin transplanted scarcity from 
Dublin to the rest of the country. It left those living outside Dublin in the smaller towns 
who depended on creamery butter between a rock and a hard place. It was reported in 
the Connacht Sentinel that one disgruntled worker stated: 
All the talk about the equality of sacrifice is all eyewash. Little wonder that the 
working class are trying to escape this hypocrisy and a pale ghost of a 
democracy.
261
 
 
Due to mounting pressure, rationing was extended to the whole of the country on 5 June 
1943 with the ration fixed at half a pound. Persons who produced their own butter or 
purchased butter direct from farmers were prohibited from registering. By the end of 
November 1943, 2,500,000 consumers were registered with retailers while 1,000,000 
were availing of the un-rationed farm butter. Due to the increased demand, the creamery 
butter ration was dropped to six ounces per person per week from 8 January 1944; this 
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was maintained until 4 November 1944 when it was increased to a half a pound once 
more.
262
 
Tea 
 
Tea was another of the foodstuffs to be rationed in Ireland during the Emergency. 
Regarded by the Irish not as a luxury but a necessity, Ireland ranked second highest for 
tea consumption in the world per head of capita with an average consumption of two 
and a half ounces weekly, or eight to nine pounds of tea per head annually.
263
 Total 
yearly consumption of tea averaged around 25,000,000 lbs with consumption in Britain 
averaging 435,000,000 lbs.
264
 Tea was imported into Ireland from British India 
(seventy-seven percent), the Dutch East Indies (eighteen percent), and other countries 
(five percent) via brokers based in London.
265
 It was then distributed to the retail trade 
by Ireland’s principle wholesalers who were organised into the Irish Wholesale Tea 
Dealers’ Association. As discussed in Chapter I, tea was one of the first commodities to 
be brought under review by the Emergency Supplies Branch, but for various reasons 
already outlined, the Branch’s efforts to establish a reserve achieved limited results. 
Following the outbreak of war the British Ministry of Food proposed to make itself 
responsible for the entirety of Ireland’s tea requirements in order to preclude 
competition with Irish tea importers for valuable shipping space. The Department of 
Supplies agreed to the offer in April 1940.
266
 The introduction of tea rationing to Britain 
on 6 July 1940 was a worrisome development for Ireland.
267
 Yet Mr H. Broadley, of the 
Ministry of Food, was quick to allay any fears informing the Department of Supplies 
that Ireland would continue to receive tea supplies equivalent to 100 percent of the 
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country’s normal purchases. 268  With this knowledge the government encouraged 
consumers to purchase tea in excess of their normal requirements if it was possible for 
them to do so.
269
 
In spite of Britain’s promise regarding tea Ireland’s tea allocation, British 
exports to Ireland did not fully cover requirements and took no account of the supplies 
formerly imported from the Dutch East Indies and other countries. Then on 16 January 
1941, without any warning, the British government cut exports of tea to Ireland to 
eighty-five percent of normal requirements which was in line with the reduction in 
Britain. The quota was reduced to sixty percent in February, fifty percent in March, and 
twenty-five percent in April.
270
 Ireland was left with twenty-five percent of normal 
requirements while Britain continued to have eighty-five percent of her normal 
supply.
271
 Britain’s sudden turn around forced the Department of Supplies to move 
hastily to implement a rationing scheme. The wholesale, retail and catering trades were 
brought under control in March 1941 with 21,000 retailers licensed. Registration cards 
were delivered to consumers by the Local Security Force and they then registered with 
retailers.
272
 Approximately 650,000 households registered prior to the implementation 
of rationing on 5 April 1941.
273
 In February, it had been envisaged that a weekly ration 
of two ounces per head would be granted, but the rapidity with which the British 
government scaled back tea exports to Ireland meant that soon after the implementation 
of the scheme the ration had to be fixed at just half an ounce.
274
 Irrespective of the 
British Ministry of Food’s assurances, the government’s lack of foresight severely 
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worked to Ireland’s detriment and made necessary the imposition of the half-ounce 
ration. In the Dáil, on 16 January 1941, Fine Gael Deputy for Laois-Offaly, Thomas 
O’Higgins (Snr.), summarised the government’s announcements made in 1940 and 
1941 in relation to the tea supply. His statement illustrated the inconsistencies in the 
Department of Supplies’ policy: 
Buy and hoard—the advice nine months ago; three months ago, the advice is 
that there are ample supplies and no necessity for rationing; ten days later the 
commodity has run out and famine is ahead... You cannot expect to have 
confidence behind an Administration that is constantly contradicting itself. We 
asked the public to follow the Government. To follow the Government in which 
direction?
275
 
 
Tea rationing was not without its problems. The allocation of tea from 
wholesalers to retailers on the basis of a percentage of the retailer’s purchases for the 
datum year ending June 1939, as opposed to per number of customers served, was 
problematic. Retailers who sold more tea than they purchased in the datum year were 
left short following the establishment of rationing; this translated into shortages on the 
ground.
276
 Then there was the issue of the travelling shops – motor vans from which tea 
and other groceries were sold door to door – that were forced out of business by petrol 
rationing. Once a common sight, particularly in the remoter western districts, their 
disappearance was problematic as it forced their patrons onto retailers who were unable 
to cater for the larger volume of customers.
277
 A rampant black market developed where 
unscrupulous traders and dishonest speculators could fetch extortionate prices for tea; 
eighteen to twenty shillings for a pound was reportedly the going rate throughout the 
country.
278
 This was well in excess of the controlled price of tea which at its highest in 
February 1945 reached four shillings per pound (See Table 2.15). 
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Table 2.15 Average price of tea (per 1lb.) in Ireland, 1939-45 
Year beginning Feb. 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Price 2s. 8d. 2s. 9d. 2s. 10d. 3s. 3d. 4s. 4s. 4s. 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1939-45 
 
Tea was by far the most profitable commodity to deal in on the black market and a 
thriving economy grew up around it, especially among women who were desperate to 
supplement the meagre ration.
279
 Cross border smuggling was rife with butter and bacon 
being sent north while tea and flour were sent south. But what was passed off as tea on 
the black market was not always the pure article; mixtures of herbs, tea alternatives, and 
even sawdust were reportedly mixed with tea to increase margins.
280
  
Following the introduction of tea rationing in January 1941, the once served 
‘mug of tea...became a cup’ and alternative hot beverages were increasingly 
marketed.
281
 The most notable was COFF-O-ERA, a native-produced barley and herb 
blend the taste of which was supposed to resemble coffee.
282
 Among the more bizarre 
alternatives was Ash and Hawthorn leaf tea, the instructions for the preparation of 
which were published in the Kerryman on the 2 August 1941.
283
 Carrot tea was also 
recommended.
284
 Such substitutes were widely derided for their unpalatability, a point 
which was not missed in Dublin Opinion (see Figure 2.15). 
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Figure 2.15 Unpalatable tea alternatives as depicted in Dublin Opinion, 1941 
 
 Source: Dublin Opinion, Apr. 1941, p. 34 
Not long after the imposition of the tea ration, the Department of Supplies realised the 
potential of coffee as a substitute for tea and encouraged greater imports of the 
commodity. Coffee was one of the first commodities to become scarce on the continent 
due to the blockade resulting in a surplus on the international market.
285
 The Coffee 
Importers’ Association, seeing a chance to increase profits was more than willing to 
oblige the Department. Normal consumption amounted to just 672,000 lbs annually.
286
 
By March 1943, the association had imported almost 9,000,000 lbs (primarily from 
South America) which was close to thirteen and half years’ normal supply.287 During 
the year ending November 1942, 4,500,000 lbs or just over six years’ normal supply of 
coffee was sold representing an exceptionally brisk demand. Following the increase in 
the tea ration to one ounce in December 1942, the demand for coffee dropped to around 
twice that of its pre war demand.
288
 Had greater demand existed it would have been 
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possible to increase imports as South American coffee was freely shipped to Europe via 
Lisbon, a port that was serviced by the vessels of Irish Shipping Ltd. While 
consumption of coffee did increase in Ireland during the Emergency, its potential was 
not fully realised. Along with the other substitutes, it failed to make a real impression 
upon consumption habits in Ireland as tea was king. The many instances in which 
persons of limited means were willing to pay greatly inflated prices for tea underlines 
the unassailable position that it held as the staple beverage of the community. 
In order to address the tea shortage that developed in 1941, another state-
sponsored company, Tea Importers Éire, was founded on 8 June 1941. Getting off to a 
quick start, between July 1941 and February 1942 the company sourced and purchased 
approximately 12,000,000 lbs of tea in Calcutta.
289
 This equated to nearly half a normal 
year’s supply. Owing to restrictions on shipping space, it was arranged that the tea 
would be transported from Calcutta to the US on US ships. 7,000,000 lbs of tea made 
the journey this way, but following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour in December 1941 
and the subsequent entry of the US into the war it proved impossible to ship the balance. 
As a result Tea Importers Éire was forced to sell the remaining 5,000,000 lbs but did so 
at a profit of £46,000.
290
 The remaining tea was transported in trucks from New York to 
Montreal for delivery to Ireland in Irish vessels and was fully shipped to Ireland by the 
31 October 1942. The lengths to which Tea Importers and the Department of Supplies 
went to secure additional tea for Ireland reflects the seriousness with which the shortage 
was viewed by the public. At the same time, the fact that the shortage of tea was one of 
the country’s principle worries compares very favourably with the wartime experience 
in many other parts where populations suffered hunger, starvation and famine.   
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Coinciding with the arrival of Tea Importer’s shipments was the introduction of 
a coupon rationing system for tea. Consumers were required to re-register with their 
retailers; however the total number who registered was less the number to which tea was 
being granted under the previous scheme. Tea rations were being drawn by households 
on account of family members who had emigrated or joined the army.
291
 In any case, 
the savings made by the introduction of the coupon scheme along with the extra tea 
procured in Calcutta enabled the reintroduction of the one-ounce ration in December 
1942.
292
 In April 1943 the ration was reduced to three quarters of an ounce in order to 
eke out the Calcutta shipment for as long as possible.
293
 The half-ounce ration was 
introduced in the spring of 1944 owing to the fact that the supply of Indian tea had run 
dry and the ration was not increased again until after the end of the war.
294
 
The rationing of essential commodities precluded the liberty of choice for 
consumers, retailers, wholesalers and manufacturers centralising it in the hands of the 
government. Licensing controls, registration policies, quotas, and the use of coupons 
changed the methods of production and distribution. Shortages fundamentally altered 
the consumer-retailer / retailer-wholesaler relationship. Altogether the controls 
represented an unprecedented level of state intrusion into the domestic realm. Yet the 
shortage and rationing of foodstuffs in Ireland during the war years was never so critical 
to as to pose a serious threat to the wellbeing of the population. The tea ration was 
austere but tea has little nutritional value and the sugar ration was greater than that 
granted in Britain. The butter ration was adequate and compulsory tillage maintained 
the bread supply and forestalled the introduction of rationing. While the increasing price 
of these commodities contributed to a falling standard of living, critical shortages were 
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brief and most could supplement their diets with alternative foodstuffs. Conversely, the 
fuel shortage had the potential to cripple the country, and it illustrated the extent of 
Ireland’s reliance on Britain in terms of external trade. The petrol and coal shortages 
brought Irish transport to a snail’s pace with the population reverting to the bicycle and 
horse-drawn transport. The coal shortage threw the entire country onto turf but transport 
difficulties were so serious that that it nearly derailed the largely successful turf drive. 
In this respect Ireland was fortunate that the trade relationship with Britain remained 
favourable up until 1941. This allowed private individuals to accumulate reserve stocks 
of fuel which cushioned Dublin from the worst of the fuel shortage right into 1943. At 
the same time the ‘Phoney War’ was a missed opportunity. More could and should have 
been done to create a petrol reserve and had the stringent rationing of fuels and other 
imported materials been introduced as soon as the war began much hardship would have 
been forestalled. Some of the measures introduced were more successful than others, 
but almost all of the successful policies were introduced several years too late. The 
government’s decision to stall on the introduction of a comprehensive scheme of full 
rationing was a critical error. The lack of such a scheme in the early war years led to 
hoarding, shortages, rising prices, and it helped to foster the black market. This in turn 
affected public health as will be alluded to in the following chapters. 
In spite of rationing, the experience of everyday life in Emergency Ireland was 
not a uniform one. On the one hand there were those with means who could obtain 
almost anything they liked on the black market and who had some self-sufficiency in 
food and fuel, and on the other there were the poorer classes, the politically marginal, 
who had to make do with less or simply go without.  While the level of poverty was 
greatest and most visible in Dublin, serious hardships were also faced in the remoter 
western districts and in urban areas throughout the country. While it is difficult to put a 
128 
 
figure on the number of those who remained comfortable due to the unavailability of 
such data (to the writers knowledge), one can say with certainty that it was a struggle 
for those who relied on state welfare mechanisms for their survival (see Figures 0.1 and 
0.2 on p. 15). 
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Chapter III 
 
State and voluntary welfare mechanisms, 1939-45 
 
Shortages had a profound impact upon everyday life in Ireland during the 
Emergency. In spite of the various economic controls introduced, the government 
remained unable to prevent the rise in prices due to the lack of foreign imports, raw 
materials and finished goods that Ireland was able to secure. Unfortunately, Irish 
industry and agriculture was acutely dependent upon these imports, many of which 
came from Britain. Ireland thus found itself totally at the mercy of Britain’s economic 
planners and due to the British government’s decision to apply an economic screw upon 
Ireland (see Chapter I) the cost-of-living in rose by approximately seventy percent 
during the years 1939-45. Wages however were not permitted to rise at the same rate 
and this led to an decrease in the standard of living, a trend which compared 
unfavourably with that of Britain (see Figure 3.1).
1
 Worst affected by this were the most 
disadvantaged sections of Irish society, the urban poor and the rural landless labouring 
classes. These were parts of the community who even before the Emergency were 
heavily dependent on both state welfare and philanthropy. This chapter will explore the 
following questions: What were the most important welfare mechanisms in place in 
Ireland prior to the Emergency? How did the Emergency impact on welfare provision? 
Finally, how did the state and voluntary organisations respond to the crisis? Throughout 
the analysis will centre upon those mechanisms that worked or were put into motion to 
help alleviate the food, fuel and the clothing shortages. As for the Dublin-centric 
character of the chapter, it may be justified by the fact it was Ireland’s largest centre of 
population, unemployment and poverty were greatest in the capital, and by the fact that 
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the most important work of organisations such as the St John Ambulance Brigade was 
conducted there. 
Poor Law 
 
The Irish poor law instituted in 1838 provided for by the Poor Relief (Ireland) 
Act, 1837 was the foundation upon which independent Ireland’s welfare system was 
built.
2
 Derived from the English poor law, it was ‘dominated by the utilitarian canons of 
efficiency, centralisation, uniformity and accountability.’3 The cornerstone of Ireland’s 
poor law was the workhouse system of indoor relief and the division of the country into 
poor law unions within which there was at least one workhouse. Initially there were 130 
unions which served the main market towns and their catchment areas.
4
 Due to the 
Great Famine (1845-52) the number increased to 163 by 1850.
5
 Each union was 
governed by a board of guardians, which was made up of partly elected, partly 
appointed ex officio members.
6
 ‘Subject to the overall supervision of the United 
Kingdom Poor Law Commissioners,’ each board was responsible for the administration 
of the poor law in the union and the levying of a poor rate to finance the poor relief.
7
 In 
Ireland, outdoor relief was forbidden, only indoor relief granted in the workhouse was 
permitted. Described by Mary Daly as the ‘all-purpose relief agency’, the workhouse 
accommodated the infirm, the elderly, disabled persons, lunatics, children, orphans and 
the unemployed able-bodied.
8
 This system was in place almost nation-wide by the mid 
1840s.
9
 The Famine however plunged Ireland into crisis and placed the workhouse 
system under unexpected strain. At its height over one million people were dependent 
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on the Poor Law for their maintenance.
10
 This forced the British government to rethink 
its position on outdoor relief for Ireland and so was passed the Poor Relief (Ireland) Act, 
1847.
11
 This act allowed for the granting of outdoor relief to certain specified classes at 
the discretion of the board of guardians. In addition, the supervisory functions of the 
United Kingdom’s Poor Law Commission were transferred to a separate body, the Irish 
Poor Law Commission.
12
 This was important as it made the relief of the poor a 
‘statutory obligation of the boards of guardians; the 1838 act had been permissive in this 
regard.’13 In 1872 the Local Government Board was instituted to replace the Poor Law 
Commissioners. Later, under the Local Government (Ireland) Act, 1898, administrative 
counties with county councils were created which took over the rate-levying functions 
of the boards of guardians. Crucially for the development of outdoor relief, the 1898 act 
made mandatory the provision for those in exceptional distress.
14
 
The early twentieth century saw the first major break with the Poor Law in the 
shape of the social welfare reforms introduced by the Liberal government.  First was the 
Old Age Pensions Act, 1908 followed by the National Insurance Act, 1911. Under the 
Old Age Pensions Act, pensions of up to 5s. per week were granted to persons over 70 
years of age whose means did not exceed a certain threshold.
15
 The Old Age Pensions 
Act was particularly advantageous to Ireland given that the rates were set at a uniform 
basis for the entire United Kingdom in spite of the fact that the cost-of-living was much 
lower in Ireland. Furthermore, Ireland had ‘proportionately twice as many old-age 
pensioners as England, Scotland or Wales.’16 This was due to the outflow of young 
people since the Great Famine, and the fact that the registration of Irish births did not 
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begin until 1864 which enabled some claimants to falsify their age.
17
 The National 
Insurance Act, 1911 set up a scheme for state-administered social insurance. It provided 
for sickness benefit of 10s. for men and 7s. 6d. for women per week for 26 weeks, and 
5s. disablement benefit per week thereafter.
18
 Contributions were paid by both the 
employer and the employee while the state took to pay two-ninths of all benefits and 
insurance costs.
19
 After just one year in operation, 700,000 people in Ireland were 
insured under the scheme.
20
 Irrespective of the susceptibility of the Old Age Pension to 
fraud, the 1906 Act addressed one of the major causes of poverty in Ireland, while the 
National Insurance Act tackled the pressing issues of unemployment, sickness and 
disability.
21
  
In pre-independence Ireland, the Poor Law and its reform was a highly 
politicised issue. That reform of the Poor Law was identified in the Democratic 
Programme that was read and adopted at the first Dáil, 21 January 1919, underlines the 
weight which Sinn Féin attached to the issue. The programme noted that: 
The Irish Republic fully realises the necessity of abolishing the present odious, 
degrading and foreign Poor Law System, substituting therefore a sympathetic 
native scheme.
22
 
 
In 1921 and 1922 county schemes were drawn up to replace the Poor Law. These 
schemes and their method varied from county to county as a consequence of the 
confused times in which they were created.
23
 Typically though the workhouses were 
replaced with a central county home and hospital, outdoor relief was granted in favour 
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of indoor relief, and power was transferred from the boards of guardians to the local 
authority.
24
  
Once independence was achieved, the Local Government (Temporary 
Provisions) Act, 1923 was passed to legalise the various schemes previously 
instituted.
25
 In June 1923, through ‘ministerial regulation’ Earnest Blythe, then minister 
for the Department of Local Government and Cumann na nGaedheal TD for Monaghan, 
amended the county schemes to bring them into uniform order.
26
 Each scheme was to 
make provision for the separate treatment of the sick from poor relief, the treatment of 
the elderly and infirm in county homes, and to make special arrangements for ‘mental 
defectives’, unmarried mothers and children.27 All restrictions on outdoor relief were 
abolished, and assistance delivered to able-bodied adults and children unable to provide 
for themselves was henceforth referred to as home assistance (HA).
28
 Blythe stipulated 
that each county board of health was to appoint assistance officers, to examine 
applications for assistance, which would then be submitted to the Health Board for 
review.
29
 The Unemployment Assistance Act passed in October 1933 provided for the 
maintenance of the able-bodied who were involuntarily unemployed and without means. 
Up until this point unemployment insurance (UI) was the only form of poor relief 
available for the unemployed, but it excluded agricultural labourers and those in the 
private domestic service. UI was claimable only for a maximum of twenty-six weeks, 
and thereafter HA was the only form of poor relief available. This was problematic as 
HA could be highly arbitrary. Seán Lemass, then Minister for Industry and Commerce, 
illustrated this in the Dáil on 27 September 1933 arguing: 
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The assistance given by the local authorities varies from one area... to another, 
and is in most cases altogether inadequate.
30
 
 
Finally, the Public Assistance Act, 1939 reaffirmed the principles contained in the Local 
Government (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1923 regarding the county schemes but it also 
introduced an important change of terminology as ‘Public Assistance’ became 
synonymous with ‘Poor Relief.’31 
State welfare mechanisms, 1939 
 
On the eve of the Emergency, Ireland’s most important public assistance 
schemes were the National Unemployment Insurance scheme (UI), the Home 
Assistance scheme (HA), and the Unemployment Assistance scheme (UA). Under UI, 
everyone over the age of sixteen (bar agricultural and domestic service workers) was 
compulsorily insured against unemployment through a system of mandatory 
contributions.
32
 UI would continue until one’s stamps were exhausted or up to a 
maximum of twenty-six weeks. 
Table 3.1 Rates of unemployment insurance in Ireland, 1939–45 
Beneficiary 
Rate per week  
s. d. 
Men   15   
Women   12   
Boys (16-18 years of age) 7 6 
Girls (16-18 years of age) 6   
      
 Additional benefits for dependants 
Beneficiary 
Rate per week 
s. d. 
Dependent Wife 7 6 
Dependent Husband 7 6 
Dependent Housekeeper 7 6 
Dependent Children 2 6 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from: Society of St Vincent de Paul, Social Workers Handbook 
(Dublin, 1942), pp 39-40 
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The purpose of HA as administered by the local authorities, was to relieve destitution 
caused by unemployment and other factors such as sickness and to supplement 
unemployment assistance, widow’s pensions, National Health Insurance and other 
services when inadequate.
33
 The income one could get from HA was usually the same 
as that of the UA rate for the district, though this was not always the case. Necessitous 
cases were sometimes provided with clothing, mattresses, food vouchers and a fuel 
allowance while TB cases were dealt with more generously.
34
 UA was issued once UI 
ran out and to those not covered by UI such as agricultural labourers. Unlike the UI 
scheme, UA was means tested. The means of an applicant for UA was not to exceed £52 
per annum if living in a county borough or the Borough of Dun Laoghaire, and £39 if 
living elsewhere in Ireland.
35
 In the case of a person whose means exceeded £1 per 
week, the appropriate rate was reduced by 1s. for every shilling by which their income 
exceeded £1 per week.
36
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Table 3.2 Unemployment assistance: rates of benefit for men and 
women, 1942-48 
  Dependents 
Rate per 
week 
  s. d. 
Man 
None 10 6 
Dependent wife 15   
Wife and one other 16 6 
Wife and two others 18 6 
Wife and three others 20 6 
Wife and four others 22   
Wife and five others 23   
   Widow None   8 6 
Spinster None   8 6 
Married 
woman 
      
Dependent husband 12 6 
Dependent husband and one other 14 6 
Dependent husband and two others 16   
Dependent husband and three others 18   
Dependent husband and four others 19 6 
Dependent husband and five others 20 6 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from: Society of St Vincent de Paul, Social Workers Handbook 
(Dublin, 1942), p. 42 
 
The state also operated the National Health Insurance scheme, Widows and Orphans 
Pensions, Blind Pensions and Allowances, the Old Age Pensions, and the Blind Welfare 
and Child Welfare schemes. 
Voluntary Welfare Schemes 
 
Even prior to the Emergency, there was a long tradition of charitable relief work 
in Ireland, the geographical focus of which lay naturally in Dublin. One of the best 
known, the lay Society of St Vincent de Paul (SVP), founded in Paris in 1833 by 
Frederic Ozanam had been operating in Dublin since 1844.
37
 By 1939 the SVP was well 
established in Ireland; the Council of Dublin alone was responsible for ninety 
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conferences.
38
 The poor relied heavily on the society to provide clothing, footwear and 
bedding, items that were beyond their means to purchase.
39
 For example, in Guineys 
1939 winter sale, overcoats for men retailed at 15s. 11d., while unemployment 
assistance began at just 10s for a single man.
40
 However, due to the increased cost of 
living during the Emergency, which did not compare favourably with Britain, voluntary 
organisations like the SVP found it increasingly difficult to cater for those who needed 
their services. 
Figure 3.1 A comparison between the wage rates and cost-of-living in Britain 
and Ireland, 1939-45 
 
Graph compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from The Second World War and Irish women, an 
oral history (Dublin, 2007), p. 217 
 
Charitable dining halls, popularly known as ‘penny dinners’ distributing free or cheap 
meals to the needy also operated in Dublin. 
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Table 3.3 Dublin's 'penny dinners', 1941 
St Brigid’s Penny Dinners, Holles Row 
Little Flower Penny Dinners, Meath Street 
Meath Street Dining Rooms, Meath Street 
St Anthony's Penny Dinners, Seville Place 
Lourdes House, Upper Buckingham Street 
Mendicity Institute, Ushers Island 
Sandwith Street Penny Dinners, Sandwith Street 
St Joseph’s Penny Dinners, Cumberland Street 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using information from the 
Irish Times, 11 Aug. 1941 
 
The ‘penny dinners’ run by the Bon Secours nuns at Holles Row convent had been 
operating since 1932. For a penny the diners could purchase a meal of beef and 
vegetable stew, bread pudding, a cup of cocoa or tea and a slice of bread; meals were 
provided for free to the destitute. Funded by voluntary subscriptions, as many as 500 
people were fed daily. In 1935 the Women’s Christian Abstinence Union took over the 
Meath Street dining rooms from a small committee of ladies, who had set it up in 
1900.
41
 Unlike Holles Row, Meath Street Dining Rooms provided two meals a day, 
breakfast and dinner while dealing with similar numbers. Diners were charged between 
3d. and 5d. depending on the portion size for a breakfast consisting of tea, porridge, 
fried bread and ‘bread and spread’. Stew followed by a bread or cereal pudding was 
served for dinner at a cost of between 5d. and 7d. In the same Liberties district was the 
Little Flower Penny Dinners which was run by a guild of voluntary workers. Some 400 
diners were served in the dining room each day while a further 250 were provided for 
with meals in take home-cans. Diners were charged 1d. for a meat and vegetable stew 
and a further 1d. for bread with jam and a cup of tea.
42
 
The St John Ambulance Brigade was another organisation which administered 
aid to Dublin’s poor by means of communal feeding. Established by the surgeon Sir 
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42
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John Lumsden in 1904, it had its origins in the UK’s St John Ambulance Association, 
1877.
43
 Originally concerned with training people in first aid, the brigade was very 
active during 1913-23 when its members tended casualties of the 1913 Dublin Lockout, 
the 1916 Easter Rising, the War of Independence, and the Irish Civil War.
44
 In 1920, the 
scope of the brigade’s activities widened. A Welfare Department which began issuing 
food and milk vouchers to at-risk poor expectant mothers was established.
45
 The 
department soon altered it approach as: 
Experience showed the committee that the giving of food to an invalid in a 
destitute home did very little to help the invalid, as the food was shared... In 
families where there is great poverty the mother denies herself... The result of 
this is that babies born are starved and have very little chance to grow up 
healthy.
46
 
 
The secretary of the Welfare Department, Miss G. M. Barrington thus proposed the 
setting up of communal feeding centres where the mothers would be fed under the eye 
of brigade volunteers.
47
 Crucially, the multidenominational St John Ambulance Brigade 
set itself apart from other charitable organisations as it defined itself as a welfare 
organisation. Furthermore, the brigade felt that the relief of distress should be 
considered an act of social significance which was to the benefit of society and removed 
from religion rather than an act of charity which had much to do with religious 
sanctification. Its classification as a welfare organisation along with its ideological 
stance on welfare would later result in the organisation being viewed with suspicion 
from members of the Catholic hierarchy such as John Charles McQuaid. 
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The St John Ambulance Brigade opened its first welfare dining room in 1925 
close to the National Maternity Hospital at No. 40 Merrion Square. Here, pre and post-
natal mothers could receive a ‘course’ of dinners free of charge; twenty malnourished 
mothers sat down to the first meal provided in this way.
48
 Initially, the course lasted 
three months, though it was extended to five months in 1927.
49
 While laid up, each 
mother received milk vouchers and a parcel containing oatmeal, rice, sugar and cocoa 
and before she gave birth she was given a set of baby clothes and a nightdress for 
herself.
50
 For an extra penny the mothers were given a half pint of soup to take home to 
each of their children.
51
 The numbers served increased rapidly. In 1927, 9,744 dinners 
were served to just over 100 mothers, a number which was almost doubled to 19,256 a 
year later.
52
 In January 1928 a second hall was opened in the north inner city at the 
Brigade Hall, Great Strand Street. Two years later a third dining hall was opened to the 
west at Keogh Square, Inchicore, and in 1931 a fourth at Unity Hall, Marlborough 
Street, and a fifth at number 27 Mountjoy Square in 1937.
53
 Although both the 
Marlborough Street and Inchicore dining halls were closed down in 1936 and 1938 
respectively, the three remaining dining halls made a substantial contribution to the 
alleviation of poverty in Dublin. Together, in 1938 they served 73,617 meals to a total 
of 893 mothers while a further 52,581 pints of soup, 8,597 pints of milk, 578 baby 
bundles and 1,230 sets of baby clothes were issued.
54
 On average between 260 and 300 
mothers received a balanced meal every day in the brigade’s dining halls. 
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Figure 3.2 The St John Ambulance Brigade’s dining hall at Merrion Square, 
1924-25 
 
 Source: ‘Welfare Department’ in The Irish Ambulance Gazette, 4(2), (1925), p. 34 
 
In 1929 the work of the brigade in the realm of maternity and child welfare was 
recognised as part of Dublin Corporation’s Child Welfare Scheme.55 The brigade began 
receiving an annual grant from the corporation for the provision of meals to the mothers 
referred to it by the corporation. In 1929 the sum granted to the brigade stood at £100, 
but this figure increased to £2,200 by 1937.
56
 The system of referral was highly 
organised. Mothers were first referred to a maternity hospital by a corporation medical 
officer whence the referral was approved by a doctor who stamped and signed a St John 
Ambulance Brigade welfare pre-natal card (see Figure 3.3). 
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Figure 3.3 St John Ambulance Brigade, welfare pre-natal card, 1935-45 
 
Source: St John Ambulance Brigade, Welfare pre-natal card (NAI, HLTH, M 34/7/Vol.2) 
 
The mother returned the card to the medical officer who then referred her to one of the 
brigade’s dining rooms. Recommended mothers were required to present another card at 
the dining room before being put on the meals list (see Figure 3.4). 
Figure 3.4 St John Ambulance Brigade Welfare Department meals card, 1935-
45 
 
Source: St John Ambulance Brigade, Welfare Department meals card (NAI, HLTH, M 34/7/Vol.2) 
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It was estimated that the corporation grant covered approximately sixty percent of the 
Welfare Department’s costs.57 On 4 February 1937 the Irish Press claimed that this 
scheme was the first of its kind in Europe.
58
 Whether or not this was the case, it was 
held in high esteem by Dublin’s medical professionals with one doctor quoted as saying: 
No form of social effort so important or so far reaching in its effects as that of 
giving meals to necessitous, expectant and nursing mothers.
59
 
 
There were several other organisations such as parish clothing guilds which 
dispensed welfare to the very poor both in Dublin and elsewhere. Many religious 
sodalities and parish committees had a social outreach. These groups would undertake 
small-scale and short-term acts of charity, such as the distribution of clothing at 
Christmas. The Sodality of the Children of Mary attached to the Convent of Mercy Cork, 
would each Christmas purchase material to be made into articles of clothing for 
distribution amongst Cork City’s poorest.60 Similarly, the Children’s Clothing Society 
(Police Aided), a lay organisation which worked out of Pearse Street Garda Station 
supplied the poor children of Dublin with clothing it made throughout the year.
61
 The 
Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) on the other hand purchased finished articles of 
clothing to be distributed in Dublin via the Poor School Children’s Clothing Fund.62 
Some philanthropic organisations were more casual operations than others, but they 
were usually affiliated to one of the major churches. 
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Welfare mechanisms during the Emergency 
 
Ireland’s supplies difficulties had pronounced social and economic 
consequences from a very early stage during the Emergency.  Price control mechanisms 
proved unable to keep prices down while shortages led to reduced industrial output. 
Figure 3.5 Average prices of essential foodstuffs in Ireland, 1938-48 
 
Graph constructed by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1939-49 
 
Factories producing less exacerbated the supplies situation and at the same time 
employment fell. The government’s failure to institute a coherent rationing system 
exacerbated the problems of rising prices and shortages which together led to a rise in 
Ireland’s cost-of-living (see Figure 2.8). In mid 1941 the government introduced two 
pieces of legislation that would greatly influence the standard of living experienced 
throughout the Emergency. These were the Wages Standstill Order and the Trade Union 
Act. The Wages Standstill Order, introduced to counteract inflation, prevented wage 
increases while the Trade Union Act stopped workers striking for higher pay by 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
1. Eggs 2. Butter 3. Cheese 4. Fresh Milk 
5. Bread 6. Potatoes 7. Tea 8. Sugar 
P
ri
ce
 i
n
 P
en
n
ie
s 
145 
 
removing the legal protection of the Trade Disputes Act from such strikes.
63
 The 
existence of the Wages Standstill Order was, in light of rising prices, a great source of 
discontent throughout the Emergency. Worst affected was the lowly paid blue or white 
collar worker with a large family. For those already living in poverty prior to the 
Emergency; the unemployed or underemployed; the necessitous classes; the rise in the 
cost of living was even more serious. Many families’ finances as afforded to them by 
the government’s welfare schemes were already stretched to the maximum. With little 
disposable income and few assets, they were extremely sensitive to changes in the 
market. One British commentator described how he felt: 
The most unhappy thing about the way in which the price and scarcity pattern 
has developed in the twenty-six counties has been its differential incidence on 
the poor.
64
 
 
As the cost of living rose, there was an ever-increasing gap between the needs of the 
poor and the ability of state welfare schemes to meet them. Due to the inability of the 
price control machinery to keep prices down, harsh criticism was levelled at the 
government. As early as 29 September 1939, Alfie Byrne, independent TD for Dublin 
North East, suggested that welfare allowances, on account of the decreasing purchasing 
power of the pound should be increased in proportion with rising prices.
65
 Similarly, 
James Hickey, Labour TD for Cork Borough, urged that the weekly rate of pension be 
raised in order to offset the decreasing purchasing power of the pound.
66
 On 28 
November 1940, Jeremiah Hurley, Labour Deputy for Cork South East, argued that:  
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Nobody can claim that even the maximum amount which is allowed under the 
Unemployment Assistance Act is sufficient for a man with a wife and five 
children... Nobody can say that at the present time such a sum is any way 
adequate...They were regarded...as bearing some relation to the cost of living at 
that time, but they do not in any way bear any relation to the cost of living 
now.
67
 
 
It is clear that Ireland’s poor were from a very early stage in the Emergency adversely 
affected by its economic consequences. In spite of this, the government did little to 
rectify this position until late 1941. 
As well as the rise in prices, shortages of particular commodities caused 
problems. One scheme directly affected by shortages was the National Free Milk 
Scheme, in operation since 1932 and under which free milk was made available to 
children from necessitous families.
68
 An annual grant of £90,000 was earmarked for the 
scheme for the scheme. The quantity of milk granted to each family was as follows: 
Table 3.4 National Free Milk Scheme scale, 1932-45 
Number of children Pints of milk 
1 1 pt 
2 1.5 pt 
3 2 pt 
Malnourished children 1 pt each 
Source: Department of Local Government and Public Health, report, 1943-44, p. 60 
 
Throughout the country milk was distributed to the homes of the poor via volunteers.
69
 
In Dublin which accounted for one third of the consumption, Dublin Corporation’s 
Child Welfare Department recommended families to the Dublin Infant Aid Society 
which administered the scheme in the city.
70
 On average the Infant Aid Society visited 
4,600 homes each month, and during the year ending 31 March 1941, 46,892 visits were 
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made.
71
 Owing to rising prices and the increase in unemployment, the society’s annual 
report for 1940-41 noted that this sum was no longer adequate.
72
 The annual report of 
the Department of Local Government and Public Health explained that the difficulties 
normally encountered securing fresh milk in rural areas was accentuated ‘by reason of 
the increasing consumption of milk as a result of the scarcity of other commodities such 
as tea.’73 In response the local authorities were empowered to buy supplies of dried milk 
where fresh milk was unobtainable, though this did little to quell calls for a more 
comprehensive system of emergency welfare.
74
 
The Maternity and Child Welfare Schemes (another service designed to 
safeguard the health of mothers and their children) were also affected by shortages. The 
schemes existed throughout the country, the most important being operated by the local 
authorities in the four county boroughs. The way they were affected by the Emergency 
reflects the impact of the war upon Ireland more generally. Dublin County Borough’s 
Maternity and Child Welfare Scheme, run by the Child Welfare Committee in 
conjunction with the Dublin Corporation’s Public Health Section was the country’s 
largest. In 1944 it had a full-time staff of thirty-two, whereas in Cork, the second largest 
scheme had just three full-time staff.
75
 The focal points of the schemes were the child 
welfare clinics or babies clubs. Born out of the Women’s National Health Association’s 
(WNHA) campaign in 1908 to lower infant mortality, they offered an array of services 
to mothers and their children and by the Emergency were well established in Dublin 
bridging the divide between state and voluntary organisations.
76
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Table 3.5 Dublin’s babies clubs, 1942 
Club Address 
Sláinte 6 Blackhall Street 
Carnegie Centre Lord Edward Street 
Carnegie Centre, St Patrick's Lord Edward Street 
Carnegie Centre, St Monica's Lord Edward Street 
St Andrew's Lower Mount Street 
Crumlin-Kimmage 202/204 Cashel Road 
St Joseph's Clinic, St Joseph's Flats Killarney Street 
Gordon The Coombe 
A.O.H. Hall Newbridge Avenue, Sandymount 
St Brigid’s Keogh Square 
Rathmines Dispensary Rathmines Road 
St Anthony's  Temple Street Hospital 
Source: Society of St Vincent de Paul, Social Workers Handbook (Dublin, 1942), p. 4 
Clinical examinations, dental treatments and classes in nutritional instruction and 
hygiene were all performed at the clubs. Other activities conducted included classes in 
cookery, sewing, and first-aid while fuel, clothing and communal feeding schemes were 
common.
77
 The shortage of petrol impeded the schemes in some areas.
78
 Attendances at 
the Waterford clinic for mothers and children dropped from 1,036 and 5,724 in 1938 to 
773 and 2,635 in 1944.
79
 As a result efforts were made to: 
Compensate for the situation by an increase in the quantity of literature 
distributed and by the distribution of extra supplies of cod liver oil, etc., to 
delicate and under-nourished infants.
80
 
 
Conversely, the numbers attending the Dublin scheme for mothers and children 
increased from 32,024 and 34,217 in 1938 to 52,465 and 56,062 in 1944 as a result of 
higher demand.
81
 
Voluntary organisations were perhaps in a better position to respond more 
quickly to the crisis, yet shortages and rationing rendered the delivery of welfare along 
former lines problematic. At the very least, the existence of the government’s controls 
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added to the burden of bureaucracy; in the worst case scenario, it hindered their ability 
to deliver aid altogether. The introduction of the Rationing of Yarn Cloth and Clothing 
Order, 1942, is a case in point (see chapter II). Initially the position of charitable 
organisations within this framework was undefined.
82
 Various organisations such as the 
Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH) were quick to highlight this to the Department of 
Supplies and the urgency with which they did so is illustrative of the importance they 
attached to their work.
83
 The Department’s oversight here lends weight to William 
Cosgrave’s assessment of the clothes rationing order. As previously quoted in Chapter 
II, Cosgrave argued that it was: 
A panic order; it got panic consideration and a panic decision, and there were 
panic blunders and panic changes.
84
 
 
The problem of how to reconcile the clothes rationing system with the desire of 
charitable organisations to grant rationed articles to the poor was quickly addressed. 
Charitable organisations were instructed to collect the appropriate number of coupons in 
respect of the garments issued.
85
 Others who wished to purchase material to be made 
into clothing were granted licences by the department to do so.
86
 The bureaucracy 
however was somewhat at odds with realities on the ground. In one instance the 
department queried the quality and type of material which the Dublin’s Children’s 
Clothing Society sought. Its secretary, Miss Mabel Dalton, replied ‘I am afraid it will be 
a case of take whatever you are lucky enough to get hold of.
87
 In 1943, following 
discussions held between representatives of Supplies and the main charitable 
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organisations, the whole procedure was formalised.
88
 The coupon exchange facility was 
intended to guard against the black market. As it was common practice for poor families 
to sell their coupons, the lag between the introduction of clothes rationing and the 
introduction of the special facilities may have been problematic. If families had already 
sold their coupons, they would have excluded themselves from receiving the free 
clothing from the charitable institutions.
89
 
Communal feeding 
 
  The negative implications of shortages and rising prices upon the ability of 
philanthropic organisations to deliver clothing to the needy was a worrisome issue, 
however it was trumped by the prospect of widespread food poverty. The Irish Times’ 
‘Community Kitchens’ series published in late 1941 highlighted this growing anxiety. 
The series argued that as a result of the Emergency, communal feeding schemes were 
necessary to improve the general standard-of-living. The preliminary article to the series 
even went so far as to suggest that: 
Even if no emergency existed, the economic argument in favour of community 
kitchens would be strong. In the circumstances of today, it seems to be 
overwhelming.
90
 
 
At the heart of this argument was the principle of economy as catering for large 
numbers economises on food and energy, economies which were considered to be 
equally important. It was within the context of a worsening fuel position (see Table 2.2) 
and the approach of winter that the ‘Community Kitchens’ series was published. The 
Irish Times argues that the communal feeding issue was of the upmost importance, so 
much so that it was stated to be in ‘the national interest’.91 Noting that the numbers 
visiting the existing charitable dining halls were increasing, the idea was put forward 
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that a community feeding scheme that did not rely on voluntary subscriptions or charity 
should be instituted.
92
 The article went on to state that: 
The distinction between filling and feeding must be considered - the hungry man 
prefers to be filled, the expectant mother and her children must be fed. Dietary, 
therefore, must be examined carefully. There is too little food and too little fuel 
for hit-or-miss methods.
93
 
 
Drawing on the work of the professor of biochemistry at Trinity College Dublin, 
William Fearon, the piece indicated that incidence of malnutrition and anaemia which 
was already common among Dublin’s mothers was likely to increase.94 
Marrowbone Lane Samaritan Fund: 
 
 The Marrowbone Lane Samaritan Fund – the chairman of which was the young 
Dublin paediatrician Robert Collis – was a communal feeding project initiated in 
response to growing poverty.
 95
 In 1939, Collis wrote the play, Marrowbone Lane, 
which was performed in the Gate Theatre in the summer of 1939, and was revived for 
the Gaiety in 1941 due to popular demand.
96
  Due to the controversy it caused, 
Marrowbone Lane focused public attention on the slum question, reportedly alerting 
‘large numbers of the better-to-do sections of the population’ to the appalling conditions 
in which ‘the other half’ were living.97 
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Figure 3.6 The final scene of Marrowbone Lane as produced by the Gate 
Theatre Dublin, 1939 
 
Source: Marrowbone Lane Samaritan Fund (n.d., suspected 1942), p. 2 
 
Like many others, Collis sought to address the complacency in Irish society which he 
felt was hindering medical and social improvement. To those who might, as Collis put it, 
‘feel... that... the back of the slum problem has already been broken’ he pointed out that 
there were 17,759 condemned houses in Dublin, while in 1914 there had been 13,106.
98
 
Dublin Corporation’s 1938 Report of the Housing Commission revealed that the 
number of families living in dwellings unfit for human habitation such as the tenement 
depicted in Marrowbone Lane numbered almost 20,000.
99
 Collis was quick to capitalise 
on the uproar the play generated, calling a public meeting the week after it opened to 
consider the severity of living conditions in the tenements. The Marrowbone Lane 
Samaritan Fund was thus launched and fundraising began in earnest.
100
 Collis’ motives 
were clear. In 1941 following a performance of the play in the Gaiety he stated that he 
believed there were in the region of 40,000 people in Dublin with no more than 6d. a 
day for food or fuel adding ‘I am tired of giving medicine to children who really need 
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food.’101 The plight of the poor was further compounded by the decreasing value of 
their real income (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 A comparison between Ireland’s wage rates, the cost of living and the 
value of real income, 1939-45 
  
Irish wage rates, 1 
Jan. 1939 = 100 
Ireland's official 
cost of living 
index, Sept. 1939 
= 100 
Real income 
1939 100 100 n/a 
1940 101 118 -17% 
1941 105 130 -25% 
1942 107 144 -37% 
1943 110 162 -52% 
1944 118 170 -52% 
1945 122 169 -47% 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from The Second World War and Irish women, an 
oral history (Dublin, 2007), p. 217 
 
Among the patrons of the multidenominational Marrowbone Lane Samaritan 
Fund were the socially conscious TDs James Dillon, Sean Moylan, Alfie Byrne, and 
William Norton; the writer Sean O’Faolain and the President of the Irish Women’s 
Workers Union (IWWU), Miss Louie Bennett, were also listed.
102
 The focus of the fund 
was to address the suffering of the city’s most necessitous classes, those being the poor 
expectant or nursing tenement mother of the unemployed husband and her children. Aid 
aimed at the mothers was delivered through the St John Ambulance Brigade’s maternity 
welfare programme as this was considered to be the most efficient channel.
103
 Miss G. 
M. Barrington, secretary of the brigade’s Welfare Department was also a Marrowbone 
Lane committee member. The funds donated to the brigade enabled the feeding of an 
additional fifty mothers daily.
104
 The position of the patrons of the fund held regarding 
maternity welfare was underlined in the organisation’s pamphlet which stated: 
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This work is of such absolute national importance that there is no doubt that it 
should not be treated in any way as a charity. Every expectant mother should be 
able to obtain as her right a proper balanced meal a day, the necessary funds 
being supplied by an organized society (i.e., the City or Central Health body).
105
 
 
The idea that maternity welfare – and thus communal feeding – was too important to be 
left to philanthropy was at odds with the position of the Catholic hierarchy and more 
particularly that of the Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid. McQuaid 
welcomed state funding for social service initiatives once they were under 
denominational control; he opposed what he judged to be excessive or unnecessary state 
intervention on moral grounds. Collis was known to the Catholic hierarchy who from 
1935 to 1937 blocked his efforts (along with that of others such as Kathleen Lynn, 
Dorothy Price and Ella Webb) to create a national children’s hospital through the 
proposed amalgamation of the Harcourt Street and St Ultan’s children’s hospitals.106 In 
1936 when McQuaid was still headmaster at Blackrock College he expressed his 
contempt for Collis’ plan to the then Archbishop of Dublin, Edward Byrne, when he 
noted: 
It appears that a new hospital is to be built in Crumlin at the insistence of Dr 
Collis for chronic rheumatic children. Such an institution in non-Catholic hands 
is the very negation of all that Your Grace has worked for.
107
 
 
The hierarchy’s opposition to the involvement of non-sectarian secular organisations in 
maternal and child welfare was heightened in the following years as was evidenced by 
the development of Catholic Social Service Conference. An alternative Catholic 
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children’s hospital, Our Lady’s Hospital for Sick Children, was not opened in Crumlin 
until 1956.
108
 
The other side of Collis’ communal feeding scheme was aimed solely at the 
children of the unemployed which made it distinct from other feeding initiatives. The 
proprietors of Bewley’s Cafe were approached who granted the Marrowbone Lane Fund 
use of their premises on Westmoreland Street while staff of the café volunteered to 
work for the fund. Commencing on 24 April 1941, an average of 200 children were fed 
at the café each evening in two groups, one at 6.45pm and the other at 7.15pm.
109
 Meals 
distributed to the children were free of charge. As was common with other feeding 
centres, a meat and vegetable stew was the staple dish served. It was followed by a 
‘cereal pudding (tapioca, oatmeal, biscuit), “reinforced” with raw eggs, and a half-pint 
of milk’; a meal that equated to almost 1000 calories and included all the essential 
vitamins.
110
 However, so malnourished were some of these children when they first 
arrived that they were unable to eat a full portion while some of the mothers who 
brought their children ‘had themselves collapsed from hunger, and admitted that they 
had not eaten for two days.’111 It also proved necessary to mince the ingredients of the 
stew such as peas, carrots, beans and the meat as the children were inclined not to eat 
those foods to which they were not accustomed.
112
 Of the 200 children, 100 were drawn 
from Dublin’s hospitals. These children were identified ‘as definitely needing extra 
nourishment’ and were put on the fund for two months, or for a longer period if the 
physician recommending the case wished it. Small grants were also made available to 
give immediate relief to especially needy cases met at the hospitals. While the hospitals 
are not named, Collis being the chairman of the fund would suggest that the majority of 
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the children were or had been patients of either Harcourt Street or St Ultan’s children’s 
hospitals.  The remaining 100 children (aged between 5-11 years) were drawn from 
families of the unemployed men of the Inchicore area. The way in which the feeding of 
this group was conducted illustrates how the fund took a scientific approach to its work. 
To start, the height, weight and haemoglobin levels of each child was measured. It was 
found that the children were approximately five inches shorter and eight pounds lighter 
than normal children of the same age group while their haemoglobin levels showed a 
thirty percent degree of anaemia. Then the effect of being on the meals was measured 
against a control group. It was found that in the space of ten months these children on 
average gained an extra pound in weight and grew a half inch higher than those not on 
the meals which is a strong indication of the value of Collis’ work.113 
The Cooked Meals Service 
 
The publication of the ‘Community Kitchens’ series in the Irish Times in August 
1941 highlighted the hardships experienced by the urban poor, underlining the severity 
of the situation they were facing into in the winter of 1941. The government’s response 
to this pressure was swift. On 21 August, the day following the publication of 
‘Community Kitchens – X’ (the last article in the series), Dublin Corporation 
announced to the press that it would:  
Take immediate steps to provide meals [from community kitchens] for the needy 
during the coming winter.’114  
 
This pledge was backed up by legislation which took the form of the Emergency 
Powers (No. 109) Order, 1941. This order empowered the local authorities of the county 
boroughs of Dublin, Cork, Limerick and Waterford, along with the borough of Dún 
Laoghaire and the urban district of Dundalk ‘to organise if necessary, centres for 
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supplying cooked meals.’115 It was also stipulated that the local authorities were entitled 
to work with established bodies to provide for the poor. The Department of Local 
Government and Public Health guaranteed ‘all authorised capital expenditure’ for both 
newly-erected municipal and voluntary communal feeding kitchens.
116
   However, as 
Ireland’s rural population was not considered to be at risk of starvation or fuel poverty, 
local authorities governing rural areas were not permitted to institute communal feeding 
projects. 
Dublin Corporation’s scheme was named ‘The Cooked Meals Service’, and 
although it was intended to supplement the work of the voluntary organisations the 
name was designed to disassociate it from philanthropy and the stigma of pauperism.
117
 
It was hoped that this would make the scheme amenable to the ‘new poor’; families 
with an annual income of around £250 or £300 who increasingly found it difficult to 
make ends meet. By the end of 1941 such families had seen their real income decrease 
by twenty-five percent, and if the main breadwinner was to fall ill with TB for example 
it would have left them in real trouble (see Table 3.6). The Cooked Meals Service 
centred on the distribution of meals from several kitchens, the most important being the 
Hospitals Trust Canteen at Ballsbridge and that of the Mansion House. It was planned 
that the pre-cooked meals would be transported in suitable containers by motor van to 
various distribution centres established throughout the city. For organisational purposes 
the city was to be divided into thirty-one districts depending on population; each district 
was to have one to three distribution centres.
118
 The corporation estimated that it would 
be possible to provide a total of 100,000 meals daily in this way if required. 
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Table 3.7 Planned daily source of meals for Dublin Corporation's cooked 
meals service, 1941 
Institution Meals 
Existing organisations 3,000 
Grangegorman Mental Hospital 12,000 
Dublin Board of Assistance 8,000 
Vocational Education Committee 6,000 
Goodwill Restaurants 12,000 
Other firms and canteens 2,000 
Hospitals Trust Canteen 45,000 
Mansion House 12,000 
Total 100,000 
Table constructed by Ciarán Bryan using information from the Irish Times, 4 Oct. 1941 
 
The plan acknowledged the primacy of family life as dictated in Catholic social 
teachings. Opting to provide meals that the family could take home was seen as 
preferable to having them eat in communal dining rooms. It also illustrated how 
‘souperism’, that is, the use of material inducements to Catholics to convert to 
Protestantism, that had been such a scandal in mid nineteenth century Ireland was still 
feared.
119
 For example on the 1 October 1941, the Protestant tradition University of 
Dublin (TCD) offered its catering facilities to the Cooked Meals Service (although it did 
not offer its dining facilities). This move was followed by UCD on the 8 October 
1941.
120
  
In spite of the government’s pronouncements regarding the establishment of the 
Cooked Meals Service, and campaigns designed to encourage the government to open 
communal feeding centres by the likes of the Irish Housewives Association, the scheme 
was not put into practice.  
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Figure 3.7 Members of the Irish Housewives Association campaigning in 
Dublin, 8 Mar. 1942 
 
Source: Andree Skeffington, ‘Milestones’ in The Irish Housewife (1948), p. 19 
 
According to James Hurson, Secretary of the Department of Local Government and 
Public Health, this was because: 
There are strong moral and social reasons for refraining as far as possible from 
interfering even in very difficult circumstances with the normal family regime of 
the people.
121
 
 
The government played the moral card. Whether or not this was a general sentiment 
held among Government officials, it suited both the central and local government not to 
incur the expense that the provision of such a scheme would have entailed. Hurson also 
added: 
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While government is fully alive to the distress which may exist and has taken 
such steps as are in its power to relieve it, its policy has been based on the 
principle that there will be as little interference as possible with family life and 
custom and accordingly it will only be under the compulsion of very exceptional 
circumstances such as a more drastic curtailment of fuel supplies than has 
hitherto been experienced, that it will sanction a resort to a public system of 
cooked meals.
122
 
 
Hurson’s appears to be very much a Catholic and middle class interpretation of the 
supplies crisis in Dublin, yet this viewpoint was not unique to the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health. Over nine months earlier in April 1941, James Hickey, 
a Labour TD, argued against communal feeding because he felt it was important to 
‘maintain the status of the family’.123 It is also possible that the government bowed out 
of the field due to direct pressure from the Catholic hierarchy. In 1943, Dr Francis 
Constantine Ward, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Local Government and 
Public Health wrote to McQuaid to inform him that he wished the Catholic Social 
Service Conference (CSSC) to ‘get both credit and probable money-grant for such 
services’ as the Catholic approach to such problems was ‘more necessary and 
desirable’.124 The fact that equipment earmarked for ‘The Cooked Meals Service’ was 
later granted to the CSSC, the organisation which became the dominant player in the 
arena of communal feeding is also suggestive of this. However, there exists no evidence 
of such a discussion between the government and the hierarchy. While everyone 
including those with disposable income suffered from the fuel shortage, distress caused 
by the rising price of everyday foodstuffs was largely unique to those vulnerable to 
rising prices. It is for this reason that the ‘Cooked Meals Service’ was seen first and 
foremost as a means to combat a critical fuel shortage, as opposed to one designed to 
feed the masses. This sentiment illustrated by Hurson also underlines a lack of 
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appreciation at the highest level in the department of the importance of proper nutrition 
and a failure to truly understand the plight of the poorest. 
School Meals 
 
An energetic campaign aimed at making mandatory the provision of a hot 
midday meal by the state for national school children formed an important part of the 
debate on communal feeding. The Education (Provision of Meals) (Ireland) Acts 1914 
to 1930 and the School Meals (Gaeltacht) Acts 1930 to 1934 allowed the local 
authorities to provide meals to school children in their areas and to recoup half of the 
expense from a state grant.
125
 In 1938, 533 national schools throughout the country were 
participating in the scheme and a total of 7,823,248 meals were served (see Table 3.8). 
Typically the children were given a third of a pint of milk, and a fruit bun or a plain bun 
with jam. In a few cases, soups or meat and vegetable stews were provided. During the 
Emergency however, in light of the increased prevalence of malnutrition and the rise in 
the cost-of-living, the milk and bun meal became the subject of criticism. The 
establishment or re-establishment of a proper midday meal for school children was one 
of the measures suggested in the ‘Housewives’ Petition’ (sent to the government on 5 
May 1941) to safeguard the poor and unemployed against the rise in the cost-of-living 
(see Chapter II).
126
 Louie Bennett, president of the Irish Women Workers’ Union was 
amongst the early signatories of the petition. In October 1941, the Council of Action, 
established by the Dublin Trades Union Council, convened to consider the problems 
arising out of the Emergency with special regard to the supply of food and fuel.
127
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Attended by representatives of eighty-three organisations, one of the proposals strongly 
supported was the provision of a hot midday meal for necessitous school children.
128
 A 
campaign in support of the school meals proposal was thus begun. On 12 December 
1941, Dublin Corporation’s School Meals Committee received a deputation from the 
Council of Action and a delegation from the Dublin Branch of the Irish National 
Teachers’ Organisation. A sub-committee was appointed as a result of this meeting to 
investigate matter and concluded that the hot school meal should indeed be introduced. 
This position was endorsed by the School Meals Committee and was subsequently 
approved by Dublin Corporation which on 2 February 1942 appointed a deputation to 
wait on the Taoiseach to request use of the Cooked Meals Service’s facilities at the 
Mansion House to supply meals to ‘citizens and their children urgently in need of the 
same.’129 Using the Mansion House kitchens would have allowed meals to be provided 
in schools that lacked the necessary facilities. 
The position by March 1942 was that the Schools Meals Committee, Dublin 
Corporation, various medical officers for health, the Dietetic Council of the Irish 
Medical Council, the Irish National Teachers’ Organisation, Dublin Trade Unions 
Council, the Council of Action (representing eighty-three organisations), the Irish 
Women Workers’ Union, the St John Ambulance Brigade, the Infant Aid Society, the 
Irish Countrywomen’s Association, and a number of Dublin TDs from various parties 
were all in favour of the proposal to supply a hot midday meal to national school 
children.
130
 In spite of this broad based support, the Department of Local Government 
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and Public Health would not sanction the proposal. In a note on school meals by James 
Hurson, secretary of the Department of Local Government and Public Health dated 19 
January 1942, the department’s position is outlined. Hurson stated that: 
No encouragement... should be given to a proposal by which any of the 
children’s ordinary meals in the family home would be generally replaced by 
meals provided in the school or elsewhere. The family meals constitute an 
important element in the filial relationship between parents and children which it 
would be socially disastrous to weaken in any way. It should certainly not be 
interfered with except in circumstances of the most extreme need.
131
 
 
When on 12 March 1942, Dublin Corporation’s deputation of five including Louie 
Bennett and James Larkin Jnr met the Taoiseach and Minister Seán MacEntee, its 
proposals were rejected. De Valera felt that Mansion House facilities should be retained 
for their original purpose, while MacEntee, citing the existence of the Food Allowance 
Scheme, argued that the ‘position of the poor man was not worse today than a year or 
two ago.’132 The deputation did not agree with this assessment. Bennett accused the 
government of not understanding the poor, referring to the existence of the ‘new poor’, 
‘there was an Emergency – a great one’ she exhorted.133 Speaking from experience the 
deputation argued that poverty had increased in the city especially among working class 
families who managed before the war on small incomes, but during the Emergency 
‘found it impossible to do so and were in actual want and suffering from lack of 
sufficient food.’134 
A government memorandum on school meals agitation suggested that in light of 
the various government and voluntary welfare mechanisms that ‘there can be no real 
destitution or hardship’ and where malnutrition existed, it was due to the ‘wrong choice 
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of food’.135 There was also evidence to suggest that the existing community kitchens 
weren’t being fully utilised and this reinforced the government’s position. In letters sent 
to the Irish Times, published on 9 and 12 March 1942, representatives of both the St 
John Ambulance Brigade and the Guild of Goodwill noted that their facilities were 
underused.
136
 This was supported by Robert Collis who estimated that not more than 
one-fifth of Dublin’s community kitchens were working at full capacity, which he felt 
had nothing to do with ‘Protestant soup’ having a bad name as most of the kitchens 
‘were Catholic’.137 However, for the kitchens such as those operated by the St John 
Ambulance Brigade and the Guild of Goodwill it is likely that the denominational issue 
figured in the minds of the potential attendees, a conclusion also drawn by Lyndsey 
Earner-Byrne.
138
 As for the poorer than expected uptake in both the secular and Catholic 
kitchens in general, James Larkin Jnr suggested that it was because the ‘new poor’ were 
too proud to ask for charity while Collis argued that the people of Dublin needed to be 
‘educated to take a good meal.’139 While the lack of education may have been a problem, 
there was clearly an aversion to communal feeding among the public. Louie Bennett’s 
claim that the mothers did not themselves desire communal feeding, but did so for their 
children, supports this idea.
140
 One could argue that the demand didn’t exist because 
there wasn’t a need for the service, however the infant and tuberculosis mortality 
statistics would suggest otherwise (see Figure 5.2). Thus while the demand may not 
have been apparent in the existing centres, did this not obviate the need for school meals. 
The introduction of a substantial school meal would have been an economical way to 
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combat the increased cost-of-living; it would have benefitted the entire family, and 
would have nullified the stigma of pauperism. 
The general consensus – even expressed by Louie Bennett – was that the ideal 
situation was for the children to go home and have dinner with their families.
141
 Owing 
to the difficulties encountered in cooking with limited supplies of substandard fuel, this 
was not always possible. This situation was compounded by the fact that many families 
simply could no longer afford to purchase sufficient food. When gas rationing, a 
product of the coal shortage, was announced in Dublin on 3 March 1942, the dual 
session in schools from 10 a.m. to 12.30 p.m. and 2 p.m. to 4 p.m. was introduced. The 
longer lunch break was instituted to allow pupils to return home to have a meal with 
their families as the restrictions on the gas supply rendered the provision of a hot meal 
at the end of the school day impossible.
142
 Gerard Fee suggests this helped to diffuse the 
debate on school meals, but it also highlighted the plight of many poor school children 
who were forced to wait outside the gates of locked schools as there was no point in 
returning home.
143
 Many families were reliant on turf as by late 1941 Dublin Gas 
Company stopped taking on new customers.
144
  
In spite of the Department of Local Government and Public Health’s resistance 
to the proposals, agitation for school meals continued. In April 1942 Galway County 
Council passed a resolution asking the government to extend the School Meals Scheme 
nationwide.
145
 On 12 October 1942, Dublin City Council adopted the resolution 
submitted by Alfie Byrne that: 
In view of the serious malnutrition in Dublin, the council urge the immediate 
provision of hot school dinners from the municipal kitchens.
146
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Also in October 1942 the issue was pressed in a joint open letter to government by 
women’s organisations; the Irish Housewives Association was among their number.147 
Almost a year later in August 1943 the Torch called on Labour Party members and 
workers’ organisations to focus on the issue: 
This bun and milk business is entirely inadequate. England can feed its school 
children... it can be done here... we have a responsibility to all children to see 
that they are properly fed.
148
 
 
The continuing agitation however derived a certain amount of success as the number of 
children taking meals in schools increased and in some instances there were 
improvements in the type of meals served. In February 1942, 21,000 children in Dublin 
were being given some sort of meal in school.
149
 By 1944 this number had increased to 
32,000.
150
 Between 1938 and 1945, the number of schools in urban areas throughout the 
country distributing a midday meal increased from 214 to 352 (see Table 3.8).  There 
was also a slight improvement in the meal served in Dublin as from 1943 a sandwich 
with cheese and butter three times a week and a jam sandwich twice a week was 
substituted for the bun meal.
151
 In Mayo, salad and in season vegetables were given 
with the cheese and butter sandwich on the recommendations of the Chief Medical 
Officer for Health. The numbers fed in urban areas increased by almost 100 percent 
between 1938 and 1945, and expenditure of the scheme by 300 percent during the same 
period. In the Gaeltacht however, the numbers decreased as difficulties were sometimes 
encountered due to supply issues. The IHA felt that this subject had continued relevance 
during the post-war years in both rural and urban contexts with one contributor to the 
1946 edition of the Irish Housewife commenting: 
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There is room for every sort of effort, both voluntary and chartable, and state 
organised. The first thing is to admit that children must be fed, whether they live 
in the town or the country.
152
 
 
Table 3.8 Statistics relating school meals schemes in Ireland, 1939-45 
School meals 
Year Total 
schools 
Schools 
participating 
Total 
meals 
supplied 
Average 
daily 
number 
fed 
Total 
cost 
Average 
cost of 
food per 
meal
*
 
1938-39 n/a 214 5,174,663 29,321 £29,443 1.4d. 
1939-40 n/a 227 5,204,801 31,867 £31,230 1.44d. 
1940-41 n/a 267 6,127,798 34,662 £34,147 1.4d. 
1941-42 n/a 315 8,320,361 45,934 £46,737 1.35d. 
1942-43 n/a 331 9,129,881 48,530 £61,182 1.79d. 
1943-44 n/a 346 9,805,603 54,256 £87,440 2.43d. 
1944-45 n/a 352 9,986,224 57,020 £115,312 2.7d. 
  
     
  
School meals (Gaeltacht) 
Year Total 
schools 
Schools 
participating 
Total 
meals 
supplied 
Average 
daily 
number 
fed 
Total 
cost 
Average 
cost of 
food per 
meal
*
 
1938-39 325 317 2,648,585 n/a £20,096 1.8d. 
1939-40 316 313 2,661,682 n/a £18,595 1.7d. 
1940-41 311 309 2,711,005 n/a £20,705 1.8d. 
1941-42 308 300 2,401,011 n/a £18,937 1.9d. 
1942-43 308 301 2,342,101 n/a £17,218 1.8d. 
1943-44 308 307 2,313,732 n/a £25,033 2.6d. 
1944-45 308 304 2,219,868 n/a £19,903 2.15d. 
*
Cost given in decimalised pence in original source. Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Department of 
Local Government and Public Health, Report, 1939-45 
 
St John Ambulance Brigade 
 
The endeavours of the St John Ambulance Brigade’s Welfare Department 
received positive review in the third article of the ‘Community Kitchens’ series.153 The 
hot meal was in itself an extremely valuable asset at a time when home cooking was 
both expensive and difficult due to fuel scarcity. The distinguishing feature of the 
brigade’s scheme was the fact that since at least 1935 the meals were designed by the 
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expert dietician and professor of biochemistry at TCD, William. R. Fearon.
154
 One such 
meal was outlined in the Marrowbone Lane Samaritan Fund pamphlet: 
The dinner consists of (1) stew made with a little meat (minced), cereals (chiefly 
lentils and pulses), carrots and onions on a bone stock, potatoes and green 
vegetables; (2) Baked rice pudding to which beaten-up eggs are added after 
cooking, with hot milk poured over each helping; (3) Half-a-pint of milk is 
given to each mother to drink with her dinner. Owing to the scarcity of rice, sago 
mixed with oat flour is used on alternative days. This is a properly balanced diet 
for expectant and nursing mothers.
155
 
 
This meal would have constituted a massive boost to the deficient dietary of the mothers 
who were fortunate enough to be put on the list. Interestingly, it is possible to see how 
the menu was influenced by shortages as sago mixed with oat flour was used as a 
substitute to make up for the shortage of rice. Not only did the brigade feed the mothers, 
but just before giving birth each mother was granted clothing for both herself and the 
baby, a packet of oatmeal and a pint of milk for fourteen days after her confinement.
156
 
The provision of clothing was an important facet of the brigade’s work, a point was 
highlighted by the tenement dweller Mrs. K. who considered the problem of how to 
clothe her family as being her greatest worry.
157
  
Shortages and rising prices hampered the ability of the St John Ambulance 
Brigade to deliver welfare along former lines. In 1940 the Welfare Department was 
forced to reduce the length of the course of meals from six to five months.
158
 
Difficulties persisted. As early as July 1941 it was noted in the Ambulance Gazette that: 
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The committee find it increasingly difficult to maintain a suitable balanced diet, 
as many of the ingredients originally in the dinners are now unobtainable. The 
committee are anxious about the immediate future which holds two especial 
problems – the scarcity of the normal foodstuffs and the rise in prices which is 
faced without a corresponding increase in the annual income.
159
 
 
The fuel shortage also caused difficulties. Up until the winter of 1941, the brigade 
granted the mothers a 5s. fuel parcel, though henceforth this was replaced with a 5s. 
food voucher as fuel was unobtainable.
160
 The rising price of fuel forced the caterers to 
employ fuel economies; hay boxes were used to complete the cooking of par cooked 
soups and to keep dishes warm.
161
 Off cut pieces of wood sourced from timber 
merchants as far afield as Portarlington were used to fire boilers though irrespective of 
such economies, overall operational costs increased.
162
 The impact of the rise in prices 
was borne out in the Welfare Department’s annual reports published in the Irish 
Ambulance Gazette. In 1938 the three-course meal provided to the mothers cost the 
brigade 6d. per head, 7d. by the end of 1939, 8½d. in 1942, and as much as 10d. in 
1944.
163
 Such was the increase, in 1944 the brigade closed down its dining room at 
Merrion Square so as to maintain standards in its two other dining rooms at Mountjoy 
Square and Great Strand Street.
164
 Up until this point the brigade had been feeding an 
average of 1,000 mothers per year since 1939 which equated to an average of 75,000 
dinners and 85,000 pints of soup.
165
 Following the closure of Merrion Square these 
figures were reduced by more than fifty percent. 
The closure of Merrion Square did not result in a general regression of the 
communal dining facilities present in the city. As will be explored in the following 
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chapter, a new organisation, the Catholic Social Service Conference (CSSC) had since 
1941 made significant strides into the area. By 1944 the CSSC was operating seventeen 
maternity welfare centres in Dublin which offered an almost identical service to that 
provided by the St John Ambulance Brigade. The CSSC even transformed the former St 
Brigid’s Penny Diner on Holles Row which was in close proximity to the Merrion 
Square dining hall into a CSSC food centre designed to feed large numbers. Lindsey 
Earner-Byrne argues that the closure of Merrion Square was ‘very much a question of 
territory’ as the location of the CSSC centre forced the Catholic patrons to choose.166 
Denomination aside, the fact that the course of meals offered by the CSSC ran for six 
months, a month longer than that provided by the brigade, must have been a key 
consideration for the mothers. In a letter to the Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles 
McQuaid, a Catholic member of the brigade, Hilda Nolan, admitted that a number of the 
mothers were being fed at the CSSC dining hall at Holles Street, and that this factored 
into the brigade’s decision to cease operations at Merrion Square.167 The other factor at 
play which was not mentioned by Earner-Byrne was financial. Hilda Nolan explained to 
McQuaid that: 
The cost of maintenance is, of course, increasing and has been causing 
considerable anxiety to the [Finance] Committee 
 
In this respect, the brigade’s first instinct was to close down the dining hall on Great 
Strand Street. This centre, however, located in the north inner city was remarkably 
isolated from other communal dining facilities. In contrast, three CSSC food centres 
were located within half a kilometre of Merrion Square, the closest being Holles Row. 
In order to balance the books the brigade was always going to close down one of its 
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dining halls, but it was the existence of competition which sealed the fate of Merrion 
Square.  
Government welfare mechanisms, the Food Allowances Scheme 
 
In light of shortages, the increasing cost-of-living and calls for the control of 
prices, the government began to seriously consider the issue of the standard of living in 
Ireland. The Food Allowances Order was introduced on 1 September 1941 to address 
the issue. The order made provision:  
For the granting of a weekly allowance of food to eligible persons of certain 
classes who are resident in specified urban areas.
168
  
 
The following classes of persons were entitled to participate in the scheme 
 
1) Dependants (up to a maximum of six) of a person in receipt of unemployment 
assistance. 
2) Old age pensioners. 
3) Blind pensioners. 
4) Dependent children under sixteen years of age of blind pensioners. 
5) Recipients of disablement benefit under the National Health Insurance Acts who 
are in necessitous circumstances. 
6) Widows, children and orphans who are beneficiaries under the Widows’ and 
Orphans’ Pensions Act.169 
 
The specified urban areas included county boroughs, city boroughs, urban districts, and 
towns governed by commissioners.
170
 The quantity of food to be granted to each 
eligible dependant included three and a half pints of milk, a quarter of a pound of 
creamery butter, and two pounds of (batch) bread per week.
171
 For the purposes of the 
order a man with a wife was considered to have one dependant while each additional 
child would count as another dependant up to a maximum of six dependants. Reportedly 
based on a sample survey of the dietary of the necessitous classes, the intention of the 
voucher scheme was ‘to make good, in part at least,’ deficiencies in ‘nutritive 
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elements.’172 The first issue of food vouchers was made on the 4 September 1941 for 
dependants of unemployment assistance recipients while vouchers were issued to the 
remaining eligible classes on the 5 September 1941.
173
 Vouchers were valid for a week 
commencing from the date of issue and were issued on a weekly basis along with the 
appropriate payment of unemployment assistance, pensions, etc. In that first year a sum 
of £600,000 was provided to meet the cost of the food vouchers, £200,000 of which was 
earmarked for allocation by the boards of assistance to necessitous persons above the 
amount normally granted under home assistance.
174
  
The Food Allowances Scheme, did not have the effect of putting the 
beneficiaries in a better economic position than they were prior to the Emergency, rather 
it went some way to meeting the effects of the increased cost-of-living. This was 
reflected in the Bulletin of the Society of St Vincent de Paul which noted: 
At first sight it would seem that most of… [the recipients] would cease to be in 
need of assistance from our Society. We ought to be slow, however, to jump to 
this conclusion, because a large proportion of the increase in benefits or 
allowances has been accounted for already by the rise in the price of certain 
commodities which has take place since the beginning of the emergency.
175
 
 
Although enacted to secure the wellbeing of approximately 119,000 people, there was 
opposition to the order from some quarters.
176
 The scheme was criticised for being an 
undue infringement upon the natural liberties of those entitled to avail of it. Prior to its 
introduction, Labour TD and leader of the party William Norton argued that a cash sum 
rather than vouchers should be granted, adding that the scheme would bestow the 
stigma of pauperism upon the claimants.
177
 While the case was made by the opposition 
and the Labour deputies in particular that the poor were as capable of spending cash as 
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anyone else, providing relief in voucher form guarded against a situation whereby cash 
may have been spent unwisely. As the results of the Dublin section of the National 
Nutritional Survey illustrated, families didn’t always spend their income to the best 
nutritional advantage with the report recommending better food education to rectify 
this.
178
 Guaranteeing a weekly food allowance in exchange for vouchers also ensured 
that in spite of the increasing cost-of-living, the family would gain the same amount of 
food every week, something which would have been impossible to achieve had a fixed 
cash sum been granted. These points vindicate the government’s decision to introduce 
allowances in voucher as opposed to cash form. 
The voucher system provided a guaranteed domestic market for Ireland’s 
agricultural produce which benefited wheat and dairy farmers in particular. At the same 
time, families residing outside the scheduled urban areas who were  in receipt of state 
welfare were not entitled to the food vouchers. In Ireland’s rural areas there existed 
poverty and unemployment, especially among members of the rural labouring landless 
class. This fact was pointed out in the Dáil on 14 May 1941 by Labour Deputy for 
Wexford, Richard Corish.
179
 There were also necessitous families inhabiting small 
towns and villages which were not governed by a commissioner or defined as an urban 
district or city borough. This was true of the densely populated Cork city hinterland 
where in areas such as Glanmire and Blackrock resided a great many industrial workers 
who commuted to their workplace in the city on a daily basis. Such areas were 
classified as rural areas even though they were situated less than three kilometres from 
the city and contained an industrial working population who owned little land. In these 
districts, unemployed members of the population were entitled to the same amount of 
Unemployment Assistance (fourteen shillings) as the better off rural dwelling labouring 
                                                 
178
 Stationery Office, National Nutritional Survey, part I, methods of dietary survey and results from 
Dublin investigation (Dublin, 1946), p. 15. 
179
 DD, Mr Corish, 14 May. 1941, Vol. 83, No. 3, Col. 402. 
174 
 
family who lived in Kildare countryside for example. In Kildare, it was typical of such 
families to possess an acre or two of their own land, labour for larger farmers, catch 
rabbits, make jam, keep some pigs or poultry and cut their own turf. Their self 
sufficiency placed them in a better position to cope with the hardships caused by the 
Emergency. In April 1944, supplementary cash benefits were made available for 
recipients of widows, orphans, old age and blind pensions who lived outside of the 
scheduled areas.
180
 This went some way towards correcting the insufficiencies of the 
1941 order. The maximum allowance of this scheme was 2s. 6d. per week in the case of 
a blind or old age pensioner or recipient of disablement benefit, and 1d. 6s. a week for 
each of their dependent children.
181
 For the year 1944-45, total expenditure on the 
scheme amounted to £190,434.
182
 Counties Cork, Donegal, Galway, Kerry, Limerick 
and Mayo accounted for over fifty percent of this amount (see Table 3.9). Though in the 
end, the granting of Food Vouchers along with Cash Supplements had largely ceased by 
July 1947 while Food Vouchers for recipients of Home Assistance continued until 
March 1948 and some cash supplements were granted as late as 1949.
183
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Table 3.9 Expenditure by the local authorities on Supplemental Cash 
Allowances, 1944-45 
Public 
Assistance 
Authority 
Expenditure 
£ s. d. 
Carlow 4,138 15 6 
Cavan 2,951 14 0 
Clare 4,123 8 6 
Cork, North 9,561 16 6 
Cork, South 11,096 13 0 
Cork, West 9,647 7 9 
Donegal 24,119 12 6 
Dublin 12 15 0 
Balrothery 149 15 6 
Rathdown Nil 
 
  
Galway 10,716 18 0 
Kerry 18,136 9 6 
Kildare 4,236 2 0 
Kilkenny 5,323 6 0 
Laois 4,023 17 6 
Leitrim 1,654 15 6 
Limerick 13,003 0 0 
Limerick, C.B. Nil 
 
  
Longford 1,363 17 0 
Louth 1,063 10 0 
Mayo 14,920 18 0 
Meath 2,320 14 0 
Monaghan 1,650 18 6 
Offaly 2,869 16 6 
Roscommon 4,373 4 0 
Sligo 1,313 6 4 
Tipperary, N.R. 5,288 2 0 
Tipperary, S.R. 5,620 11 6 
Waterford 5,768 1 0 
Westmeath 4,269 10 6 
Wexford 11,343 11 6 
Wicklow 5,372 1 6 
Total 190,434 8 9 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 1944-
45 
 
Cheap fuel for necessitous households 
 
The Food Allowance Scheme introduced in September 1941 went some way to 
addressing the increased cost-of-living for residents of urban areas, but it was not until 
November 1942 that the government introduced a scheme to tackle the problem of fuel 
176 
 
poverty among these households. This had much to do with the fact that up until early 
1941, Ireland remained cushioned from the worst effects of a fuel shortage due to a 
combination of stockpiling and greater than normal imports.
184
 This however was of no 
benefit to the poor who owing to their meagre incomes were unable to buy in bulk, a 
situation which left them vulnerable to rising prices. Robert Collis’ address delivered to 
the audience at the Gaiety following a performance of Marrowbone Lane is 
demonstrative of the nature of the suffering experienced in light of fuel poverty. He 
described how the previous day a mother brought her baby to the Rotunda Hospital: 
The child felt cold to touch. I had its temperature taken. It did not register on the 
ordinary thermometer. I got a sub-normal thermometer. It registered 85ºF – 13ºF 
below normal, 98.4ºF. I asked the mother, who was a quite nice looking young 
woman – ‘Why?’ She told me that for the last ten days they had no fire in the 
room. It was freezing February weather. We took the baby in, but we could not 
resuscitate it. It had frozen to death.
185
 
 
In late 1942, as the pinch began to be felt more widely and with fuel poverty among the 
poorer classes becoming acute, the fuel scheme was introduced. The scheme provided 
for a sum of £100,000 annually to ensure a regular supply of cheap fuel for necessitous 
households in the non-turf areas during the winter months.
186
 Relevant households were 
each week entitled to collect one hundredweight (cwt) of turf from government fuel 
depots. They did so upon the exchange for a voucher purchased for a nominal fee unless 
they were in receipt of Home Assistance (see Table 3.10). 
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Table 3.10 Winter fuel scheme for necessitous households in Ireland, 
1942-47 
Persons in receipt of Price for 
one cwt 
    
Home Assistance Free 
Old age pensions 6d. 
Blind pensions 6d. 
Widows pensions 6d. 
Unemployment assistance 
(with dependants) 1s. 
  
 
Persons on low incomes 2s. 
Source: Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 1942-43, p. 32 
 
For the months of April to October a flat rate of 1s. per half hundredweight was 
charged.
187
 Dublin’s fuel depots were often located in open spaces such as parks and 
were supplied from the city’s central fuel dump in the Phoenix Park where during the 
years 1942-47 over half a million tons of turf were delivered from the turf area.
188
 In 
Galway a fuel depot was located at Eyre Square. One major point of criticism levelled at 
the scheme was that it didn’t cover necessitous households resident in the turf-area.189 
In October 1941, Dubliners were reportedly charged 6d. for a stone for wet 
green timber cut too large for their fireplaces, whereas just a year later, pensioners for 
example could obtain eight stone of turf for the same price under the winter fuel 
scheme.
190
 The impact of the scheme was immediate. Minister for Local Government 
and Public Health, Seán MacEntee, reported in the Dáil on 10 December 1942 that a 
weekly average of 1,200 tons of turf was being distributed in Dublin benefitting as 
many as 24,000 households.
191
 By May 1943, approximately 29,000 Dublin households 
                                                 
187
 Fee, ‘The effects of World War II’, pp 134-5. 
188
 Donal Clarke, Brown Gold, a history of Bord na Móna and the peat industry in Ireland (Dublin, 2010), 
p. 50. 
189
 Irish Housewives’ Committee, first annual report, June 1943 (NAI, Tweedy Papers 98/17/5/1/1, p. 2). 
190
 DD, Mr Byrne, 30 Oct. 1941, Vol. 88, No. 2, Col. 360. 
191
 DD, Mr MacEntee, 10 Dec. 1942, Vol. 89, No. 2, Col. 193. 
178 
 
were benefitting from the scheme.
192
 It provided cheap fuel to households who 
desperately needed it. This solution was not without its problems. The turf sent to the 
non-turf area was often derided for being too wet. Labour TD William Norton lamented 
‘its quality is such that a decent horse would not lie down in it for bedding.193 This issue 
is brilliantly captured in an illustration in the September 1943 edition of Dublin Opinion 
(see Figure 3.8). 
Figure 3.8 ‘The turf barge for Dublin’ as depicted in Dublin Opinion, 
September 1943 
 
Source: Dublin Opinion, Sept. 1943 
 
Some households refused to take their allowance due to its poor condition, a point 
which is unsurprising when one considers the difficulties families encountered 
obtaining their supplies.  Unlike rationed fuels which were often delivered to one’s 
doorstep by bellmen, fuel scheme turf was distributed from depots. Due to high demand, 
beneficiaries of the scheme were forced to queue at the depots often long before they 
opened in environments that offered little shelter. Unruly crowds were commonplace. 
Depots were short-staffed and the employees often unsympathetic. To make matters 
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worse, the recipients had to provide their own sacks and means by which to bring the 
turf home be it makeshift handcarts, trolleys and even prams. Those who refused the 
turf often elected to sell their vouchers and do without rather than go through the trouble 
of getting the turf from the depots.
194
 Interestingly, this scheme received far less 
criticism than that of the food voucher scheme.  
Footwear for children 
 
The Footwear Scheme for children from necessitous households launched by the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health late in 1944 is another example of 
a scheme introduced to ensure that the poorer classes were able to obtain a particular 
article that was in short supply. 
By arrangement with the Department of Supplies the manufacturers of 
children’s footwear produced official footwear of a strong and durable type 
bearing the distinguishing mark “C.P.” (Cúnamh Poiblí) on the sole, close to the 
heel.
195
 
 
The boots were then distributed to retailers all over the country through the normal 
distribution channels either to be exchanged for vouchers or sold at fixed prices. 
Table 3.11 Footwear retail prices under the footwear scheme in Ireland, 1944-45 
Sizes Price 
    
7 to 10 (small) 10s. 6d. 
11, 12, 13 and 1 13s. 
2, 3, 4, and 5 14s. 2d. 
6 and 7 (large) 16s. 
Source: Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 1944-45, p. 88 
 
The administration of the scheme was entrusted to the public assistance authorities as 
part of their administration of Home Assistance. The local authorities examined 
applications from eligible persons, determined the cases to be assisted, and issued 
vouchers exchangeable for footwear to these cases. Recipients of Home Assistance were 
entitled to free footwear under the scheme, however, in all other cases contributions 
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were determined by means.
196
 It was on these grounds that the scheme was most often 
criticised. As pointed out by Labour Deputy James Larkin (Junior), families supported 
by Unemployment Assistance (particularly larger ones) were in many cases unable to 
avail of the scheme even when granted vouchers due to the fact that they were unable to 
afford to pay the contribution.
197
 The scheme was also susceptible to abuse; 
Independent Deputy, James Dillon, questioned the legitimacy of claims made in rural 
Ireland.
198
 The Irish Press reported that in Kerry applications for boots were made by 
one in nineteen of the county’s population with the result that the local authority opted 
out of the scheme altogether considering most requests to be made by ‘chancers’.199 
This however, would have denied those who genuinely required the aid. Alluding to the 
Catholic social principle of subsidiarity, the article proposed the governance of the 
scheme be handed over to smaller local bodies, i.e. the Parish Councils.
200
 Nevertheless 
the public assistance authorities continued to administer the scheme with the Dublin 
Board of Assistance issuing 45,000 pairs of shoes in 1945.
201
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Table 3.12 Expenditure on and the number of vouchers granted by the local 
authorities in Ireland for the footwear scheme, 1944-45 
Public 
Assistance 
Authority 
Expenditure 
Total No. 
of 
Vouchers 
allocated £ s. d. 
Carlow 137 5 0 917 
Cavan 315 3 2 2,558 
Clare 206 8 8 3,438 
Cork, North 387 13 6 2,750 
Cork, South Nil 
 
  7,500 
Cork, West 345 9 2 4,125 
Donegal 274 15 10 2,750 
Dublin 6,231 17 4 37,500 
Balrothery 68 11 2 544 
Rathdown 285 19 0 2,750 
Galway 250 16 4 3,438 
Kerry 462 3 8 4,812 
Kildare Nil 
 
  1,556 
Kilkenny 247 18 0 2,099 
Laois 118 9 4 962 
Leitrim 102 9 4 1,375 
Limerick 1,008 9 8 5,500 
Limerick, C.B. 243 9 8 3,000 
Longford Nil 
 
  1,326 
Louth 260 14 2 1,071 
Mayo 294 1 8 2,750 
Meath 113 3 0 1,771 
Monaghan 119 16 10 1,004 
Offaly 83 13 1 1,282 
Roscommon 94 5 0 468 
Sligo 249 5 4 1,771 
Tipperary, 
N.R. 124 2 6 1,085 
Tipperary, S.R. 691 19 0 4,812 
Waterford 380 0 10 3,344 
Westmeath 164 3 6 822 
Wexford 255 9 0 3,190 
Wicklow 488 19 11 2,009 
Total 14,027 11 8 114,279 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using date from the Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 1944-
45 
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Case Study: The experience of ‘Mrs. K.’ The mother of a ‘typical’ tenement 
dwelling family 
 
The case of ‘Mrs. K’, the mother of a necessitous tenement family, as portrayed 
in The Bell’s ‘Other people’s incomes’, 1943, offers insights into the value of aid 
administered to the poor by both the government and voluntary organisations. Here was 
a family of eight including an unemployed husband and six children aged between ten 
months and thirteen years. The family’s accommodation was typical of Dublin’s 
tenements, their flat comprising a mere two rooms, there was no gas or running water, 
and the toilet which was in an outhouse in the yard was shared with five other families. 
The man of the house, an unemployed labourer, was granted 27s. 6d. Home Assistance 
per week as well as six food vouchers which were valued at one 1s. 9½d. each.
202
 The 
vouchers were given in addition to the monetary aid under the Home Assistance scheme. 
The six vouchers represented the maximum assistance a family was entitled to although 
the husband had seven dependants including his wife.
203
 Every second week six 
additional loaves could be claimed on the basis of the vouchers which came to the value 
of 3s. 3d. thus bringing the average weekly value of the vouchers to 12s. 4½d. This gave 
the family an average total weekly income of 39s. 10½d. 
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Table 3.13 Expenses of an average Dublin tenement dwelling family, 
1943 
Expenses s. d. 
Rent 7s. 0 d. 
Society 1 s. 6 d. 
Bread (21 loaves at 6 1/2d.) 11 s. 4 1/2 d. 
Milk 3 s. 9 1/2 d. 
Tea 2 s. 0 d. 
Sugar 2 s. 6 d. 
Cigarettes (for himself) 1 s. 9 d. 
Butter 4 s. 0 d. 
Soap   5 d. 
Potatoes (1/2 stone for Sunday)   9 d. 
Fat pieces for dripping   6 d. 
Cocoa   6 d. 
Fuel 2 s. 0 d. 
Total 38 s. 1 d. 
Source: Compiled, ‘Other peoples incomes - 3’ in The Bell, 7(2), (1943), p. 59 
 
Under the fuel scheme the family could purchase four stones of turf for a shilling during 
the summer, and two stones during the winter.
204
 As can be seen from Table 3.12, 
almost every incoming penny was accounted for by the week’s end. The remaining 1s. 
9½d. was used to buy matches, mending materials, paper and pencils for the children, a 
candle a week in the winter, and was put towards Sunday dinner.
205
 This left 
precariously little room for emergencies such as the sickness of a family member or 
other unplanned expenses that inevitably arise when raising a large family.  
Welfare dependence was a facet of daily life that was very common to Ireland’s 
poorest and one that was accentuated by the pressures of living during the Emergency. 
Although two thirds of the family’s income was spent on food, the difference between 
total weekly income and expenditure was negligible. A quick glance at Table 3.12 
indicates that the amount of food purchased was not nearly enough to feed two adults 
and six growing children for a week, least of all maintain them in good health. It was 
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this fact which made Mrs. K.’s family and families in a similar position so dependent on 
the free food and meals offered by voluntary organisations. Only on a Sunday was a 
cooked meal eaten in Mrs. K.’s household. For the rest of the week the entire family got 
their dinner from a nearby food centre. Normally they would have been expected to pay 
a penny per head for each meal, but the women who ran the centre were not ‘sticklers 
for payment.’ 206  The meal itself typically consisted of a stew followed by a milk 
pudding or bread and jam. It was the substance between the two ‘bread and spread’ 
meals consumed by the family every day. At a rate of eight meals daily costing two 
penny per meal the family would have made a saving of 8s., a sum which amounted to 
almost forty percent of what Mrs. K. was spending on food each week. However the 
expense incurred producing the meals in communal feeding kitchens was often greater 
than the price charged for the meal.
207
 Either way the nutritional value of this meal 
cannot be overstated for without it the family would have had little to no intake of 
vitamins, minerals and protein in their diet. 
The school-going children, of which there were four got ‘a good drink of milk at 
school’ although Mrs. K. admitted that the amount of milk she bought was not nearly 
sufficient for the family’s needs.208 As was normal with the tenement dwellers, this 
family also availed of aid offered by the ‘Vincens-man’.209 Interestingly, it seems that 
the family and Mrs. K. in particular, fared best during and just after her pregnancies. In 
the three months preceding and following the birth of a child, Mrs. K. attended a 
maternity welfare centre. By 1943 the Catholic Social Service Conference maternity 
welfare programme was in operation and offering a six-month-long course of meals. 
Here she availed of well-cooked, balanced and healthy meals. Mrs. K’s admission that 
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she missed the meals when taken off them suggests that her family was closer to hunger 
than she would have liked to admit.
210
  
The effects of the Emergency rendered existing government welfare schemes 
inadequate and hindered the ability of philanthropic organisations to deliver aid along 
former lines. Indeed the ways in which these welfare schemes were affected reflects the 
impact of the Emergency more generally. The necessitous classes were the first to feel 
the effects of the increased cost-of-living, and while the government was slow to 
respond, the aid provided to the poor by voluntary organisations helped to alleviate 
poverty in the interim. The vital role played by voluntary organisations underlines the 
inadequacy of the state-sponsored schemes and the extent to which the Second World 
War affected everyday life in Ireland. The case of Mrs K demonstrates the valuable 
contribution made by voluntary organisations to the economy of the very poor. It also 
highlights the importance of communal feeding initiatives and the crucial role they 
played in Dublin. The Food Allowance Order, 1941, and the cheap fuel scheme for 
necessitous households, 1942, were the most significant welfare mechanisms introduced 
by the government as a direct result of shortages and the increased cost-of-living. 
However, the government’s efforts were often criticised. Typically labelled as being 
insufficient and limited in scope by the opposition and advocates of the poor, the 
Catholic hierarchy and proponents of Catholic social teachings perceived them to be an 
undue intrusion into family life. The government’s decision not to put into operation the 
Cooked Meals Service can be seen as a failure, especially in light of the success of 
similar initiatives in Great Britain where levels of nutrition were greatly raised. By 
February 1945, an estimated 1,650,000 quality school dinners were served to pupils in 
England and Wales, in July 1940 the corresponding figure had been 130,000; one child 
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in three was fed at school in 1945 as opposed to one child in thirty in 1940.
211
 
Undoubtedly motivated by financial pragmatism, Catholic social principles were 
employed to justify the government’s position. Importantly, the Emergency highlighted 
the inadequacy of the state’s welfare system and forced the government to rethink its 
approach to health. The biggest testament to this fact was the introduction of the 
Children’s Allowance in 1944, and the establishment of separate departments for 
welfare and health in 1947. 
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Chapter IV 
 
The Catholic Social Service Conference, 1941-48 
 
War-time conditions created problems beyond the scope of existing charitable 
organisations. In January 1941, just six weeks after his appointment as Roman Catholic 
Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid called together a group of representative 
Catholic lay men and women to consider what he saw as a solution to the crisis.
1
 The 
primary aim of this meeting was to: 
Devise a national solution, in accordance with Catholic principles, sufficiently 
adequate to meet the situation caused by the rapidly increasing poverty and 
distress... and to consider the need for the cooperation of all social welfare 
activities.
2
 
 
What exactly McQuaid had in mind was the formation of a Catholic umbrella 
organisation to coordinate and extend the work of the various independent Catholic 
organisations and charities.
3
 With McQuaid’s approval, a provisional committee of 
fourteen was appointed to establish the organisation’s structure and modus operandi. 
McQuaid hoped that the existence of such an organisation would enable the existing 
charities to become more effective and efficient. While the promotion of cooperation 
was a fundamental objective of the organisation, so too was the stipulation that each 
participating organisation maintain its individual status.
4
 According to the Standard the 
intention was not to interfere, but to provide leadership and ‘unity of effort’. 5 The 
organisation was first named Catholic Social Welfare Conference, but this was soon 
changed to the Catholic Social Service Conference (CSSC).
6
 While the initial aim may 
have been to devise a ‘national solution’, the work of the CSSC was confined to the 
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Archdiocese of Dublin, and more particularly, the city of Dublin. This chapter will 
therefore examine the role played by the CSSC in the alleviation of distress in Dublin. 
Attention will be focused on the CSSC’s efforts to alleviate food and clothing poverty, 
and an attempt will be made to shed light on how the approach of the CSSC was in 
accordance with Catholic principles. 
At the start the provisional committee identified the problems which in its 
opinion were most affecting the nature of poverty in the city; Mr E. J. Duffy, President 
of the Society of St Vincent de Paul who was well acquainted with the issue of poverty 
in Dublin was a committee member.
7
 During a two-day assembly held in Ely House on 
the 12 and 13 March 1941 which was attended by Duffy, the structure of the 
organisation was established.
8
 The provisional committee considered the five most 
urgent needs of Dublin’s poor to be food, fuel, clothing, housing and employment and 
as a result a sub-committee was established to deal with each of these issues. According 
to an un-authored and undated CSSC document entitled ‘A review of the activities of 
the CSSC’, each committee was coordinated by volunteer experts from appropriate 
fields, many of whom came from corporation or government departments.
9
 The CSSC’s 
position on welfare was apparent from the start. In the invitation to the inaugural 
meeting to be held on 17 April 1941 which was sent to approximately forty Catholic 
charities and organisations, the provisional committee pledged the CSSC to ‘act in the 
closest cooperation with, and give loyal support to the State and Local Authorities in 
their efforts to solve’ the issue of poverty.10 The objective was to create a key role for 
the Catholic Church in welfare provision. While McQuaid had a definite agenda 
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regarding the CSSC and the role of the church in the provision of welfare, the 
organisation was also created with a view to alleviating problems then arising or ones 
which might transpire during a potential crisis. Following the fall of France in June 
1940, tensions increased in Ireland. The threat of invasion by one or the other of the 
belligerents was seen as a real possibility. In 1941 the government estimated that at the 
height of a potential crisis as many as 400,000 persons or fifty percent of the country’s 
workforce would become unemployed; an approximate 300 percent increase over the 
actual level of unemployment at that time.
11
 In such a scenario, it was hoped that local 
voluntary organisations acting on their own initiative would be able to maintain 
essential services in the event of central government becoming paralysed. The creation 
of parish councils for this purpose was actively encouraged by the government and the 
establishment of the CSSC can be seen as part of this trend.
12
  
The CSSC aimed to address immediate problems arising out of the Emergency 
and also to position itself as an organisation capable of coordinating welfare schemes in 
the event of a breakdown of central government. According to the president of the 
CSSC, Owen Crowley, the CSSC also intended to construct long-term social policy 
based upon Catholic principles.
13
 The publication of papal encyclicals on social issues, 
the most important being Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno crystallised these 
principles and provided the ideology of ‘Catholic Action’.14 As Máire Ní Chearbhaill 
explains, Catholic Action had several meanings: 
It could describe any action by a lay person inspired by faith, or it could define a 
lay group that had been mandated by the local bishop for a specific task; it could 
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also be used in the sense of defending the Church from its enemies, or in 
working to improve the prevailing working and social conditions.’15 
 
The ideology of Catholic Action heavily influenced the approach of the Irish Catholic 
Church to matters of social welfare while ‘McQuaid gave teeth to Catholic Action in 
Dublin’.16 Quadragesimo Anno in particular stimulated interest in social issues among 
educated Catholic laity, and prompted the Catholic hierarchy to influence the 
development of Irish social welfare policy. The ideology of Catholic Action was 
intended to restore Catholic power and influence especially in Europe where it had lost 
ground in light of industrialisation and the spread of socialism.
17
 As such it was adopted 
by Ireland’s Catholic hierarchy and proved to be fundamental to the development and 
approach of the CSSC.  
Underpinning ideologies 
 
Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical of 1891, Rerum Novarum or ‘On the condition of the 
worker’ was the papal response to the process of ‘modernisation’ experienced since the 
onset of the industrial revolution.
18
 The document reaffirmed the right of the individual 
to private property, rejected socialism and unchecked capitalism, and at the same time 
offered recommendations as to how the ‘misery and wretchedness pressing so unjustly 
on the majority of the working class’ might be checked.19 On the state, it advised that 
the foremost duty of its rulers ‘should be to make sure that the laws and 
institutions...shall be such as of themselves to realize public well-being and private 
                                                          
15
 Máire Brighid Ní Chearbhaill, ‘The Society of St Vincent de Paul in Dublin, 1926-1975’ (PhD thesis in 
history, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2008), p. 94. 
16
  Lindsey Earner-Byrne, Mother and child, maternity welfare in Dublin 1922-60 (Manchester, 2007), p. 
91. 
17
  Kelly, ‘Catholic Action and the development of the Irish Welfare State’, p. 109; Don O’Leary, 
Vocationalism and social Catholicism in twentieth-century Ireland, the search for a Christian social 
order (Dublin, 2000), p.11. 
18
  Kelly, ‘Catholic Action and the development of the Irish Welfare State’, p. 110; The encyclical was the 
preferred method of bringing important papal statements to public notice. 
19
 Rerum Novarum, Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on capital and labour, 15 May 1891, para 3. 
191 
 
prosperity.’20 Crucially, it vehemently opposed the socialist idea of the interventionist 
state. In relation to this, the encyclical stated its outright opposition to the contention 
that ‘civil government should at its option intrude into and exercise intimate control 
over the family household.’21 The encyclical also underlined the importance of Christian 
charity which it stressed was useful,  efficient, and well established and pointed out that 
a ‘system of relief organized by the State’ would never ‘make up for the devotedness 
and self sacrifice of Christian charity.’22 
Quadragesimo Anno, encyclical of Pope Pius XI on ‘The reconstruction of the 
social order’ was published in 1931 to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Rerum 
Novarum. Like Leo XIII, Pius XI commissioned Quadragesimo Anno in response to the 
pressing social and economic issues of his day, namely, the end of the industrial 
revolution and the onset of the Great Depression. Together both documents can be 
viewed as a response to the successive waves of modernisation that had swept away the 
traditional social and economic order. However, unlike Leo XIII who considered the 
plight of the worker, Pius XI placed greater emphasis on the moral implications of the 
economic and social order recommended that society be arranged according to Catholic 
social principles.
23
 Essentially, Quadragesimo Anno advocated vocational organisation 
which would entail the grouping of employers and employees into industry-specific 
corporations in order to foster communication, efficiency, and most importantly to 
promote their common interests.
24
 There had been a widespread loss of confidence in 
capitalism following the Wall Street Crash in 1929 and as a result cooperation as 
opposed to competition was to be the cornerstone of the new economic system.
25
 It also 
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urged ‘solidarity’ advocating that the individual must take account of the common good 
and that special attention must be paid to the weak and poor.
26
 Pope Pius XI’s 
encyclical also underlined the importance of the principle of subsidiarity which 
emphasised that individuals should be allowed to act freely and with dignity in order to 
utilise their initiative to the benefit of the common good. This principle would prove 
particularly significant for the development of Catholic Action in Ireland. 
27
 Not only 
applicable to the individual, subsidiarity was considered relevant to organisations also.
28
 
Subsidiarity warns states and large organisations or institutions against assuming too 
much power and control over society, while the guiding principle of subsidiarity is that 
activities or functions must be carried out by the smallest organisation or on the most 
local level possible. The encyclical also noted that ‘no one can be at the same time a 
good Catholic and a true socialist.
29
 
The message expressed in both encyclicals was fundamentally the same: social 
harmony and the rejection of communism were paramount, yet at the time of their 
publication the encyclicals were not equally received in Ireland. While Rerum Novarum 
fostered interest in social Catholicism in Europe, in Ireland it was not so warmly 
embraced.
30
 The geopolitical instability of the early twentieth century experienced on 
both the national and international stages consumed the attentions of those in Ireland 
who otherwise might have engaged with the developments in social Catholicism.
31
 On 
top of this, the very issues which prompted Leo XIII into publishing Rerum Novarum 
(the successive waves of industrialisation and the existence of a disenchanted working 
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class) were not so apparent in the Irish context. However, much had changed in Ireland 
by the time Quadragesimo Anno was published in 1931. Many of the inhibiting factors 
which had militated against the development of a socially-conscious Catholic class had 
either receded or had been settled.
32
 Ireland had become more industrialised, its urban 
working class had increased in number, and the labour movement had grown. This 
made it increasingly difficult for the church and government to ignore issues of a social 
and economic nature. Add to this the new found strength of the Irish Catholic Church 
coupled with the growing number of socially active educated Catholics and it becomes 
clear why Ireland of 1931 was more receptive to the social teachings of the papacy than 
Ireland in 1891. A comparison of the content of the ‘Ecclesiastic Register’ – a piece 
published annually in the Irish Catholic Directory – in the years following 1891, with 
that of its content in the years after 1931 is telling.
33
  
The encyclical Quadragesimo Anno prompted the Irish Catholic Church to 
examine topics of social and economic significance, and it is obvious that it received a 
warmer reception than Rerum Novarum had forty years earlier. This however did not 
translate into wholehearted enthusiasm for its application. As an answer to the ills of 
modernisation, Quadragesimo Anno stressed the value of the corporatist or syndicalist 
models of political, economic and social organisation (or vocationalism as it would 
become known as in Ireland).
34
 For the most part in Ireland, there was little appetite for 
the further social upheaval that embracing the corporatist model would have entailed. 
Yet had the Catholic hierarchy pressed for change along the lines advocated in the 
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encyclical, they undoubtedly would have been set on a collision course with the 
government. Instead, valuing its newfound privileged position, the bishops preferred to 
take a more conservative approach to the document thus maintaining the status quo. The 
question of personal morality was always their primary worry. Dances, foreign music, 
cinema and the foreign secular press were identified as causing ‘a great lowering of the 
moral tone.’35 One contributor to the Irish Monthly, a Mr Wilfred Parsons summed up 
the attitude of the Irish Catholic hierarchy to Quadragesimo Anno in April 1941 when 
he said ‘we have gone to other things, and now the whole business looks like a fad.’36 
However, just over two years previously in January 1939, de Valera conceded to the 
demands of the vocationalist lobby when permitted the establishment of the 
Commission on Vocational Organisation. The commission, chaired by the Bishop of 
Galway, Dr Michael Browne, was to examine and report on the most efficient means of 
promoting the creation of vocational organisations in Ireland.
37
 This decision is 
reflective of Catholic influence on the government and suggests that some bishops, such 
as Bishop Browne, saw the vocationalist model as a viable alternative to the existing 
structures. Clearly then the response to Quadragesimo Anno was a mixed one. 
One sphere in which Quadragesimo Anno caught the imagination of Ireland’s 
socially conscious educated Catholic laity and allowed them to find common ground 
was in the realms of subsidiarity, Christian charity and Catholic Action. In this regard, 
Pius XI’s teachings on social policy in Quadragesimo Anno, which emphasised the 
importance of Christian charity, and rejected state-centralised welfare schemes, were of 
fundamental importance to the development of the CSSC. The state was perceived by 
vocationalists to be a dangerous force; this was underlined in Rerum Novarum which 
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warned against states appropriating too much power.
38
 Such fear in an era of 
totalitarianism was unsurprising. ‘But it was taken so far that the social welfare system 
of a liberal country such as Ireland, based on the British model, was looked upon with 
suspicion.’39 The character of state charity was also despised, as evident on an address 
on 30 April 1933 by Dr Byrne, Archbishop of Dublin. Speaking at the centenary 
celebration in Dublin of the founding of the St Vincent de Paul, Archbishop Byrne 
stated: 
The system of poor relief which they had imported from England was a soulless 
one, under which the poor were treated like animals huddled in workhouses or 
given a little help to keep body or soul together. The dole had very little 
Christianity behind it either.
40
 
 
Archbishop Byrne went on to add: 
 
Never was the Society of St Vincent de Paul more necessary than today. 
Catholic Action was the hope of Ireland, and the Society was the greatest 
element of Catholic Action in their midst.
41
 
 
Both the imperative of Christian charity and the danger of totalitarian government 
appropriating too much power were aspects of the encyclicals that the Irish Catholic 
hierarchy latched onto. Catholic Action and Christian charity were considered bulwarks 
against the advances of socialism and communism. 
The inaugural meeting of the CSSC took place on 17 April 1941 in the Oak 
Room of the Mansion House, Dublin, with over 150 persons attending; the Central 
Catholic Library, 75 Merrion Square, would subsequently become the CSSC’s meeting 
place.
42
 The attendees included official representatives from almost forty Catholic 
organisations with Owen Crowley, a teacher, presiding in the absence of the archbishop. 
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Noteworthy was the inclusion of vocationalist organisations including the Knights of St 
Columbanus, the Catholic Yong Men’s Association, and the Catholic Truth Society.43 
The choice of the Catholic Library, which had been a centre for the distribution of 
Catholic social teachings since its foundation in 1922, as the official meeting place of 
the CSSC is indicative of the importance of these principles to the fledgling 
organisation. Even the venue for CSSC’s formative meetings held in the previous 
months at Ely House, the HQ of the Knights of St Columbanus, is telling; the Knights 
were very much a pro vocationalist and pro Catholic Action organisation. 
The courage of McQuaid to take on such an unprecedented and unwieldy project 
so soon after his appointment as archbishop is noteworthy. As a Holy Ghost priest 
McQuaid was only all too well aware of how limited religious orders were in terms of 
co-operation. While there existed within religious orders of the Catholic Church a 
tradition of independent autonomous good works, united effort and pooling of resources 
was rare. Parish charities were also similarly standalone in their efforts to meet the 
needs of the poor. The entrenched tradition of independence went even further as co-
operation between congregations, even among houses of the same order, was limited 
and as such they often existed in perfect independence and practiced complete self-
sufficiency. Although the St Vincent de Paul had a central organ of administration, each 
conference like a parish concerned itself with the welfare of its own. It was this tradition 
which made McQuaid’s move to unite Dublin’s various charitable organisations under 
one umbrella organisation so ambitious. The ideology provided by Leo XIII and Pius XI 
in the form of Catholic Action coupled with the needs of the time galvanised the various 
religious orders into action. Foremost among the immediate concerns of the Conference 
were problems associated with unemployment and the supply of food and fuel to 
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Dublin’s poor. Remedies for unemployment and the extension of facilities for cheap 
feeding and distribution of fuel through existing charitable organisations were identified 
as objectives of the utmost importance.
44
 
Food centres 
 
The CSSC’s Food Committee got to work almost as soon as it was founded. It 
identified existing centres and convents which distributed ‘penny dinners’ and an effort 
was made to supply them with food and better equipment. The expansion of communal 
feeding services was seen to be the most effective and efficient way of ensuring that as 
many needy people as possible were provided with the nourishment they so desperately 
required. The Food Committee concentrated on the establishment of adequately-
equipped food centres in parishes in the city and diocese where in its opinion distress 
was most keenly felt and relief most urgently needed.
45
 In a similar way to both the St 
Vincent de Paul and Muintir na Tíre, the Catholic parish was taken as the unit of 
administration. Within the parish the parish priest was made responsible for the work of 
the CSSC.
46
 Once a parish was identified as being in need of a food centre, the Food 
Committee with the help of the parish clergy identified a suitable building for the 
purpose. The building was then connected to the electricity and water supply if these 
services were absent while the necessary alterations were made to transform it into a 
food centre. The food centre was then equipped with electrical and turf boilers; 
preparation counters; potato peelers; washing-up apparatus such as sinks and all the 
other minor equipment and utensils that were necessary to run an industrial kitchen. If 
dining facilities were to be provided, the adjoining hall was fitted out with tables, chairs 
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and cutlery. The total cost of equipping these food centres varied from £100 to £700.
47
 
Dublin Corporation also loaned the CSSC electric and turf boilers originally secured for 
the Cooked Meals Service (see Chapter III).
48
 
Once the food centre was furnished with the necessary equipment, a sister from 
one of the religious orders in the city was appointed to run the centre; the CSSC’s 
flagship food centre, the Henrietta Lane centre was opened on 3 November 1941 under 
the management of the Sisters of Charity of St Vincent de Paul.
49
 While the sister 
superintendent was an unsalaried position, she was granted authority to hire a number of 
paid lay workers to carry out work under her supervision. Nuns were seen as especially 
suited to working in the food centre environment. Some were accustomed to dealing 
with the poor (as would have been the case with the Sisters of Charity) and had 
experience of working in large institutions such as hospitals where they would have 
attended the needy and infirm and catered for large numbers. Some sisterhoods were 
solicited to supervise centres not attached to their convents, and in the case of certain 
sisterhoods the work was totally foreign.
50
 This was a new departure. Additionally they 
constituted a free source of labour who took orders, and who could easily be replaced if 
their performance was judged to fall short of expectations of the CSSC’s hierarchy. The 
sharp distinction made with the degrading poor law system and the squalor of soup 
kitchens of the famine era is clear. Not only were the volunteers and paid staff who 
operated the food centres trained, but the centres were equipped with quality cooking 
and cleaning apparatus. As can be seen from Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, the kitchens and 
dining halls appear to be modern, respectful and clean spaces (note the whitewashed 
walls, clean floors and neatly-covered preparation tables). Also the way in which the 
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women in Figure 4.3 can be seen sitting down to their meal – in an orderly manner with 
the proper utensils – cannot be more at odds with the engrained populist images of the 
Great Famine’s soup kitchens as depicted in the London Illustrated News. Such images 
more often than not portray scenes of chaos, humiliation, filth and general degradation. 
Figure 4.1 The kitchen area of a CSSC food centre in the Archdiocese of Dublin, 
1941-45 
 
Source: Mary Purcell, 50 Years of the Catholic Social Services Conference (Dublin, 1991), p. 17 
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Figure 4.2 The kitchen area of a CSSC food centre in the Archdiocese of Dublin, 
1941-45 
 
Source: Mary Purcell, 50 Years of the Catholic Social Services Conference (Dublin, 1991), p. 9 
 
Figure 4.3 Diners eating at the Henrietta Lane food centre, Dublin, 1941-45 
 
Source: Mary Purcell, 50 Years of the Catholic Social Services Conference (Dublin, 1991), p. 9 
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By September 1942, twenty-three food centres had been established in the 
Archdiocese of Dublin under the auspices of the Food Committee of the CSSC.
51
 
According to CSSC records there food centres were capable of producing anywhere 
between 500 to 1,500 meals per day.
52
 Figures available in September 1942 for eighteen 
of these food centres reveal that they were serving as many as 121,000 meals on average 
per month.
53
 The enormity of this feat of organisation becomes clear when it is taken 
into consideration that the first meeting of what would become the provisional 
committee of the CSSC was held less than eighteen months previously in January 1941. 
By 1943, the CSSC had in operation a further four food centres taking the total number 
of food centres in the Archdiocese of Dublin to twenty-seven which were producing as 
many as 250,000 meals per month or 3,000,000 meals per year.
54
  
Table 4.1 Statistics relating to the CSSC’s food centres for the twelve months 
ending in September during the years 1943-48 
  1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 
No. of centres 27 27 25 25 24 23 
Total meals served 3,000,000 2,500,000 2,700,000 2,706,613 2,579,947 2,107,657 
Table created by Ciarán Bryan using data from: CSSC, Annual general reports, 1943-48 (NAI, TAOIS/97/9/292) 
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Figure 4.4 CSSC food centres in the Dublin metropolitan area, 1944 
 
Source: Appeal, Catholic Social Services Conference, Sept. 1944 (DAA, AB8/B/XIX, p. 4) 
 
The sit-down meals enabled by the dining facilities such as those illustrated in 
Figure 4.3 were normally reserved for women and children under the CSSC’s maternity 
welfare scheme; this scheme will be discussed later in the chapter. In addition, the 
CSSC also provided a take-home meals service. In Figure 4.5 a nun can be seen passing 
food through a window to a mother and her children, while in Figure 4.6 lay staff are 
pictured working behind a counter while a group of women and children wait to be 
served on the opposite side of the counter with various sorts of receptacles at the ready. 
Those who availed of the take-home meals sometimes provided their own containers; 
the woman in the right-foreground of Figure 4.6 is seen holding a jug. The CSSC’s 
second food centre opened in South Crumlin was exclusively for take-home meals.
55
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Figure 4.5 A nun passes a take-home meal to a mother with her children at a 
CSSC food centre in Dublin, 1941-45 
 
 Source: CSSC, Handbook of the Catholic Social Service Conference (Dublin, 1945) 
 
Figure 4.6 CSSC lay staff pictured serving takeaway meals to a group of women 
and children at a food centre in Dublin, 1941-45 
 
Source: CSSC, Handbook of the Catholic Social Service Conference (Dublin, 1945) 
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Each take-home meal was estimated to constitute sufficient feeding for two or three 
persons with the result that by 1943 the CSSC was producing between 6,000,000 to 
8,000,000 meals per year.
56
 The take-home meal therefore had additional value although 
once the food was taken home it could not be guaranteed that those who needed it most 
received it. Except under the maternity welfare scheme diners were expected to pay 1d 
for an average portion, or 2d for a substantial one; these prices compared favourably 
with those charged in other communal feeding centres (see Chapter III).
57
 The diner’s 
contribution went some way to covering the cost of the meal, but those unable to afford 
to pay for the meals were not turned away.
58
 For the twelve months ending September 
1944, the total cost of the CSSC’s operations amounted to £38,771. Of this amount, 
£28,707 was spent on the running of the food and maternity welfare centres. An 
estimated eighty percent of this sum was spent on the food while the remainder covered 
the cost of food, wages, and equipment and so on.
59
 This showed remarkably efficient 
use of limited resources. 
An important aspect of the CSSC’s communal feeding work, the take-home 
meal, was partly a product of necessity (as some of the food centres lacked dining hall 
facilities), but it also had much to do with the CSSC’s underpinning ideology. The 
CSSC’s adherence to Catholic social teachings is especially apparent in the workings of 
the take-home meals service. Enabling the poor to eat in their own homes as opposed to 
in a communal dining hall was considered to be less disruptive to normal family life.
60
 
The opposition to communal feeding in regards to the family is crystallised by the 
comments made in the Dáil on 3 April 1941 by Labour TD for Cork Borough, James 
Hickey, who stated: 
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I am opposed to communal kitchens. I believe in feeding the people in their own 
homes... I am not trying to make little of anybody’s efforts to help the poor but I 
am very keen on maintaining the status of the family.
61
 
 
By taking their meals home, families could avoid the stigma of pauperism associated 
with dining among other poor families in a communal dining hall. The departure from 
the degrading nature of the indoor poor relief system of the Great Famine era is clear. 
The CSSC emphasised its respect for the dignity of the family and expressly 
distinguished its work from that of state-run or secular welfare schemes. According to 
Lindsey Earner-Byrne this was an attempt to ‘characterise the CSSC as the appropriate 
method of family support rather than a bureaucratic state version.’62 
In terms of finance, the food centres received grants from the CSSC and Dublin 
Corporation in addition to the diner’s contributions.63 The CSSC also made frequent 
appeals for voluntary subscriptions both financial and otherwise. The value of benefit in 
kind and personal services rendered in this way was said to be immense.
64
 As discussed 
in Chapter III, the Department of Local Government and Public Health guaranteed ‘all 
authorised capital expenditure’ for both newly-erected municipal and voluntary 
communal feeding kitchens.
65
 Funding voluntary communal feeding initiatives was a 
cost-effective way for the government to increase the welfare services available to the 
poor. It also underlines the fact that the government considered the work to be important. 
This begs the question, if both local and central government were willing to patronise 
the CSSC and other organisations such as the St John’s Ambulance Brigade, why did 
the authorities not undertake their own communal feeding projects? Poverty throughout 
the country was increasing and in Dublin it was particularly evident. In Dublin, the 
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corporation had put into place the Cooked Meals Service (see Chapter III), but the 
scheme wasn’t given the green light. To put it simply, the CSSC offered the cheapest 
solution to the crisis. It received voluntary subscriptions and its centres were mostly 
operated by volunteers, religious sisters and members of the clergy. Even before the 
Emergency and the formation of the CSSC, Catholic organisations in Dublin were 
operating communal feeding centres or ‘penny dinners’ such as the one at Holles Row 
(see Chapter III). This tradition was something Dublin Corporation lacked. The CSSC’s 
unit of administration, the parish, was also suited to the task at hand. Being a well-
defined and bounded unit of administration with a community consciousness, it 
constituted the ideal organisational division. It seems plausible that the government may 
have assumed the position of patron while allowing the CSSC to take a central role in 
the field due to pressure from McQuaid although there exists no documentary evidence 
to this effect. Nevertheless, the CSSC was eager to position itself as the appropriate 
instrument of family support and the fact that the Cooked Meals Service was put into 
place by the government but not used appears to be significant. Whatever the reason, in 
the CSSC the government was presented with a cost-effective response to the crisis 
which also appealed to Catholic sensibilities and proponents of Catholic social 
teachings. 
By highlighting the cost-effective nature of the work conducted by the CSSC in 
its food centres, one could be forgiven for assuming the meals provided were of little 
nutritional value. The evidence however, suggests otherwise. For their 1d or 2d 
contribution, diners could avail of substantial and well-balanced meals such as those 
described in Table 4.2. 
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Table 4.2 Typical meals served in CSSC food centres, 1941-45 
  Vegetable and meat stew 
  Corn beef, cabbage and potatoes 
Mains Rabbit soup and potatoes 
  Rabbit soup and colcannon 
  Fish, potatoes and vegetables 
  Bread pudding and jam 
Sweet Rice and jam 
  Tapioca and jam 
Followed by A cup of tea, bread and butter 
Source: A review of the activities of the CSSC, 28 Sept. 1945 (DAA, AB8/B/XIX, p. 3) 
 
So long as the food centres maintained this standard, and varied the meals they served, 
the meals would have constituted an invaluable source of nourishment in terms of 
vitamins and minerals that were otherwise largely absent from their starvation diets. 
However this might not always have been possible, as the chairman of the Food 
Committee, Ernest Cullen, noted in October 1941: 
The twenty-seven food centres working under the auspices of the Conference are 
doing good work. They supply over 250,000 meals per month and they are 
endeavouring to provide a varied meal.
66
 
 
Clearly Cullen wasn’t as confident in the ability of the CSSC to ensure its diners always 
received a varied meal. The Maternity Welfare Department’s annual report for 1946-47 
noted that owing to high prices the maintenance of varied meals was a ‘very difficult 
problem’.67 
An invaluable aspect of the work conducted by the CSSC was in the area of 
human nutrition and the way in which it made practical use of the science of dietetics. 
In October 1941 a booklet which was sponsored by the CSSC – Food supplies – food 
and dietetics – was published. Its author was Professor Edmund J. Sheehy who was first 
and foremost an agricultural scientist who specialised in animal nutrition, but had 
obviously kept pace with developments in the field of human nutrition. Evidence of this 
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lies in the booklet itself and in an appendix (which he also authored) to William 
Fearon’s important article, The National problem of nutrition.68 Commenting on the 
‘inadequate and incomplete diet’ of the poor, the booklet noted: 
Examination of the food budgets of these families, aided by our numerous 
charitable organisations, reveals an alarming state of affairs. Bread, tea or cocoa, 
sugar, and margarine constitute the principle items of their daily food. 
Vegetables and eggs are practically unknown quantities in these households.
69
 
 
Joseph Reilly writing in The Standard was full of praise for this publication 
recommending that every household should have a copy. Reilly hoped that the booklet 
would draw attention to the ‘social evil’ of malnutrition so that surveys concerned with 
living standards and consumption habits might be produced in order to reveal the extent 
of the problem among Ireland’s poor.70 In the 1941 report of the Food Committee, it 
noted that enquiries were being made into the possibility of arranging a series of 
lectures on dietetics.
71
 Whether or not this series materialised, on 10 February 1943 a 
lecture which advocated the importance of a balanced diet was delivered by Dr Oliver 
Fitzgerald M.Sc. to representatives of the CSSC’s food centres. A copy of this paper is 
attached to the ‘Draft Constitution’ of the CSSC which indicates that the organisation’s 
hierarchy credited the issue of nutrition with a degree of importance.
72
 Several months 
earlier on 18 October 1942, as arranged by the Maternity Welfare Department, D. K. 
O’Donovan delivered a lecture on diet in relation to pre and post-natal care. It was in 
this field, where the work of the Food Committee and the Maternity Welfare 
Department overlapped, that the CSSC was particularly strong.
73
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Maternity welfare 
 
Closely connected to the work conducted in the food centres was the CSSC’s 
maternity welfare programme. Owing to Emergency conditions, unemployment, rising 
prices, etc., the number of Dublin mothers in necessitous circumstances had risen 
considerably. This fact was reflected in the increasing infant mortality statistics (see 
Figure 4.7). To address this issue, Archbishop McQuaid personally requested the 
creation of the Maternity Welfare Department to cater specifically for the needs of 
mothers and their children.
74
 While some preliminary work in the area of maternity 
welfare was carried out in late 1942, the Maternity Welfare Department was officially 
established in 1943.
75
 The department’s objective was to set up maternity welfare 
centres throughout the city where services and facilities would be provided to promote 
the health of expectant and nursing mothers. During the preliminary stages the aim was 
to attach one maternity welfare centre to each of the twenty-seven food centres.
76
 For 
the CSSC: 
The most important function of the maternity department is taking care of poor 
expectant mothers who often with large families are under-nourished for the 
sake of their children... Sending mothers here [to the centres] is to ensure that 
they really do get the needful food. At home their maternal instinct might be to 
divide it on the children.’77 
 
The key aspect of the scheme was a supervised sit-down meal granted for a total of nine 
months, three months before and six months after birth. The CSSC’s handbook noted: 
The health of the newborn infant depends very much on the mother’s condition, 
and this depends largely on a proper diet.
78
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The CSSC very clearly recognised the correlation between good health and proper 
nutrition. For the nine months the mothers received for six days of the week, free of 
charge, a pint of milk and what was described as ‘a nourishing meal’. They were 
instructed in topics such as hygiene, feeding, nutrition and hours of rest.
79
 Before giving 
birth they were provided with clothes for themselves and the newborns, they were also 
encouraged to go to the hospital for the birth of their children, and breastfeed. The 
CSSC understood that: 
A baby born of a mother cared for in this way will be substantially more healthy 
and better developed at birth, thus giving him a better chance to resist disease in 
childhood and consequently a better start in life.
80
 
 
In a similar fashion to the CSSC’s food centres, the maternity welfare 
programme was put into action relatively quickly. By the end of December 1942, while 
maternity welfare scheme was in its preliminary stages, some 150 mothers were being 
fed daily in the CSSC’s six welfare centres which were attached to existing food centres. 
The scheme was not cheap however. The cover cost of each meal was 4d. and the meals 
were served free of charge to the mothers. At this rate the CSSC’s president, Owen 
Crowley, estimated that it would cost £250 annually to feed the mothers, a sum which 
was exclusive of the other services provided.
81
 At this early stage cost was identified as 
a factor which might limit the programme. It was with this concern that in February 
1943 the CSSC applied to Dublin Corporation for funding along the same lines as that 
granted to the St John Ambulance Brigade (see Chapter III), but with corporation 
funding came regulation. Under the scheme mothers were required to comply with 
Dublin County Borough’s Maternity and Child Welfare scheme which involved regular 
visits to the maternity hospitals and the Dublin Corporation’s child welfare clinics 
which were known as the babies clubs (see Table 3.5). At the clinic the mother was 
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issued with a card which she had to produce at the maternity hospital for stamping.
82
 
Stamping had to be repeated weekly, and was put in place to ensure the mothers 
received the meals for no longer than they were entitled to. The CSSC was also 
expected to submit lists of attendance on a weekly basis to the corporation’s Public 
Health Department.
83
 
Government bureaucracy was a source of dissatisfaction for the CSSC. The 
religious sisters who represented the mothers at monthly meetings of the food and 
maternity welfare centres reported that they found fault with the card system. At the 
March 1944 meeting, the Crumlin clinic’s opening times were described as being 
inadequate. The clinic opened only twice weekly for a two hour period, and when open 
just the first thirty mothers were attended to. This meant that if a mother was late, or if 
she was unable to attend the clinic, her course of meals would have been interrupted. It 
was also pointed out that mothers were often kept waiting in the maternity hospitals for 
long periods of time, so much so that they might miss their daily meal, as would any of 
their young children that they brought along with them. In an attempt to rectify this 
problem a duplicate letter was produced by the department, signed by the sister in 
charge of the centre, and then given to the mothers to be presented to the matron of the 
hospital in the hope that they would be given priority of treatment.
84
 The prevalence of 
this issue is not recorded, but considering the clinic in question, was situated in a suburb 
of Dublin, its opening hours are unsurprising. Whether or not this move had the desired 
effect has not been recorded, but it illustrates that the relationship between the CSSC 
and the authorities was not always a harmonious one. In all of this, the undertones of 
Catholic social teachings are perceptible, and it correlates with Lindsey Earner-Byrne’s 
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thesis that the CSSC’s aim was to present itself as the appropriate instrument of family 
support.
85
 
The meals provided to the mothers were described as being ‘generous, well 
balanced... [and] prepared in accordance with medical advice.’86 It was noted in the 
history article that each day the mothers were given a: 
Special meal...planned by a dietician... Fried liver, chops etc. are to be had. Hot 
sweets follow with a large glass of excellent milk.
87
 
 
For mothers who typically lived on a diet of bread and tea, this course of meals would 
have represented a considerable boost. Whether or not the dietician who planned this 
meal appreciated the importance or even existence of the vitamins it contained, they 
were most definitely aware that it was rich in fat, protein, iron and calcium, and 
understood the role of these nutrients and minerals in the human dietary. 
An important aspect of the work conducted by the CSSC’s Maternity Welfare 
Department was in the realm of dietetics, that is, the part of medicine that relates to the 
regulation of diet. The dissemination of information relating to nutrition, healthy eating 
and optimal cooking formed an integral part of the department’s initiative to improve 
the health of the mothers and their children. A surviving draft of a lecture presented by 
Dr D. K. O’Donovan, dated 18 October 1942, entitled, ‘Diet in relation to pre and post 
natal care’ is evidence of this. However, the technical nature of this particular lecture 
and the type of language used suggests that O’Donovan delivered his piece to a well 
educated group, perhaps at a monthly meeting of the sisters in charge of the food and 
maternity welfare centres rather than to a group of mothers themselves. Such lectures 
were delivered with the intention that the information would be passed on to the 
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mothers, and it underlines the importance credited to the subject by the CSSC. 
O’Donovan was so convinced of the importance of good nutrition that he stated: 
The proper diet for pregnant and nursing mothers is so necessary that this aspect 
of social welfare should take precedent over any other dietary schemes for other 
groups of the population.
88
 
 
O’Donovan understood that poor nutrition during this critical phase of life resulted in 
higher rates of infant mortality. According to O’Donovan, the rate in particular parts of 
Dublin was as high as 160 per 1,000 live births during the first year of life.
89
 This was 
almost double the average rate for Ireland’s urban areas and almost three times higher 
than the average rate for rural areas for 1942 (see Figure 4.7). 
Figure 4.7 Irish urban and rural infant mortality rates, (deaths of infants aged 
less than one year per 1,000 births per annum), 1939-48 
 
Graph constructed by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 
1939-45; First report of the Department of Health, 1945-49 
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Dr Oliver Fitzgerald’s lecture delivered to the representatives of the food centres 
also highlighted the importance of proper nutrition for expectant and nursing mothers. 
Together both Fitzgerald’s and O’Donovan’s lectures show a clear understanding of the 
role and importance of the various constituent parts of the human dietary. For example 
O’Donovan’s lecture on ‘Diet in relation to pre and post-natal care’ delivered to the 
welfare department, explained with accuracy how: 
A high intake of iron is particularly necessary during the later months of 
pregnancy... If the mother’s diet lacks iron she will therefore develop a severe 
anaemia during this period, and this may be exaggerated by blood lost during the 
birth of the baby.
90
 
 
This was something that O’Donovan correctly identified as being especially detrimental 
to the health of expectant and nursing mothers. Similarly, Oliver Fitzgerald painted a 
bleak picture of the health of middle-aged female Dublin slum dwelling mother whose 
diet was typically deficient in Iron. Fitzgerald described how: 
A very common sight in the Dublin dispensaries is the poor slum mother, about 
forty years of age, with pale face and colourless lips – tired and lifeless. She 
frequently lives on a diet consisting of tea with a small amount of milk in it, and 
possibly bread dipped in drippings.
91
 
 
Such a diet was obviously deficient in the constituent parts needed to ensure proper 
health. Iron is also poorly absorbed from wheat, and drinking tannin containing 
beverages such as tea is now known to inhibit iron absorption, a fact which was not 
discovered until the mid 1970s.
92
 In spite of this, both O’Donovan and Fitzgerald 
realised that Dublin’s poorest mothers should have been consuming more meat, eggs 
and fresh vegetables such as spinach.
93
 
From 1944, another valuable service provided for the mothers was the maternity 
ambulance. Expectant mothers could avail of the service if they needed to attend one of 
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the city’s maternity hospitals and were encouraged to do so if they had long distances to 
travel. On average, some forty cases used the ambulance each month which was the first 
of its kind in the city.
94
 The reality of petrol rationing and the circumscribed public 
transport added value to the maternity ambulance service. This service, which was free 
in necessitous cases, saved many pregnant women a long uncomfortable walk to the 
maternity hospitals. In June 1945, the CSSC began operating another ambulance, the 
general ambulance. This ambulance was put at the disposal of the dispensary doctors 
who could call upon it in urgent cases where it proved impossible to get an ambulance 
from elsewhere. This ambulance mostly operated within the area extending from 
Clontarf to Booterstown.
95
 It was intended to supplement the Dublin Corporation’s 
existing ambulance service, not to replace it. Again, this service was free in necessitous 
cases. During the year 1947-48 the general ambulance dealt with 832 cases while the 
maternity ambulance saw to 616 mothers.
96
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Figure 4.8 Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid blessing the CSSC’s 
maternity ambulance, 8 July 1944 
 
Source: CSSC, Handbook of the Catholic Social Service Conference (Dublin, 1945) 
 
The CSSC decided to locate its maternity welfare centres alongside existing 
food centres. The administrative, technical and practical framework on the individual 
food centre level was already in place making them ideal sites for the maternity welfare 
centres. The sisters needed to run the centres had already been appointed, the kitchens 
were staffed with teams of cooks who had received technical training in efficient 
cooking and dietetics or were at least supervised by a sister who had such experience. 
This was the most efficient course of action to take and as a result it did not take long 
for the CSSC to expand the maternity welfare scheme. By 1945, seventeen maternity 
welfare centres had been established in those parts of the city where they were most 
needed.
97
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Table 4.3 List of CSSC maternity welfare centres, 1945 
St Vincent’s, Henrietta Lane. 
Matt Talbot, Townsend Street. 
Lourdes House, Buckingham Street. 
St Anthony’s, Seville Place. 
St Joseph’s, Brickfield Lane, Cork Street. 
Holy Child, Ellenfield, Whitehall. 
St Paul’s, Queen Street. 
Our Lady of Good Counsel, Carrow Road. 
Convent of Mercy, Goldenbridge. 
St Agnes’, Crumlin. 
Our Lady of Mount Carmel, Longford Street. 
St Agatha’s, North Clarence Street. 
Our Lady of the Rosary, Harold’s Cross. 
Sisters of Charity, Upper Gardiner Street. 
St Joseph’s, Church Road. 
Christ the King, 10/12, Faussagh Lane, Cabra West. 
Mater Dei, North Brunswick Street. 
Source: CSSC, Annual general report, departmental reports, Pre-Natal, 1942-43 (NAI, TAOIS/97/9/292, p. 5) 
 
At any one time, a monthly average of over 700 mothers attended the CSSC’s maternity 
welfare centres, and during the twelve months ending September 1944, 200,000 meals 
and 200,000 pints of milk were served to expectant and nursing mothers.
98
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Figure 4.9 CSSC maternity welfare centres in the Dublin metropolitan area, 
1945 
 
Source: Appeal, Catholic Social Services Conference, Sept. 1945 (DAA, AB8/B/XIX) 
 
The total of seventeen centres working in 1945 was still ten short the original target of 
twenty-seven, or one for each of the CSSC’s food centres in the city. The cost of the 
scheme coupled with the existence of other commitments all drawing on limited funds 
was the reason for the shortfall. In fact so inhibiting was the expense of the scheme that 
in May 1943 the period for which the meals was given was reduced from nine to six 
months.
99
 Though, at the end of the day, in spite of the CSSC’s high expectations, the 
establishment and operation of seventeen maternity welfare centres in so short a space 
of time was still a remarkable feat. 
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Table 4.4 Statistics relating to the CSSC’s maternity welfare centres for the 
twelve months ending in September during the years 1943-48 
  1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 
No. of centres 16 17 17 17 17 17 
Average no. of mothers 
served daily 480 700 700 712 778 702 
Total meals served NA 200,000 185,284 186,295 193,667 175,569 
Pints of milk issued NA 200,000 175,897 184,675 186,584 169,324 
Table created by Ciarán Bryan using data from: CSSC, Annual general reports, 1943-48 (NAI, TAOIS/97/9/292) 
 
The basic blueprint for the seventeen welfare centres was the same, as were the 
general methods employed. In acknowledgement of the principle of subsidiarity, the 
CSSC also encouraged the use of initiative and independence of action among the 
individual centres. In the Welfare Department’s monthly report for March 1944, the 
chairman of the Welfare Committee, Connor Martin, recorded how the sisters at one of 
the centres (which he did not identify) held sewing classes two nights a week where 
mothers were taught to cut out and make garments. So popular were the classes they 
were attended by as many as fifty to sixty mothers each night. The sisters also 
established a thrift account into which the mothers could pay to purchase the garments. 
So impressed was the chairman with what the sisters achieved that he suggested it 
should be extended to all of the CSSC’s welfare centres. Similarly, the needs of some of 
the centres were greater than others. In the annual general report for 1944 to 1945 the 
centres in North and South Crumlin and Cabra, were identified as being the busiest; 
their resources stretched the most. As a result the CSSC pledged to improve the service 
and expand the facilities in these areas where possible.
100
 Crumlin and Cabra, the sites 
of new housing estates built to re-house the overcrowded tenement population, were a 
locus of poverty in their own right. The cost of living in these areas was higher than in 
the city slums, they lacked essential services and possessed a young population with 
large families given preference in the allocation of accommodation. These factors bred 
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poverty, for instance the TB mortality rate for Crumlin was four times greater than the 
average for the city and five times the national average in 1942.
101
 
In the CSSC’s 1944 appeal for funds which was sent to the various parishes 
throughout the diocese, it was noted how: 
Doctors in the maternity hospitals have spontaneously testified to the immense 
benefit conferred on both mother and baby.
102
 
 
While this may have been a slight exaggeration, recognition of the value of the work 
conducted by the CSSC in the realm of maternity welfare is evident in the 
correspondence sent to the CSSC by members of both Dublin Corporation and the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health. The CSSC’s work with and ability 
to contact what were known as extern patients or mothers who gave birth to their 
children in their own homes was particularly valued. These mothers were often the least 
likely to receive instruction in matters relating to both their health and that of their 
child’s. The department, recognising this, encouraged the CSSC (whose help they 
described as being invaluable) to impress upon the mothers the ‘imperative necessity of 
breast-feeding the newly-born.’103 
The issue of maternal and child welfare was brought into focus by the 
Emergency, but as Lindsey Earner-Byrne demonstrates, McQuaid’s interest in the area 
predates the period. In March 1939, Fr. McQuaid wrote to then Archbishop of Dublin, 
Edward Byrne, to express his anxiety regarding the lack of a Roman Catholic presence 
in the area of maternity and child welfare. He also warned Byrne of the activities of 
non-sectarian secular organisations within the field. Earner-Byrne suggests that this is 
revealing of the future Archbishop McQuaid’s motives regarding the establishment of 
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comprehensive social services in the 1940s for Dublin mothers and their children. 
Earner-Byrne argues that the primary motivation behind McQuaid’s entry into the field 
of welfare was to counteract the influence of ‘non-sectarian’ organisations.104 In relation 
to matters of health and welfare provision, McQuaid demonstrated on numerous 
occasions his propensity for denominationalism. In 1935 he wrote to de Valera to note 
his opposition to plans for an amalgamated children’s hospital which he believed would:  
For generations to come, hand over the Catholic children to an almost 
exclusively non-Catholic control.
105
 
 
He was deeply suspicious of TCD, and in 1943 he blocked the non-denominational 
Anti-Tuberculosis League (see Chapter V). Earner-Byrne also suggests that the 
‘extreme conditions created by the Second World War and the fact that the existing 
services were not sufficient’ was used as a ‘pretext’ by McQuaid for setting up the 
CSSC.
106
 However, the work conducted by the CSSC was important and necessary. 
Between August 1939 and February 1941 the price for all items as represented on the 
cost-of-living index had increased by twenty-six percent, by February 1943 this figure 
had increased to fifty-eight percent (See Figure 2.8). The conditions created by the 
Second World War were extreme, and owing to the increase in the cost-of-living the 
existing services weren’t sufficient, this much is demonstrated in Chapter III. In 
addition, it must be remembered that one of the CSSC’s aims was to position itself as an 
organisation capable of coordinating various welfare schemes in the event of a 
breakdown of central government.
107
 During late 1940 to early 1941 when the threat of 
invasion from one or the other of the belligerents was a possibility, the potential for 
such a breakdown was very real. Therefore while it is obvious that denominational 
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concerns ranked high for McQuaid, other issues were at play and to suggest that 
McQuaid used the Second World War merely as ‘pretext’ to enter the field is an unfair 
assessment. 
Clothing committee 
 
The CSSC considered the provision of clothing for the poor, especially children, 
to be one of the most ‘urgent problems of the Emergency’.108The Clothing Committee 
was thus established to address this issue. Due to the expense of readymade clothing, 
and the unavailability of second hand clothing, the committee decided to mobilise 
voluntary workers to make clothes. The handbook of the CSSC noted that this voluntary 
approach ‘fitted in perfectly with the Conference’s [CSSC’s] fundamental idea.109 The 
committee first set about organising one or more clothing guilds in each of the diocese’s 
parishes; this was achieved with the permission of the parish priest. The committee’s 
task was facilitated by the fact that a tradition of clothing charity already existed in the 
city, it just lacked co-ordination. Clothing guilds were usually attached to parish halls or 
sodality rooms. The connection to the parish infrastructure simplified the process 
whereby the CSSC incorporated the guilds into the framework of the organisation. The 
guilds provided the opportunity for lay persons to engage in Catholic Action. While 
such action had not been sought by the sodalities and confraternities in the pre-
emergency period due to the existence of charitable associations such as the St Vincent 
de Paul, the sodalities provided the perfect platform for the CSSC’s clothing scheme. In 
the sodalities the CSSC was presented with an existing infrastructure, a loyal 
membership and a fundraising network that utilised initiative.
110
 Organisations that 
already had a proven record in the area of clothing charity, most notably the SVP, were 
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also incorporated into the CSSC’s scheme. Once an existing guild had been brought 
under the CSSC’s umbrella, or once a new guild was established, it was run by a 
committee consisting of a member of the parish clergy as well as representatives of the 
co-operating organisations in the parish.
111
 In addition to setting up the guilds, the 
Clothing Committee was charged with buying whatever material and second-hand 
clothing was available to be manufactured into clothing; visiting the guilds regularly; 
holding quarterly meetings of representatives of the guilds and reporting monthly to the 
CSSC.
112
 
The guilds both pre-existing and newly-established were mainly sewing and 
knitting groups. Unlike the food centres, they were often located in wealthy parishes or 
in convent schools where students and past pupils were recruited.
113
 The Clothing 
Committee played a key role in procuring equipment for the guilds which included 
cutting-out tables, sewing machines, and wardrobes. Typically, guild members would 
meet in these workrooms once or twice a week where they would knit, sew, mend, and 
alter garments.
114
 By 23 October 1941, twenty-four clothing guilds were operating 
under the guidance of the CSSC in the Archdiocese of Dublin; a month later this 
number had increased to sixty-three.
115
 The majority of these guilds were organised 
among the Sodalities of the Children of Mary.
116
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Figure 4.10 A CSSC clothing guild meeting, most likely of the Sodality of the 
Children of Mary, 1941-45 
 
Source: CSSC, Handbook of the Catholic Social Service Conference (Dublin, 1945) 
 
The particular value of the CSSC to the guilds lay in its ability ‘to procure considerable 
stocks of materials otherwise unprocurable by the guilds’ coupled with the financial 
assistance it offered.
117
 The Clothing Committee also purchased whatever finished 
articles (both new and second hand) it could procure; boy’s and girl’s clothing of all 
sorts such as suits, shirts and jerseys, were gathered while footwear was particularly 
prized.
118
 Each week, the Sub-Committee for Distribution would meet to consider how 
best to distribute the limited supplies which was done so every Thursday night from the 
central clothes store at number one Cavendish Row.
119
 The CSSC subsidised the 
allocations to the extent of fifty percent which enabled the guilds to make new clothes 
for a total outlay of one half the cost of the material used. Guilds raised money through 
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local fundraising exercises such as concerts, whist drives, raffles, dances, carol singing, 
and any other legitimate means that could be used to generate income.
120
 Beyond the 
prescription of a general plan and purpose, the CSSC’s handbook noted that the guilds 
were allowed to develop according to local circumstances and requirements.
121
 This was 
in acknowledgement of the principle of subsidiarity. 
With the activities of the St Vincent de Paul geared towards adults, the majority 
of the guilds concentrated on the production of children’s clothing.122 While the guilds 
produced thousands of garments each year, no single type of garment was mass 
produced. The majority of items were unique and this was something the CSSC prided 
itself upon.
123
 The production of the three piece layettes or sets of baby clothing for the 
maternity welfare department was a case in point.
124
 They were described as often 
displaying different patterns, embroidered and stitched in different colours. A core 
objective of the CSSC was the promotion of efficiency, yet it was ‘it was part of the 
policy of the guilds to avoid uniformity and flatness.’125 In Britain utility clothing was 
introduced, uniformity was pursued in the interests of efficiency.
126
 Some articles were 
even produced by the guild members in their own homes; all of this was completely and 
intentionally at odds with how aid would be delivered by the centralised state. Once 
completed, the garments were distributed through various channels, most notably the St 
Vincent de Paul. The SVP already possessed a developed clothing distribution 
infrastructure. Some guilds sent senior members to visit families recommended for help 
in order to assess their needs. In a two-year period, one guild made 152 visits, helped 
seventy families and distributed 1,860 garments; some families were helped on as many 
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as five occasions.
127
 Baby clothes, in contrast, were distributed through the maternity 
welfare centres. Sometimes garments were distributed through the schools in order to 
ensure they reached those who needed them most, and to prevent them being sold or 
pawned. With the cultural and economic practice of black-market trade being so firmly 
established in Emergency Ireland this would have been a real temptation.
128
 
September 1942 can be judged as the height of the CSSC’s clothing charity 
work. At this point eighty-four guilds were operating under the umbrella of the 
organisation.
129
 A year later, the initial enthusiasm had been replaced by the reality of 
rising prices and inflation and the number of guilds fell to sixty-five.
130
 Austerity was 
beginning to bite, and it limited the ability of the CSSC to deliver its charity. The drop-
off is unsurprising when it is taken into account that the cost of clothing as represented 
on the official cost-of-living index increased by approximately thirty-six percent 
between August 1942 and August 1943. The Clothing Committee’s annual report for 
1942 to 1943 noted that: 
Owing to the great scarcity of material, boots and shoes the Committee found it 
difficult to cope with the demands of the guilds.
131
 
 
In spite of the setbacks the CSSC and the guilds did not give up. Reflecting this was the 
Chairman of the Clothing Committee, P. K. Conway’s statement in March 1944 that: 
We are quite pleased with the amount of goods secured despite the gradual 
shrinkage of supplies generally.
132
 
 
The sixty-five clothing guilds continued to work into 1948. The levelling out of clothing 
prices after 1943 likely facilitated their efforts (see Figure 4.11). 
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Figure 4.11 The price of clothing on Ireland’s cost-of-living index, 1939-47 
 
Graph constructed by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin (1947) 
 
During the Emergency the Clothing Committee of the CSSC and the guilds it 
coordinated stimulated local effort in a way that is impossible to measure. Nevertheless, 
this good work was not overlooked. The annual report for 1947-48 noted that: 
The exact extent and excellence of the work done each year, by the Clothing 
Department and its associated guilds, is one of the outstanding features of the 
work of the Conference. Literally thousands of garments are made and 
distributed each year by the guilds. The workers in the guilds deserve the highest 
praise for the many varied and beautiful garments they have made available for 
the children of the poor.
133
 
 
While records pertaining to the total number of garments produced do not exist, records 
of expenditure provide some insight into the extent of the CSSC’s contribution in this 
area. Between September 1943 and September 1944, the CSSC spent almost £6,000 on 
clothing and material.
134
 This amounted to almost a sixth of the CSSC’s entire 
expenditure for that period. This sum does not include the expenditure of the individual 
guilds. Aside from the financial contribution, the labour input involved in such an 
undertaking was necessarily considerable. While a handful of cooks with the proper 
equipment could literally feed hundreds, it could take a single craftsperson several hours 
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to produce just one garment. This further underlines the extent of the operation and the 
degree to which the CSSC contributed to easing the serious issue of clothing poverty in 
Dublin during the Emergency.  
Armed with the ideology of Catholic Action which was primed by Catholic 
social principles such as subsidiarity, solidarity and Christian charity, the CSSC 
provided a vital service to the poor of the Archdiocese of Dublin. It proved impossible 
for the CSSC to address all of the issues it had pinpointed in early 1941 as contributing 
to poverty in the city; the unemployment problem was insurmountable and the housing 
shortage could not be tackled due to a lack of building materials. In terms of food and 
clothing provision, areas which were suited to the skill set of the CSSC’s volunteers and 
voluntarism in general, the organisation excelled. The suitability of the nuns to catering 
work coupled with their knowledge of nursing and experience of caring for the poor and 
infirm meant they were the ideal workforce for use in the food and maternity welfare 
centres. Their efforts were complemented by the practical application of the science of 
dietetics which made the work of the CSSC in the food and maternity welfare centres 
particularly efficient. The meals provided constituted an important source of 
nourishment for the diners, many of whom availed of them on a daily basis. The 
clothing guilds granted clothing to many children who otherwise would have only had 
mere rags to wear. This aspect of the CSSC’s work gave lay persons who might not 
have previously had an opportunity to volunteer, a chance to engage in Catholic Action. 
The CSSC was very much a Catholic response to austerity and in some respects, its 
success lay in its adherence to Catholic social teachings. The parish was an efficient unit 
of administration for the food centres but the ability of the CSSC to attract volunteers to 
its cause in the name of Catholic Action was its single biggest asset. The volunteers, the 
subscriptions of money and material, and its ability to tap into a pre-existing charitable 
229 
 
framework, all of this made the organisation an extremely cost-effective welfare 
mechanism. First and foremost, the CSSC was established in response to the increasing 
austerity that was brought about by the Second World War; the establishment of an 
umbrella organisation to unite traditionally fiercely independent Catholic organisations 
was in itself a massive feat. Nevertheless, the actions of the Catholic hierarchy in 
Dublin, Ireland’s capital and most important city were as much motivated by a fear of 
what the suffering of Dublin’s population could produce, as by the desire to curtail the 
suffering itself. Fear of the spread of communism, or the state expropriating too much 
power, were ever-present motivating forces. 
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Chapter V 
 
Nutritional science and its social application, 1912-48 
 
Even the daily press is beginning to realise that medicine is news.
1
 
Theobald Wolfe Tone Dillon (Dec., 1943). 
 
During the 1940s, some of Ireland’s most pressing public health issues were 
addressed. This was achieved through the mobilisation of the existing public health 
machinery, and where necessary, the implementation of newly-designed structures. 
Great advances were made in the war against tuberculosis; the Tuberculosis 
(Establishment of Sanatoria) Act was introduced in 1945. The Mental Treatment Act 
was passed in 1945, the Health Act in 1947, and on 22 January 1947 – the Department 
of Health – a department of state charged solely with the administration of the health 
services was established. The execution of the National Nutrition Survey in Ireland 
between 1946 and 1948 also represented a significant national milestone for this 
particular branch of medicine. If the severity of the TB crisis along with the public and 
political uproar stimulated change, what caused the government to enquire into the 
nutritional state of the Irish population?  
During the Second World War the combatant nations were eager to harness the 
new science of nutrition to maximise efficiency of production and ensure the health of 
their armies and populations. As Lizze Collingham points out: 
Obscure nutritionists suddenly found themselves in positions of power within 
government and the military and were able to exert varying levels of influence 
on food policies.
2
 
 
The British rationing system is often celebrated. Using the science of nutrition, the 
Ministry of Food managed to feed the British population with limited resources. To 
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what extent were these trends evidenced in Ireland? Finally, to what extent did rationing, 
shortages, and rising prices affect public health? 
In the developed countries of Western Europe, by 1939, diseases such as typhus
3
 
and cholera
4
 had been almost completely eliminated and the prevalence of what were 
termed zymotic
5
 diseases had diminished greatly. This feat was achieved in the main by 
utilizing preventative sanitary and hygienic measures which aimed to improve general 
hygiene, living conditions, and the environments within which diseases thrive. As these 
diseases were being eradicated, it was also realised that certain bacterial diseases were 
immune to such measures. The idea that the improvement of man’s resistance was 
equally as important as improving his or her general hygiene thus began to gain traction 
as did the concept that to raise one’s resistance to disease it was necessary to be 
properly nourished.
6
 Prior to the start of the so-called ‘Chemical Revolution’ in France 
in 1785, no systematic work relevant to nutrition had been carried out.
7
 The work on 
scurvy was the one exception to this.
8
 Nutritional science, begun as a sub-discipline of 
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chemistry in the late eighteenth century, had developed greatly by the twentieth century, 
and the numbers engaged in nutritional work had grown enormously.
9
 The importance 
of food to one’s health was obvious, but with the discovery of micronutrients in the 
twentieth century the health aspect became both more identifiable and scientifically 
attractive.
10
 In 1912, the first vitamin (vitamin E) was discovered; diseases such as 
rickets (1922) were shown to result from nutritional deficiencies, and generally there 
was a growing consensus that health depended upon the quantity and quality of 
satisfactory food.
11
 By the start of the Second World War all the major constituent parts 
of the human dietary had been discovered and their role in the human body was 
known.
12
 
In 1938 professor of biochemistry at Dublin University, William R. Fearon, 
published The national problem of nutrition.
13
 In this paper, Fearon noted (with a hint 
of pride) how the first study which computed a ‘nation’s actual food supply, imported 
and home-produced, in terms of proteins and calories’ was carried out in Ireland in 1912 
by Professor William Thompson, also of Dublin University.
14
 He went on to add: 
Since then, knowledge of the science of nutrition has been advanced 
enormously, and Thompson’s pioneer work has been pursued in every civilised 
country – though least of all in his own.’15 
 
Sir William Henry Thompson, born in Granard, County Longford in 1860, was a 
passenger aboard the mailboat RMS Leinster that departed Dún Laoghaire on 10 
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October 1918 and which was sunk by a German U-boat. Thompson was one of the 501 
casualties of the incident and his untimely death was undoubtedly a great loss to the 
development of nutritional science in Ireland.
16
 
The study of nutritional science may have stalled in Ireland, but internationally 
great strides were being made in the field. Inadequate nutrition was highlighted as one 
of the immediate consequences of the Great Depression, but firm, internationally 
applicable data and models were lacking.
17
 In England and elsewhere the Depression 
stimulated a plethora of studies and surveys into nutrition and their findings 
increasingly filtered down into the popular knowledge.
18
 During the 1930s, the most 
important nutritional studies were made by Dr Hazel Steibling for the USA (1933), the 
British Ministry of Health (1934, 1937), and the Health Committee of the League of 
Nations (1936-37).
19
 These works advocated the basic nutritional requirements for 
people in terms of their age, gender and type of employment. While the American 
findings recommended slightly more generous standards, the results of the Ministry of 
Health’s study and those of the League of Nations correlated very closely. In 1937, the 
British Advisory Committee on Nutrition, appointed by the British Minister of Health 
and the Secretary of State for Scotland, published its first report.
20
 This ground-breaking 
work, directed by Sir John Boyd Orr, constituted the UK’s National Nutritional 
Survey.
21
 It drew the conclusion that despite the recent advances in nutritional science, 
there was not sufficient food produced in, or imported into the country to ensure 
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everyone an adequate diet.
22
 This study was unprecedented in both scope and scale as it 
involved a wide survey of food supplies, diets and the state of the population’s nutrition. 
The League of Nations report was also significant. It analysed the connection between 
food prices and income upon levels of nutrition. It underlined the importance of 
education as a factor for determining eating habits. It also stressed the need for different 
countries to adapt their dietary recommendations to meet their geographical, social, and 
economic peculiarities. Wallace Aykroyd, an Irish man educated in TCD was the 
driving force behind this study.
23
 In relation to Ireland, Robert C. Cummins noted in a 
paper published in 1939 and entitled ‘An enquiry into some food and dietetic difficulties 
and deficiencies’ that: 
Although thirty different countries have appointed nutritional committees to 
carry out exhaustive and valuable researches in conjunction with the Central 
Council at Geneva... Éire does not appear to have joined this world movement 
for extending man’s knowledge of food deficiencies and improving his 
nutritional standards.
24
 
 
In the epilogue to Fearon’s Nutritional factors in disease, published in 1936, he 
foretold (in what was a classic statement of 1930s medical radicalism) that governments 
would increasingly become more concerned with ensuring that their populations would 
obtain a sufficient diet.
25
 Prior to the war, Ireland’s nutritional discourses were limited 
to a very small medical circle. Pre Emergency Dáil debates in which nutrition was a 
topic of discussion were almost always related to animal rather than human nutrition. 
When on the odd occasion human nutrition was mentioned, what the TDs had to say 
was for the most part constructive and in tune with the research that was being 
conducted elsewhere in the world. On 11 November 1925 T. J. O’Connell, Labour 
Deputy for Galway, made reference to the 1921 report of Sir George Newman, the chief 
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medical officer for the British Board of Medication.
26
 This report illustrated the general 
poor health of British school children of which as many as two per cent suffered from 
malnutrition. According to O’Connell, Newman was interested to know the comparative 
figures for Irish children.
27
 Of course such data did not exist for Ireland, and no attempt 
would be made to get figures of a similar nature until James Deeny’s National 
Nutritional Survey was begun in 1946. This was in spite of the fact that, as O’Connell 
put it: 
Anyone who is in touch with the schools in cities especially, and even in the 
country, must know, from even casual observation, that our schools are not very 
greatly different from the state of affairs mentioned in the report.
28
 
 
While the relationship between disease and malnutrition was acknowledged in the April 
1924 issue of the Irish Ambulance Gazette, such information was rarely disseminated 
beyond the major medical publications.
29
 
During the late 1930s there seems to have been a revival of interest in Ireland in 
matters of nutrition. Evidence for this lies the in Dáil debates but also in a number of 
articles published in academic journals during the decade. This was Ireland’s response 
to the international advances in nutritional science. Fine Gael Deputy for Monaghan, 
James Dillon, felt that the British government’s policy commitment to conform to the 
recommendations of the Commission on Nutrition was potentially of great economic 
advantage to Ireland especially if a trade agreement could be reached with Britain. 
According to Dillon, the commission proposed that: 
If the health of the British people is to be maintained, and their physique 
developed, greatly increased quantities of butter, eggs, milk products, and 
proteins in the form of fresh meat or bacon must be made available to the masses 
of the people.
30
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At the same time, the British government was increasing the amount of money it was 
spending on armaments which increased employment and thus the spending power of 
the labour force. In 1939, almost fifty percent of Britain’s budget, or ten percent of 
national income was assigned to defence.
31
 In this context Dillon saw an opportunity for 
Irish agriculture.  
James Dillon showed an appreciation for nutrition beyond its economic and 
agricultural application. Demonstrating an awareness of its social application, Dillon 
argued that dietetics should be a matter of consideration for the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health. On 1 April 1938 Dillon suggested that the then Minister 
for Local Government and Public Health, Seán T. O’Kelly, should: 
Establish a division in his Department concerned with dietetics where experts 
would be available… local institutions and public bodies could seek the 
assistance of that division with a view to bringing the diets provided for the 
inmates of public institutions and prisons and other places of that kind into line 
with modern dietetical knowledge.
32
 
 
Dillon then highlighted the importance of education in the arena of dietetics and the 
impact that a poor grasp of the subject was having upon the health of the population and 
in particular, Irish children.
33
 He pointed out that a good deal of poverty in the country 
was due to the Irish housewife’s poor understanding of domestic science. This was a 
problem which he felt was common in the poorer and more affluent households alike. 
Regarding the Irish housewife and her children, he said: 
She has no knowledge of dietetics, no knowledge of the kind of food which is 
best for the child and, with the best will in the world, she gives the child what 
she thinks is luxurious food but…it does not provide the child with the essentials 
for proper nutrition.
34
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Despite this criticism, Dillon stressed that it was up to the government to bring home to 
Ireland’s poor the merits of a diet which consisted of green vegetables, milk, eggs and 
brown bread as opposed to the more expensive luxury foods that were ultimately less 
nutritious.
35
 
During the pre-war years, when shortages were not a problem, the merits of 
informing the people on dietary matters were appreciated by only a few. These few 
however exhibited a similar trail of thought. Like James Dillon, Robert Cummins, 
professor of medicine at UCC, felt that nutrition was:  
A matter of state concern... [and that] a campaign for better nutrition should be 
an integral part of national policy.
36
  
 
The importance of education also loomed large. In the comments section that followed 
Fearon’s article The national problem of nutrition, George O’Brien, professor of 
economics at UCD, argued that instruction in dietetics was necessary for consumers and 
emphasised its importance for parents and teachers.
37
 Similarly, Cummins felt education 
was important sating: 
The community itself should receive education on diet, particularly the 
women… efforts should be directed to compulsory teaching in the schools what 
is known of balanced diet and economic food values and proper cooking.
38
 
 
While making this point, Robert Cummins took the opportunity to have a sideways jab 
at the political attention that was paid to the Irish language going on to add:  
For the future health of the community compulsory dietetics would be of far 
greater importance than is compulsory Gaelic!
39
  
 
However the idea that it was the government’s responsibility to educate women, 
children, families in matters relating to their health and wellbeing was a contentious 
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one, especially for members of the Catholic hierarchy. As demonstrated in the previous 
chapter, the Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid was particularly anxious to 
position the Catholic Church as the appropriate method of familial support.  
On 29 April 1939, representatives of the Department of Local Government and 
Public Health attended the ‘National conference on the wider aspects of nutrition’ held 
in British Medical Association (BMA) House, Tavistock Square, London, along with 
officials from across the British Empire. E. T. J. McWeeny, head officer of the 
Tuberculosis Schemes reported on the proceedings. He noted that due to economic 
reasons along with ‘apathy and ignorance’ malnutrition existed in Ireland’s urban 
areas.
40
 Robert Fearon and Gerald Dockery’s survey of ante-natal nutrition in Dublin, 
published in the February 1939 issue of the Irish Journal of Medical Science, was more 
explicit. Small though their sample may have been (just sixty women who were in 
attendance at the ante-natal clinic of Dublin’s Rotunda Hospital were examined) their 
findings still painted an alarming picture of the pre-war nutritional state of Dublin’s 
poor. Just eight percent of the women examined consumed an adequate amount of 
calories (cal). The Health Committee of the League of Nations in 1936 recommended a 
daily consumption of 2,600 cal to 3,000 cal per day; the average intake for the Dublin 
women examined was just 1,359 cal.
41
 The women’s average spend on food per head 
per week was just 3s. which was approximately half that recommended by the British 
Medical Association’s Committee on Nutrition in 1933.42 Many of these women were 
subsequently referred to the St John’s Ambulance Brigade’s Maternity Welfare Scheme. 
Fearon and Dockery, while acknowledging the value of the SJA’s work, stressed that 
                                                          
40
 E. J. T. McWeeny, Report on the proceedings of a national conference on the wider aspects of nutrition, 
10 July 1939 (NAI, HLTH/B160/10, p. 63). 
41
 Gerald Dockery and Robert Fearon, ‘Ante-natal nutrition in Dublin: a preliminary survey’ in IJMS, xiv 
(1939), p. 82. 
42
 Ibid., p. 83. 
239 
 
the whole problem which involved economic and political questions ‘requires the 
attention and resources of the government to deal with edaciously.’43 
The Emergency – Infant and Tuberculosis mortality 
 
Infant mortality rates have traditionally been viewed as amongst the most 
sensitive indicators of the standard of living.
44
 
Figure 5.1 Ireland’s infant mortality rate (deaths of infants aged less than one 
year per 1,000 births per annum), 1939-48 
 
Graph constructed by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 
1939-45; First report of the Department of Health, 1945-49 
 
Ireland’s rate for 1940 remained the same as that for 1939, 66 per 1,000 births. 
Although there was a slight increase in urban areas with a population over 10,000, it 
was matched by a corresponding decrease in urban areas with a population fewer than 
10,000 (see Figure 5.1). The populations of the larger urban areas were clearly more 
sensitive to the increase in the cost-of-living; the price for all items rose by 
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approximately twenty-four percent between August 1939 and November 1940 as 
recorded on the official cost-of-living index (see Figure 2.8). While the infant mortality 
rate remained stable, there were approximately twelve percent more deaths in Ireland 
from the infectious disease, tuberculosis, in 1940 than there had been in 1939 (see 
Figure 5.2). 
Figure 5.2 Deaths from tuberculosis (all forms) in Ireland and total infant deaths 
(aged less than one year) per annum, 1939-48 
 
Graph constructed by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 
1939-45; First report of the Department of Health, 1945-49 
 
The reports of the medical inspectors for 1939-40 and 1940-41, appended to the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health’s annual reports, demonstrate little 
negative impact upon public health as a result of Emergency conditions. More 
concerned were the inspectors with the lack of extension of the public health services.
45
 
Several county medical officers of health (CMOH) however, reflecting back on the 
1940 increase in their annual reports for 1941, attributed the growth to the ‘the difficulty 
found by the poor people in purchasing adequate supplies of the protective foodstuffs’.46 
Dr E. T. J. McWeeny also noted that one CMOH (whom he did not identify) recorded a 
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decrease in the weight of the school children in all age groups from 1939 onwards.
47
 
However, calls to the government such as that made by Cork Corporation to establish a 
‘standard needs for the masses of the people’ in consultation with medical men and 
other experts to ‘estimate the minimum requirements of healthy living’ remained 
uncommon.
48
 By late 1940, the worsening tuberculosis figures were drawing political 
attention. Meath County Board of Health passed a resolution calling on the Minister for 
Local Government and Public Health, to set up a commission to inquire into the whole 
question of TB in Ireland.
49
 
Figure 5.3 A comparison of infant mortality rates (deaths of infants aged less 
than one year per 1,000 births per annum) across the British Isles, 1939-48 
 
Graph constructed by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 
1939-45; First report of the Department of Health, 1945-49 
 
Labour Deputy James Hickey’s summary of the CMOH’s reports for 1940 
delivered to the Dáil on 16 June 1942 was much more alarming than those appended to 
the Department of Local Government and Public Health’s annual reports. While the 
infant mortality rate for the country was 66 per 1,000 births, the rate in Dublin for 1940 
was 92 and rate for Cork jumped from 73 in 1939 to 95 per 1,000 births in 1940.  
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Figure 5.4 The infant mortality rates (deaths of infants aged less than one year 
per 1,000 births per annum) for a selection of Irish cities, 1939-48 
 
Graph constructed by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 
1939-45; First report of the Department of Health, 1945-49 
 
Table 5.1 Ireland’s infant mortality rate (deaths of infants aged less than one 
year per 1,000 births per annum), 1939-48 
Year 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 
Rate per 
1,000 births 
66 66 74 69 83 79 71 65 68 50 
Graph constructed by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Department of Local Government and Public Health, Report, 
1939-45; First report of the Department of Health, 1945-49 
Of 40,868 children examined in Dublin during 1940, over 1,000 were found to be 
suffering from malnutrition.
50
 The Limerick CMOH felt that part of the problem lay in 
the fact that: 
 People are not horrified at the sight of malnourished children [as] artificial 
respectability has destroyed our sense of the real.
51
 
 
In Louth, of 2,680 children examined, 100 were found to be in a state of ‘sub-nutrition’. 
Mr Hickey, the chairman of the County Louth Board of Health was of the opinion that 
tuberculosis had never been so prevalent in the country.
52
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The statement of Dr Shipsey of Waterford city was particularly striking, as quoted by 
Hickey: 
The poverty existing in that city is appalling and that the hospital was never so 
full, full of people who are not so much sick as hungry, and who come to the 
hospital mostly to get fed.
53
 
 
People were also going hungry in Tramore. Hickey quoted Dr Nicholas Purcell who 
said that there were: 
Quite a number of people in and around Tramore suffering from defective 
nutrition amounting in some cases to semi-chronic starvation.
54
 
 
Hickey’s sample paints a sombre picture of the state of the health in Ireland’s urban 
areas in 1940, a picture which is quite at odds with the more moderate data presented in 
the appendices to the Annual Report of the Department of Local Government and 
Public Health. 
The increase in the prevalence of tuberculosis (TB) was a worrisome trend. 
Tuberculosis or tubercles bacillus is an ancient disease which is caused by the bacillus 
mycobacterium tuberculosis. Typically it affects the lungs but any organ or tissue is 
susceptible. The disease itself is spread among humans via droplets generated in the 
respiratory systems of people who have the disease.
55
 While its genesis is unclear, it is 
thought that people first became infected when they started living in close proximity to 
cattle during the agricultural revolution in the Neolithic period.
56
 Despite the uncertainty 
surrounding the beginnings of the disease, what is certain is that TB remained one of the 
leading causes of death throughout history. By the nineteenth century, improving living 
conditions, advances in medicine, and a better understanding of the disease led to a 
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decline in mortality rates in developed countries (although they still remained 
significant until the advent of antibiotic treatments). Up until the mid-nineteenth century 
Ireland’s TB mortality rate was actually lower than Britain’s. This however was 
reversed during the second half of the nineteenth century when Ireland’s TB mortality 
rate started to rise and rates in Britain and elsewhere in Europe fell.
57
 During the first 
half of the twentieth century, Ireland’s TB mortality rate decreased, although the 
improvement did not match that experienced elsewhere in Europe; in fact, Ireland’s rate 
relative to other countries actually worsened (see Table 5.2). It was suggested that this 
was due to the reorganisation of the anti-tuberculosis services which had taken place in 
some countries during the inter-war years. Professor Theo Dillon hypothesised that this 
was one key difference between Éire and Northern Ireland.
58
 
Table 5.2 Annual average tuberculosis mortality rates for a selection of 
European states per 100,000 persons, 1911-37 
Country 
Annual Average 
Ann. Av % 
Decline 
1912-27 
Ann. Av % 
Decline 
1926-36 
1911-13 1925-27 1935-37 
      
Ireland 211 150 121 2.1 1.9 
N. Ireland 230 145 102 2.4 3.3 
Scotland 173 104 74 2.8 2.9 
Austria 279 171 103 3.9 4 
Italy 157 152 88 0.8 3.9 
Spain 152 147 112 0.2 3 
Norway 218 172 107 1.7 4.2 
Average 
excluding Ireland 
201.5 148.5 98 2 4 
Source: J. E. Counihan and T. W. T. Dillon, 'Irish tuberculosis death rates, a statistical study of their reliability, with 
some socio-economic correlations' in Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, 97, (1943), p. 173 
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Figure 5.5 Dr William Robert Fearon, 1941 
 
It was in 1941, following the British government’s decision 
to apply of a policy of ‘silent sanctions’ upon Ireland, that 
the country was hit by a true measure of wartime adversity 
(see Chapter I). Shortages of some essential commodities 
appeared for the first time, while privately-held stocks 
dwindled (see Chapter II). Inflation continued; the price for 
all items on the cost-of-living index had by November 1941 
increased by a further fourteen percent up to thirty-seven percent over its August 1939 
level (see Figure 2.8). The introduction of the Wages Standstill Order in May 1941, in 
light of continued inflation, led to a fall in wages in real terms and voluntary 
organisations noticed increased demand for their services (see Chapter III). It was 
claimed that between one fifth and a sixth of Dublin’s population ‘subsisted on a 
deficiency diet’ of bread and tea.59 As the crisis deepened, increasing attention was paid 
to the nation’s diet and health. In April 1941, a deputation of social workers and 
members of the medical profession with an interested in nutrition was made to 
government. Led by Dr William Fearon, its objective was to draw attention to the 
nation’s food supply in light of the Emergency. Recommending price subsidisation and 
communal feeding, the deputation argued that proper nutrition should be considered on 
the same basis as education, housing and the medical services.
60
 The deputation also 
warned that the steadily rising prices were ‘bound to have serious consequences for 
large numbers of our people.’61 In a memorandum to the Department of the Taoiseach 
on the food supply, Seán Lemass, conscious of Ireland’s food security and the reduced 
trade with Britain urged that: 
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As a matter of great urgency that a committee of qualified people, including 
experts in human and animal nutrition, should be set up to survey the whole 
question of our present and future food supplies and to make recommendations 
for their most economic use.
62
 
 
Lemass felt this committee should seek to render practical application to the recent 
advances in nutritional science.
63
 Later, on 24 October 1941, the executive committee of 
the Medical Association of Eire appointed a Dietetic Council.
64
 Its aim was to: 
Pool their knowledge of foods and diets and experiment on ways and means of 
aiding the people’s nutrition under wartime conditions, paying special attention 
to children’s diet.65 
 
Dr William Fearon was among its members and its activities were regularly recorded in 
the Journal of the Medical Association of Eire. 
 The government’s response to the deputations and recommendations regarding 
the nutrition of the population was to publish A simple guide to wholesome diet in June 
1942. A Department of Local Government and Public Health publication, it argued that 
in light of threat to the food supply, there should be: 
A much wider understanding of nutritive value of the various foods generally in 
use, and of the close relationship between the daily diet and the maintenance of 
health.
66
 
 
The guide explained the function in the body of the constituent parts of the human 
dietary (fats, proteins, carbohydrates and vitamins) and illustrated their primary food 
sources. It recommended a balanced diet comprised of proportionate amounts of the 
essential foodstuffs was the key to good health and lambasted the all-too-common diet 
of ‘bread and spread’ supplemented with tea and the occasional potatoes and a little 
meat.
67
 The guide also noted: 
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Malnutrition does not necessarily result solely from inadequate or imperfect diet. 
It may be due to lack of knowledge of the essentials of good diet, or to faulty 
methods in the cooking of the food.
68
 
 
Emphasising the importance of education and re-education, the Department of Local 
Government and Public Health was quick to blame the consumer for his or her own 
poor nutritional state as opposed to say, economic factors. 
Infant mortality increased in 1941, and while the mortality rate for TB remained 
unchanged, Dr E. T. J. McWeeny, CMOH for the TB schemes felt that this was merely 
a brief arrest (see Figure 5.2).
69
 In March 1941, the Royal Academy of Medicine in 
Ireland (RAMI) set up a special sub-committee to investigate the Irish TB issue.
70
 
Reporting back to RAMI’s executive council in late June 1941, the committee 
concluded that: 
A scheme to provide for the detection, treatment, cure and prevention of 
pulmonary tuberculosis must be built around certain essential elements... A 
central tuberculosis dispensary. A centre or centres for different diagnosis and 
early treatment. A well equipped modern sanatorium. Efficient after care in the 
patient’s home.71 
 
The article emphasised that the construction of a modern, well-equipped sanatorium 
should be the ‘essential pivot of the scheme.’72 That same month, an article published in 
the Irish Journal of Medical Science, authored by Dr Dorothy Price, a paediatrician at 
St Ultan’s Hospital for infants, Dublin, illustrated a theory which was becoming 
increasingly popular. Based on a study of 1,121 cases of tuberculin children conducted 
by the Irish Paediatric Association in 1938, the link was made between the prevalence 
of TB with deficient nutrition, and inadequate family income.
73
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Figure 5.6 Dorothy Price (on the left) with a nurse and young patient, 27 May 
1947 
 
Source: Photograph of Dorothy Price with a nurse and patient, possibly at St Ultan’s Hospital, 29 May 1947 (TCD MS 
7537/208) 
 
During the 1930s, a degree of pessimism existed regarding the possibility of 
combating tuberculosis successfully while complacency was encouraged by the 
decreasing mortality rate. The dominant policy bias among Irish medical authorities and 
the government was that the best way to combat TB was through the expansion of 
public treatment facilities namely the public sanatorium infrastructure and the 
tuberculosis dispensaries which in addition to referring patients to sanatoria attempted 
to replicate sanatorium treatment in patient’s homes.74 The twentieth century sanatorium 
movement had commenced in Germany in 1854 when Hermann Brehmer established 
his tuberculosis treatment facilities at Gobersdorf and was further developed when his 
former assistant Peter Dettweiler founded a tuberculosis sanatorium at Falkenstein in 
1876. The treatment regime they established was further enhance when Otto Walther 
founded his tuberculosis sanatorium at Nordrach-im-Baden, in the German Black Forest 
in 1888. His methods provided the most popular treatment model for sanatoria which 
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sprang up all across Europe.
75
  The dispensaries were modelled on the ‘Edinburgh 
Scheme’ developed by the Scottish physician Robert William Philip, wherein a central 
tuberculosis dispensary effectively acted as a clearing house for tuberculosis patients 
determining the most appropriate forms and location of treatment.
76
 Ireland’s first 
purpose-built sanatorium in Newcastle County Wicklow was established in 1896, 
modelled on the Ventnor Sanatorium in the Isle of Weight with suitable adaptations to 
incorporate the best architectural features from the German sanatoria, its treatment 
regime was according to ‘Nordrach principles’.77 The medical regime of the sanatoria 
was based on the curative effects of fresh air treatment. Patients were exposed to fresh 
air as much as possible. Windows were kept open. Patients’ beds were wheeled out onto 
verandas accessible from the wards or into the grounds themselves. Bed rest followed 
by graduated exercise, good food, educating patients regarding hygiene and the disposal 
of sputum were also important. It was this perspective which informed government 
policy as well as the conclusions of the RAMI’s TB sub-committee in 1941. This in-
vogue bricks-and-mortar solution, a palliative measure, was by its very nature a way of 
dealing with the effects as opposed to the fundamental causes of the problem. While 
certain medical professionals understood this, the sanatoria solution remained the 
cornerstone of anti-tuberculosis schemes in Ireland and elsewhere. 
Anti-Tuberculosis League 
 
In 1942 there were a total of 4,347 recorded deaths from TB, approximately 
thirty-two percent more than there had been in 1939.
78
 On 19 November 1942, at a 
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meeting held in the Royal College of Physicians, Dublin, which was attended by 
medical profession from across the island, plans for the formation of a National Anti-
Tuberculosis League were approved.
79
 International anti-tuberculosis leagues had been 
in existence since the late nineteenth century with the fist league established in 
Pennsylvania in the US in 1882.
80
 The aim of the Irish league as outlined by Dr Kevin 
Malley was to ‘unite all classes of society in a nation-wide campaign... against 
tuberculosis.’ 81 Unlike the sanatoria movement, the league sought to devote more 
attention to the prevention of the disease as opposed to its treatment.
82
 A non-
denominational organisation co-founded by Dr Dorothy Price, its membership was open 
to all citizens. It sought to consolidate the sporadic efforts made by different bodies 
under one organisation. The ultimate aim was to establish branches of the league 
nationwide, and to affiliate the organisation with the International League Against 
Tuberculosis. It was hoped that the mortality rate could be lowered through education, 
propaganda, early detection aimed at risk groups (such as adolescents), nutrition 
surveys, increased sanatorium accommodation, aftercare and rehabilitation. The role of 
socio-economic factors such as housing and nutrition were to be examined while 
compulsory notification, teaching, and legislation would be sought.
83
 TB was a young 
person’s disease. Approximately fifty percent of all deaths among those aged between 
fifteen and thirty-five years were due to TB.
84
 The league appreciated the 
interconnectedness of the issues of TB and nutrition. It was noted in the league’s initial 
programme that it would be necessary to ‘carry out an investigation into the nutritional 
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problem of tuberculosis.’ 85  The league’s different approach aside, the publicity it 
created catapulted the TB issue into the national spotlight. 
Figure 5.7 Irish National Anti-Tuberculosis League flyer, 15 February 1943 
 
Source: Flyer for the Irish National Anti-Tuberculosis League, 15 Feb. 1943 (TCD, MS 7536/276) 
 
The Anti-Tuberculosis League however, did not even get off the ground. On 15 
February 1943, at a meeting held in the Hibernian Hotel, Dublin, to officially launch the 
league, John Charles McQuaid, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Dublin, had a letter read 
aloud by his representative Monsignor Molony to block the initiative.
86
 McQuaid was of 
the opinion that the nationwide campaign envisaged by the provisional committee of the 
Anti-Tuberculosis League, could: 
Succeed only under government patronage. It is my definite opinion that such a 
campaign can be carried through in Éire only by the Red Cross Society. That 
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society enjoys government patronage, is in fact nationwide, and has a large 
membership of trained workers.
87
 
 
Dr Theo Dillon proposed the motion that the Anti-Tuberculosis League be founded; 
however, the chairman Dr R. J. Rowlette ruled that the motion could not be put to the 
meeting on account of McQuaid’s expressed wishes.88 McQuaid’s intervention was seen 
as an act of sabotage by the provisional committee viewing as he did the organization as 
‘Trojan horse for the expansion of the powers of the state’.89 Informed by Catholic 
social teachings (see Chapter IV), Ireland’s Catholic hierarchy opposed state 
intervention into family life and had consistently demonstrated their willingness to 
block non-denominational projects on moral grounds which was ultimately to the 
detriment of those who needed help most. Thus was formed the Anti-Tuberculosis 
section of the Irish Red Cross. Public disapproval was expressed by General Richard 
Mulcahy while the events made front page news of the following day’s Irish Times 
which was sympathetic to the provisional committee.
90
 The provisional committee was 
of the opinion that the Irish Red Cross, in spite of its large membership, trained as they 
were in little more than first aid, did not constitute the appropriate organisation to take 
on a successful national campaign against TB.
91
 The league’s provisional committee 
was not completely frozen out however as it merged with the Red Cross’ own 
tuberculosis committee to form the Irish Red Cross Anti-Tuberculosis Committee. 
While the new committee was comprised of fifteen members - eight Red Cross and 
seven from the provisional committee - just two were Protestant, Dr Price and Dr 
Rowlette.
92
 Yet in spite of the reservations of the league’s provisional committee, 
within less than a month the patronage of the Department of Local Government and 
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Public Health had been secured. The department issued a circular to all the local 
authorities to bring to their attention the Red Cross’ anti-tuberculosis campaign. While 
the role played by diet in building up the resistance of the TB patient was stressed, the 
circular stopped short of attributing the increased incidence of TB to deficient 
nutrition.
93
 The department also authorised the various local authorities to make grants 
of food and sometimes clothing to tuberculosis patients.
94
 
Tuberculosis and nutrition 
 
Today tuberculosis is properly understood and the link between poverty, 
malnutrition and the prevalence of the disease is readily accepted. Malnutrition itself is 
considered to be a ‘major risk factor for the progression of tuberculosis.’ 95  The 
durability of the bacillus tubercle bacilli is fully appreciated. For instance it is now 
known that the bacillus is so resilient it can ‘remain viable throughout the host’s 
lifetime’.96 After entering the body, infection then depends on several factors such as 
age and gender along with environmental factors including overcrowding, nutrition, and 
working conditions. Furthermore, numerous studies have indicated that income is a 
major factor which determines the impact of the disease as income dictates living 
standards. As a result lower income groups suffer most from the disease and as income 
rises tuberculosis mortality is greatly diminished.
97
  
Pre-Emergency Dáil debates that considered TB almost always focused on the 
building of sanatoria, the provision of more hospital beds, and the adequacy of the milk 
supply; the role of nutrition was rarely considered.
98
 As the Emergency wore on 
however, and the prevalence of the disease increased, the relationship between 
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malnutrition and TB was increasingly made. Deputy James Hickey, Labour TD for 
Cork Borough quoted a statement made in 1940 by the chairman of the Louth Board of 
Health who said that: 
TB cases will not be cut down by any brick and mortar policy alone or by the 
mere building of a sanatorium or a tuberculosis hospital... it is more food, better 
living conditions... that are the primary necessities.
99
 
 
An even more revealing statement made by Kildare’s assistant CMOH was relayed to 
the Dáil by William Norton, Labour TD for Kildare and party leader. The assistant 
wished to have the scale of home assistance increased believing that it was ‘impossible 
to maintain good health whilst people were living in a state of starvation or semi-
starvation.’100 She estimated that ninety percent of tuberculosis cases came from the 
poorest families and pointed out that the death-rate would be lower if the people had 
more to eat. The assistant went on to add that her primary aim was to prevent 
tuberculosis but for a time her principle duty had been the ‘signing of death 
certificates.’101 Dr Bastible, CMOH for Donegal, reported a death within the county 
every second day to TB and noted that malnutrition and overcrowding acted like 
‘ancillary impediments to stemming its ravages’. 102  While Dublin with its higher 
mortality rate (in 1935-37 the mortality rate for the city was as high as 151 per 100,000 
of the population as opposed to the national average of 121 per 100,000) constituted the 
geographical focus of the TB debate, the TB problem was very much a national one.
103
 
In ‘Tuberculosis: a social problem’, published in Studies in 1943, Professor 
Theo Dillon reasoned that, of the factors connected with poverty that were having an 
unfavourable effect upon the TB mortality rate, insufficient food and overcrowding 
were the most harmful. He added that ‘it is probable that, of the two, insufficient food is 
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the more important.’104 Theo Dillon emphasised that it was Ireland’s poor, unemployed, 
city dwelling adolescents that were most likely to become infected with TB and that 
their susceptibility to the disease was being accentuated by malnutrition.
105
 Dillon was 
of ‘no doubt that the best way to deal with tuberculosis would be to solve the great 
problems of unemployment, urbanization and malnutrition.’ 106  When RAMI’s 
tuberculosis sub-committee (of which Theo Dillon was the chairman) published its 
report in June 1941, it had come to the conclusion that a bricks and mortar policy would 
prove the best course of action. 
All are agreed that a well equipped modern sanatorium is the central pivot of any 
efficient scheme.
107
 
 
Two years later in 1943, Theo Dillon was arguing that the aim should be to address the 
root of the problem as opposed to trying to deal with its effects. This approach was 
arguably all the more practical as the expansion of the sanatoria infrastructure had 
almost completely halted by 1941 owing to the shortage of building materials.
108
 On 29 
October 1943, at a meeting of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland 
(SSISI), Dillon went further stating that ‘nutrition was more important than medical 
facilities in curing the disease’.109 Dr John Duffy (a founding member of the Anti-
Tuberculosis League) was also in no doubt as to the connection between 
undernourishment and TB. Citing various studies and using examples from WWI, Duffy 
argued that it would be ‘dangerous to reduce expenditure on food relief for the purpose 
of improving housing conditions.’110 At a time when there were ‘many poor women 
starving in Dublin’ and when the numbers suffering and dying from TB throughout the 
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country were rising, it was becoming harder to overlook the relationship between the 
two.
111
 
As the Emergency progressed, malnutrition was increasingly identified as a 
major contributory factor to the increased prevalence of TB. However, there was by no 
means a consensus on this point. Seán MacEntee, Minister for Local Government and 
Public Health, was loath to acknowledge the correlation between the two. To admit that 
a section of the Irish population was malnourished, or indeed starving, would have been 
a political embarrassment. This denial had a precedent in both France and the UK. In 
1935, Parisot, a French member of the League of Nation’s Health Committee, 
approached his counterpart in the British Ministry of Health in an attempt to gain a 
binational consensus to obstruct, or at least restrict nutritional surveys to outside 
Europe. The possibility of having one’s population pronounced malnourished caused 
real anxiety.
112
 Lynda Bryder also shows how in Britain in the 1930s, there was an 
‘official denial’ of the relationship between malnutrition and TB with Sir Arthur 
MacNalty, chief medical officer of the Ministry of Health, being particularly 
culpable.
113
 In Ireland, various reasons both in isolation of and in relation to 
malnutrition were identified as being causative factors. MacEntee was quick to point out 
that disagreement existed even among the experts. A 1942 survey of the opinions of 
thirty-one CMOH on the subject demonstrated this lack of agreement. Aside from 
malnutrition, they cited various reasons for the increase including: 
1) Overcrowding. 
2) There being a more rapidly fatal form of the disease present. 
3) The increased physical strain on weakly persons employed on turf and tillage 
schemes. 
4) The stress produced by living in such abnormal times. 
5) The non-co-operation of patients. 
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6) The return to Ireland of persons infected with tuberculosis that were formerly 
resident or employed in Great Britain. 
7) The discharge from the Irish Army of tuberculin cases. 
8) Increased rural to urban migration.114 
 
Having illustrated these points, MacEntee stated: 
 
No doubt each and all of these may have contributed in some degree to bring it 
about. And yet when any one of the suggested causes is closely considered in the 
light of the facts, it is difficult to accept it as being the really significant factor in 
bringing about the sudden increase in morbidity and mortality which was 
experienced last year.
115
  
 
In MacEntee’s opinion the problem was not ‘capable of facile explanation’, he instead 
ascribed it to ‘some new [unknown] factor evoked or stimulated by the conditions of the 
Emergency.’116 
The relative significance of the various reasons listed by the CMOH is 
impossible to determine, but like Minister MacEntee suggested, there is little doubt that 
together they contributed in some way to the increased prevalence of TB. The majority 
of the points however, cannot be considered independently of malnutrition. The 
association between poverty, overcrowding, and malnutrition is well established. The 
potency of TB has much to do with the immune status of the carrier; one’s immune 
system can be compromised by malnutrition. Again it is possible that ‘poverty imposes 
psychological stress on the body that reduces immune capacity’ thus increasing the risk 
of infection.
117
 As regards ‘weakly’ persons becoming infected as a result of 
overexertion on the bogs or in agriculture, it is indeed possible that this could 
compromise one’s immune system. In this case the social background of the worker is 
important: had they come from among the under or unemployed poorer classes, they 
may have been poorly nourished to start with. The non-cooperation of patients is an 
interesting point. The tendency of the tuberculosis sufferer and their family to conceal 
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their disease to avoid the ‘stigma of TB’ was well documented.118  This trend was 
particularly common among wage-earning family members of the poorer classes. 
Tubercular breadwinners were particularly adverse to the prospect of being bedridden 
and were even more anxious to avoid the sanatorium. The loss of a breadwinner’s 
income had the potential to plunge a family into poverty inducing dependence on state 
welfare. The most a man with a wife and five dependent children could hope to obtain 
through welfare was thirty shillings weekly (see Chapter III); on such a wage hunger 
was inevitable. The sanatorium patient was well fed, but there was no special provision 
for his or her family which must have weighed heavily on one’s conscience. Economic 
difficulties were an obstacle to treatment.
119
 Central to this was the prospect of poverty 
and thus hunger. As can be seen from Table 5.3, the TB mortality rate for 1940 for men 
insured under the National Unemployment Insurance scheme (see Chapter III) was 
much lower than that experienced by the general male population. In brief, men in 
proper employment were far less likely to die from TB than their uninsured, 
unemployed counterparts. These figures underline the influence of socio-economic 
factors upon the death rate. 
Table 5.3 A comparison of the TB mortality rate for insured men with that of the 
general male population, 1940 
Age 
TB 
deaths 
Number of 
insured 
men 
Rate per 100,000 Percentage 
decrease 
on general 
rate 
Insured 
men 
General 
Male 
population 
16-19 12 39,320 33 121 65% 
20-24 59 64,358 92 196 53% 
25-34 105 112,659 93 214 61% 
35-44 79 78,377 101 179 43% 
45-54 48 60,716 79 184 57% 
55-64 34 44,542 77 133 42% 
65+ 13 13,589 96 73 30% 
Source: Theobald Wolfe Tone Dillon, ‘Statistics of tuberculosis’ in Irish Journal of Medical Science (July, 1942), p. 228 
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Seán MacEntee acknowledged that a number of factors combined to bring about 
an increase in the prevalence of TB in Ireland, but at the same time he argued against 
any factor associated with poverty. Whether or not MacEntee was in denial is not clear, 
but such an admission would have reflected badly upon the government. In one breath 
he pointed out that the problem was beyond simple explanation, but in the next he 
offered up inward migration as the reason. This theory credited the increase to the influx 
of infected people from Britain and the continent to Ireland during the early part of the 
Emergency. This hypothesis enabled MacEntee to claim that: 
Any increase thus arising, however, cannot be ascribed to existing living 
conditions here, for in such cases the disease originated abroad and was brought 
back here.
120
 
 
This however neglects the fact that both inward and outward migration to Dublin from 
both rural areas and Britain had been a feature of Irish society since long before the 
Famine. 
Nutritional studies, 1943-44 
 
 1944 was an important year for the development of nutrition and dietetics in 
Ireland. Central to this was Charles Clancy Gore’s 1944 paper, ‘Nutritional standards of 
some working-class families in Dublin, 1943’. Read to the Statistical and Social Inquiry 
Society of Ireland on 28 January 1944, it caused quite a stir. The report itself was a 
survey of the nutritional state of 100 families (accounting for 684 people, 348 children 
and 336 adults) selected from one of Dublin’s new estates. Using the British Medical 
Association’s 1933 dietary recommendations as the standard, Gore calculated that it 
would cost 14s. weekly to adequately feed an adult man at the prevailing Dublin 
prices.
121
 What Gore actually discovered was far in deficit of this standard. Just one 
percent of the adults and two percent of the children examined were consuming a 
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satisfactory amount of food per the 14s. standard.
122
 At the lowest end of the scale, 109 
persons were consuming on average between just two and four shillings’ worth of food 
per head per week.
123
 Milk consumption was found to be totally inadequate while the 
amount spent on bread as opposed to more nourishing but less filling foodstuffs 
increased with family size. For twenty-five families with nine or more members, their 
expenditure on bread accounted for at least fifty percent of their total food expenses.
124
 
TD James Dillon perfectly summed up the position of the working class man (or 
agricultural labourer) with a large family and an insufficient income, explaining: 
He gets, perhaps, at the present time 36s. a week. Now, when the first baby is 
born to that man's household, it is welcome. He is able to make both ends meet. 
When the second baby arrives, he views its arrival with some modest concern. 
The third baby is unquestionably a burden, and the fourth and fifth are 
disasters.
125
 
 
On ‘Nutritional standards of some working-class families in Dublin, 1943’, Clancy 
Gore concluded: 
The standard of living of these families is obviously low. This may be due 
entirely to prevailing war conditions causing the very marked increase in the 
cost of living. In peace time it is probable that the smaller families would have 
adequate incomes. At the moment it is possible, only for these smaller families, 
to maintain with difficulty a reasonable standard of living. It is, however, 
absolutely impossible for the larger families to provide adequately for 
themselves, at present.
126
 
 
The study, the first substantial nutritional survey conducted in the country thus painted a 
damming picture of the nutritional state of Dublin’s working class and clearly 
demonstrated the impact that the Emergency was having upon large families in 
particular. 
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 One major point on which Clancy Gore’s study was criticised was the fact that it 
was based upon families where the main breadwinner was in employment.
127
 Had it 
included families dependent upon state and voluntary welfare schemes for their 
maintenance, an even grimmer picture of living conditions in Dublin would have been 
depicted. In this sense, the study understated the malnutrition of Dublin’s poor. This 
was noted by Patrick McGilligan, Fine Gael TD for Dublin North-West.
128
 Alfred 
Byrne, independent TD for Dublin North-East, and former lord mayor of Dublin (1930-
1939), remarking on the study and the nature of poverty in Dublin more generally 
stated: 
Malnutrition in the poorer parts in the City of Dublin, so far as children are 
concerned, is responsible for very many deaths of infants, and these could be 
saved if something extra were done by the Government for their parents. 
Malnutrition is providing prospective patients for the sanatoria in and around the 
city. I can go back some 50 or 60 years, and I can truthfully say that I see more 
barefooted children, and more children badly clad and ill-fed in the city to-day 
than I ever saw before. I have seen women in the poorer parts of Dublin barely 
covered. I have been brought to homes and I have entered rooms where there 
were no beds and where there was no bed clothing. I have seen children sleeping 
on sacks in the corner of a room. All these things can be seen within 100 yards 
of the principal street in this city... On the corporation housing estates we have 
people living on very moderate allowances. They have to pay high bus fares in 
order to get to their homes on the outskirts of the city. These people have 
received very meagre increases in pay to meet the higher cost of living. The 
result is that the children are suffering and the women are paying the price. I 
have seen women in various parts of Dublin depriving themselves of food that 
they should keep for themselves, so that their children might be fed.
129
 
 
Byrne added: 
 
I say that the time has arrived for the Government to determine the minimum 
standard at which a human being can live: that that minimum standard should be 
fixed by the Government and that it should be guaranteed from somewhere.
130
 
 
A Department of Local Government and Public Health memorandum on Gore’s 
paper dated 14 April 1944, reasoned that the disparity between the price of food items 
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on the cost-of-living index and industrial wages were relevant to the study’s 
conclusions.
131
 An article on Gore’s paper which appeared in the Irish Independent on 
13 July 1944, stoked further interest with the Department of the Taoiseach querying the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health ‘as to the desirability or 
practicability of carrying out such an inquiry under government auspices.’132 Dr James 
Deeny, appointed chief medical advisor to the Department of Local Government and 
Public Health in September 1944, noted in his memoir that Gore’s findings ‘created a 
distinct unease about the nutrition situation’ and also, how a death in Allihies, West 
Cork, believed to be from starvation, provoked an outcry.
133
 Nutrition had become 
politicised. 
The appointment in 1944 of Dr James Deeny at the age of thirty-seven to the 
position of chief medical advisor to the Department of Local Government and Public 
Health was among other things, a significant development for the advancement of 
nutritional science and its social application in Ireland. Born in 1906 to a Catholic 
family in Lurgan, County Armagh; Deeny was educated in Clongowes Wood College 
County Kildare and studied medicine at Queen’s University Belfast (QUB). Thereafter 
he assisted in his father’s practice, continued his postgraduate studies in QUB, and in 
1931, opened his own practice adjacent to his father’s.134 It was in Lurgan that Deeny 
witnessed firsthand the poverty of the town’s linen factory workers, exacerbated by the 
depression of the 1930s. Poor health as a result of hunger was a major problem which 
prompted Deeny to clinically assess Lurgan’s linen factory worker’s nutritional 
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status.
135
 In 1938, Deeny’s ‘The assessment of nutrition’, was published in the Ulster 
Medical Journal in which he concluded that ‘it is imperative that more thought should 
be given to the problem.’136 In 1939, the results of Deeny’s clinical study of 202 male 
linen weavers were published in the British Medical Journal.
137
 This was followed up 
by the results of a survey of 205 female linen weavers, ‘Poverty as a cause of ill health’, 
published in 1940 in the Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of 
Ireland.
138
 On the paper, which Deeny read to the society on 31 May 1940, Dr Robert J. 
Rowlette commented that it ‘would form the basis of a great deal of knowledge that 
they hoped to obtain in the future.’139 Between 1939 and 1944, Dr James Deeny wrote 
extensively on the subject of nutrition with a particular focus on vitamin deficiencies.
140
 
He received international attention for his 1943 article on ‘Familial idiopathic 
methaemoglobinaemia’ or the ‘blue men of Lurgan’; two brothers with a rare blood 
disease which Deeny treated with sodium bicarbonate and vitamin D. During WWII, 
Deeny gave lectures on good nutrition, disseminated in Northern Ireland via 
radiobroadcast while the Ministry of Health also consulted him on nutrition in Northern 
Ireland. Deeny’s work attracted attention south of the border also and was awarded 
research grants from Ireland’s Medical Research Council.141 
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James Deeny’s appointment is indicative of the brave direction in which the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health was heading. As evidenced by Dr 
Francis Constantine Ward, parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Local Government 
and Public Health, these qualifications figured prominently in the department’s 
selection of Deeny to the position of chief medical advisor. Discussing Deeny’s 
appointment in the Dáil on 20 September 1944, Dr F. C. Ward commented: 
He has made a special study of nutrition and social medicine and has carried out 
research work on vitamins for the Medical Research Council of Ireland. He has 
also carried out a survey into infant mortality, an investigation into the incidence 
of tuberculosis, and a survey into social conditions in the linen industry in 
Northern Ireland, and he is the author of many publications on medical 
subjects.
142
 
 
Figure 5.8 Dr James Deeny in the 1940s 
 
When the government decided in late 1944 to 
conduct a national nutritional survey in 
conjunction with the Irish Medical Research 
Council and to establish ‘dietary standards 
appropriate to this country’, it is unsurprising 
that Deeny was given the lead on the 
project.
143
 
Tuberculosis campaign, 1943-46 
 
As planning for the National 
Nutritional Survey got underway, the political, medical, and public attention paid to 
issues of malnutrition and tuberculosis continued. After 1942, the TB mortality rate 
improved steadily, bar a spike in 1947 (see Chapter VI). Dr E. J. T. McWeeny attributed 
this trend to the effect of remittances and government welfare schemes which permitted 
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better living conditions and the purchase of more food.
144
 Irrespective of the general 
improvement, the TB mortality rate remained high, not returning to its pre-war level 
until 1948 (see Figure 5.2). The establishment of the Anti-Tuberculosis Section of the 
Irish Red Cross in 1943 lent energy to the anti-tuberculosis campaign and through 
intensive propaganda it launched the issue into the public consciousness. The section 
attributed as many as 64 out of every 100 deaths for those aged between 15 and 25 in 
1944 to TB while it estimated that there were approximately 44,000 cases of advanced 
tuberculosis in the country.
145
 While the tubercle bacillus is the direct cause of infection, 
the IRC readily acknowledged that malnutrition and other social factors were principle 
contributory factors and this was repeatedly stressed in the organisation’s 
publications.
146
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Figure 5.9 The cover page of an Irish Red Cross, 
Anti-Tuberculosis Section information pamphlet, 
1945 
With the aid of members of the 
medical profession such as Dr 
Dorothy Price, the Anti-Tuberculosis 
Section produced several publications 
intended to educate the public in the 
various aspects of the disease such as 
its epidemiology, prevention, and 
rehabilitation.
147
 The IRC’s 
Tuberculosis Exhibition, opened by 
the Taoiseach on 28 May 1945 was 
originally scheduled for two weeks 
but proved so popular it was kept on for a third week.
148
 The exhibition included 
demonstrations, cooking classes, and lectures delivered by TB experts such as Dorothy 
Price and officials from the Department of Local Government and Public Health.  
Professor Theo Dillon gave a lecture on ‘food, nutrition and health’, chaired by 
Professor Robert Fearon, in which he described the modern Irish diet as ‘dear, dirty and 
deadly’.149 The exhibition was well documented in the press, its format was informative, 
it was geared towards the layman, and it emphasised the social aspect of the disease (see 
Figure 5.9). 
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Figure 5.10 An Irish Red Cross leaflet for the Mansion House Tuberculosis 
Exhibition, 1945 
 
Source: Flyer for the tuberculosis exhibition, Mansion House, 28 May 1945 (TCD, MS 7537/58) 
 
Anne Mac Lellan suggests that the IRC’s work led to a change in the national attitude; 
when one considers how the discussion of TB widened post 1943 and the increasing 
coverage it received in the media, this appears to be true.
150 
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 If the link between malnutrition and TB was being increasingly made, the drive 
for increased sanatorium accommodation remained as strong as ever. In 1944, Dublin 
Corporation announced it would build a modern facility with 320 beds at Ballyowen, 
County Dublin.
151
 That same year the Department of Local Government and Public 
Health declared that a 1,000 bed sanatorium was to be built at Santry Court, North 
County Dublin. This project however, was later abandoned due to the unforeseen 
development of air traffic at Dublin Airport which necessitated the provision of more 
runways.
152
 The Tuberculosis (Establishment of Sanatoria) Act, 1945, passed on 6 
March 1945 to ‘make further and better provision for the establishment of sanatoria for 
the treatment of persons suffering from tuberculosis’ is further evidence of the 
government’s commitment to the sanatorium solution.153 The government’s 1946 White 
Paper Tuberculosis acknowledged the ideal for Ireland of the two beds per death ratio, a 
formula suggested by the American National Tuberculosis Association.
154
 Published in 
January 1946, the White Paper promised 2,000 new beds, new sanatoria, new 
equipment and an all-round effort to improve methods of prevention and treatment.
155
 
The Post-Sanatorium League, an organisation with a particular concern for aftercare and 
rehabilitation of the TB patient, was established by a group of ex-TB suffers on 26 July 
1944.
156
 The creation of the Post-Sanatorium League is further evidence of the 
preeminent position of the sanatoria in the fight against TB. 
National Nutrition Survey, 1946-48 
 
 Deeny entrusted the organisation of the National Nutrition Survey to Dr 
Desmond Hourihane while the eminent statistician Robert Geary of the Central 
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Statistics Office was charged with establishing the methodological approach and system 
of data analysis.
157
 The aims of the study as identified by Hourihane were to: 
1) Ascertain the amount of the various foods consumed by the population. 
2) To translate these amounts into calories. 
3) To illustrate the primary food habits of the population.158 
 
The ultimate objective was to use this data to draw up dietary standards applicable to 
the Irish people that were comparable to international dietary standards such as those 
established by the Health Committee of the League of Nations in 1936. To obtain the 
data, a scheme of research was drawn up by the Department of Local Government and 
Public Health in consultation with the Irish Medical Research Council and it was thus 
decided that the survey would be divided into two parts including a dietary and a 
clinical study.
159
 The Medical Research Council – introduced to avoid any criticism of 
bias – formed an advisory committee which included Dr J. M. O’Connor (Chairman) 
and Dr W. J. E. Jessop (Secretary), while Professor William Fearon was also a 
member.
160
 The inclusion of the Medical Research Council was significant as it secured 
the assistance of two British Ministry of Health Officials, Dr E. R. Bransby and Dr H. 
E. Magee.
161
 The dietary survey which took about two and a half years was conducted 
by a team of ten women. These investigators were all married women and students of 
domestic economy or of the social sciences and were paid £200 annually in addition to 
expenses.
162
 Before they commenced their work they received three months’ training in 
England carrying out and observing similar work under the supervision of Dr Bransby. 
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Similarly, the doctor employed for the clinical examinations received preliminary 
training in England which was made possible by Dr Magee.
163
 
 It was decided that the survey should extend to 2,500-3,000 families – roughly 
about one in every 250 private families or 1,000 persons in the country; in the end, a 
total of 2,693 families constituting 14,641 people were examined.
164
 These families 
were divided fairly evenly between rural and urban areas and were classified into 
groups deemed important in relation to their proportion to the total population (see 
Table 5.4). 
Table 5.4 The seven different types of family examined in the Irish National 
Nutrition Survey, 1946-48 
Type of family No. of 
families in 
the sample 
Total no. 
of persons 
in survey 
Survey dates 
Resident in Dublin City 500 2,423 April - August 1946 
Resident in the Congested 
districts 
200 934 September - October 1946 and 
March - April 1947 
Large towns (population 
over 10,000) 
329 2,083 October 1946 - May 1947 
Small towns (population 
under 10,000) 
516 3,442 May 1947 - September 1948 
Farming families 948 4,686 October 1946 - September 1948 
Farm workers’ families 177 951 October 1946 - September 1948 
Exceptional rural families 23 122 October 1946 - September 1948 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from: Stationery Office, National Nutritional Survey, parts I-VI; Robert C. 
Geary, ‘Statistical plans and methods of the Irish National Nutrition Survey’ in British Journal of Nutrition, 4(2-3), 
(1950), p. 275 
 
In Dublin, families were randomly selected from four wards using the 1943 register of 
population. The areas sampled were Mountjoy, Rotunda, Drumcondra all on the North 
side and Drumcondra in the west. The families were then classified according to three 
grades, slum, artisan, and middle-class. In the town areas it was decided not to adhere 
too rigidly to the method of random sampling and the study was biased towards families 
that were poorer and larger than the norm. Farming families were selected from the 
Agricultural Statistics List. A number of district electoral divisions (DED) were chosen 
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in each county roughly proportional to the county’s farming population and ten families 
were then selected from each DED. Families of farm labourers were selected 
proportionate to the number of married male agricultural labourers; this was done 
alongside the study of the general farming family sample. The DED was again used as 
the unit of division in the congested districts, though it was the practice to err towards 
the poorer areas.
165
 In the congested districts, the families were visited twice in order to 
take account of possible seasonal differences in available food supplies.
166
 The final 
grouping, only created once the survey got underway, included professionals, tradesmen 
and families of ‘independent means’.167  
 For the dietary survey conducted from April 1946 to August 1948, the 
investigators visited each of the pre-determined families intermittently over a period of 
one week. On the initial visit the investigator weighed and took note of all the food in 
the house. A form (referred to as a logbook) was given to the housewife upon which she 
was to note the price of all the food purchased and the quantity of food consumed 
during the period under study. Exactly one week after the first visit was made, the 
investigator returned to weigh and measure all the food remaining in the house. The 
housewives were given 2s. 6d. upon completion of the logbook.
168
 This data enabled the 
researchers to determine the types and quantities of each individual food consumed as 
well as its cost. Allowances were made for waste along with meals eaten away from the 
home. Other data such as the age, gender, occupation of the family members, family 
income, and number of rooms in the dwelling were also recorded. It was acknowledged 
that the carrying out of the survey might disturb the housewife’s normal domestic 
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routine and so the importance of following normal practices was impressed upon 
them.
169
 According to Dr Hourihane, the investigators, especially during the early stages 
of the study, encountered reluctance on the part of the informants to provide information 
as to the foods purchased. The respondents apparently felt that the information might be 
used in some way to their disadvantage as regards rationing or income tax.
170
 This 
suggests that the investigators were viewed in a similar way to the glimmer man, or the 
government inspector – just another extension of the overbearing and invasive 
Emergency bureaucracy. When bread rationing was introduced on 18 January 1947, a 
date almost directly in the middle of the two visits to the congested districts, the 
housewives there felt that it had been introduced on account of the information they 
provided during the first visit.
171
 In other cases purchases of foodstuffs such as tea were 
concealed due to their illicit nature while other informants entered unlikely foodstuffs 
into the logbooks, ones that wouldn’t normally have been expected. 172  The latter 
pattern, especially common in the congested districts was most likely an attempt – out 
of embarrassment – to hide poverty. 
In a similar fashion to the dietary survey, the clinical survey comprised an 
examination of pre-determined groups selected from the same areas as the dietary 
survey with a bias towards the poorer sections of the community. As Robert Geary 
suggested, ‘there was little point in securing proportionate representation’.173 While the 
clinical survey was conducted analogous to the dietary survey, it was not possible to 
investigate such a broadly representative sample; sections of the population considered 
nutritionally vulnerable were therefore targeted. In total, 14,835 school children, 570 
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adolescents, and 320 nursing and expecting mothers were examined.
174
 The children 
brought a form home to their parents on which information such as the age and gender 
of the child as well as the occupation of the father was to be recorded.  The occupations 
were then used to divide the sample into broad social groups such as unskilled labourers 
and white-collar workers. Unlike the primary school children, it proved difficult to 
secure adolescents and mothers willing to be examined and almost all of those who did 
volunteer came from Dublin. The clinical survey itself was divided into two parts, a 
nutritional assessment by the investigator, and a measurement of heights and weights. 
The method adopted for the nutritional assessment was that employed in Britain during 
WWII. It consisted of the recording of certain clinical signs thought to be indicative of 
defective nutrition together with a record of the examiner’s judgement. The state of 
nutrition of the participants was then described as either being ‘good’, ‘fair’, or ‘poor’. 
While it was noted that the subjective nature of the study could lead to errors, it was felt 
that the employment of the single investigator would diminish this error.
175
  
A significant criticism that can be made of the National Nutrition Survey, when 
considering its findings, relates to the study’s geographical scope. As the rural study 
was conducted concurrently to the towns’ study, it was not feasible to examine rural 
families resident more than five miles away from the towns in which the investigators 
were lodging. It is reasonable to presume that the conditions in these areas would have 
been materially different to the less remote rural areas on account of their less ready 
access to the centres of population. Margaret Crawford makes the point that the 
proliferation of grocery shops throughout Ireland, providing as they did access to 
imported foodstuffs, helped to homogenise consumption habits.
176
 However, as 
illustrated in chapter II, some of Ireland’s remotest areas, especially in the west of the 
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country, were served by commercial travellers as opposed to the more commonplace 
grocery shops. These traders, hit particularly badly by petrol rationing were forced to 
curtail their operations with the result that some of the worst shortages reported 
throughout the Emergency were in the areas they normally served. Again, some of 
Ireland’s blackest TB spots were in rural areas, especially in the west of the country.177 
All of this indicates that within these areas there was the potential for consumption 
habits, levels of nutrition, and general living standards to diverge from the trends 
presented by the National Nutrition Survey. 
James Deeny, writing in 1950 in the British Journal of Nutrition on the 
significance of Ireland’s National Nutrition Survey, summarised:  
Roughly half the population, the 600,000 farm families, of Ireland have enough 
or more than enough to eat... The survey also shows for the other half of the 
Irish population, that the majority of dwellers in the towns or in Dublin are 
adequately satisfied and consume a reasonable diet.
178
 
 
Therefore, the National Nutrition Survey painted a very favourable picture of the 
national health as a whole. However, there were also some negatives. Among Dublin’s 
poorest slum households, the ‘bread and spread culture’ was particularly prevalent.179 
More worrying however was the deficient calcium consumption (according to the 
League of Nations Health Organisation’s standards) that was evident among Dublin’s 
poorest and largest families (see Table 5.5). 
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Table 5.5 Actual milk consumption in Dublin for families of different sizes and 
social classes presented in terms of a percentage of actual requirements, 1946 
Type of 
family 
Number of 
families in 
sub-section 
Total number 
of persons 
surveyed 
Number of persons in family 
1 or 2 3 or 4 5, 6 or 7 8, 9, 10 
or 11 
Slum 188 754 116% 73% 53% 53% 
Artisan 210 1,191 189% 110% 70% 43% 
Middle Class 102 478 179% 142% 101% 76% 
All types 500 2,243 151% 98% 70% 49% 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from: Stationery Office, National Nutritional Survey, part I, methods of 
dietary survey and results from Dublin investigation (Dublin, 1946); Department of Health, survey of human nutrition, 
17 July 1948 (NAI, HLTH/B106/9) 
 
This was easily the survey’s worst finding and the fact that the Department of Health 
omitted this particular data is an indication of how damming it was.
180
 Seventy-five 
percent of all schoolchildren examined in the clinical survey were found to be in ‘good’ 
nutritional health, twenty-two point five percent were ‘fair’ and just two point five 
percent were found to be in a ‘poor’ nutritional state.181 The nutritional state of the 
subjects was determined by the medical officer in terms of the existence of certain 
clinical signs which were judged to be indicative of defective nutrition. These signs 
included gingivitis, subnormal muscle development, subnormal muscle tone, subnormal 
hand grip, diminished subcutaneous fat, goitre and evidence of rickets.
182
 Those in a 
‘fair’ nutritional state presented mild forms of these signs, whereas those in a ‘poor’ 
nutritional state demonstrated more acute symptoms. Evidence of rickets for both boys 
and girls was encountered in approximately seventeen percent of all cases examined in 
the Dublin sample.
183
 Generally, the National Nutrition Survey highlighted the largely 
favourable nature of Ireland’s dietary habits and the positive nutritional state that the 
majority of the population enjoyed. What the National Nutrition Survey achieved was a 
defined picture of Ireland’s food situation which compared favourably with other 
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European countries as well as an illustration of the dietary deficiencies of Ireland’s 
vulnerable groups. At the same time it should be noted that these results applied to the 
nutritional state of the population during the post-war years and so should not be taken 
to be fully reflective of standards during the war years. The lack of correlation between 
the National Nutrition Survey and the findings of Clancy Gore’s study conducted 
several years earlier in 1943 underlines this point.  
Rickets 
 
The prevalence of rickets, a deficiency disease which occurs in growing infants 
and children, increased in Ireland during the Emergency. Primarily associated with 
vitamin D deficiency, a lack of dietary calcium is also important.
184
 In 1942 ‘some 
Dublin paediatricians’ became aware of the increase of the number of cases diagnosed 
radiologically in Dublin’s children’s hospitals.185 
Table 5.6 Incidence of rickets diagnosed radiologically in Dublin’s 
children’s hospitals, 1939-42 
Hospital Cases X-rayed Rickets per 1,000 
children 
  1939-40 1941-42 1939-40 1941-42 
National Children's 1,403 2,081 10 20 
St Ultan's 291 354 10 31 
Temple Street 637 596 9 28 
  Source: E. T. J. McWeeny, Memo on nutrition, 20 Oct. 1943 (HLTH/B106/10, p. 4) 
 
In 1942 a further investigation was made in conjunction with a rickets survey 
undertaken in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland by the British Paediatric 
Association. 365 children, selected at random from the outpatient departments of 
Dublin’s children’s hospitals and welfare centres, were examined. The incidence in the 
group was extremely high – 230 per 1,000 in all children under  four years of age and 
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450, per 1,000 in children between one and a half and two years of age. Dublin’s figures 
were four times higher than those of any English city investigated.
186
 Further rickets 
investigations of children aged between three months and four years, randomly selected 
from the out-patient sections of the three children’s hospitals, were conducted during 
the spring months of 1943 to 1948. Sessions that were especially likely to be attended 
by children suffering from the disease were avoided.
187
 The incidence of rickets among 
the sample decreased from 179 per 1,000 in 1943 to 29 per 1,000 in 1948.
188
 
As early as 1941, Dr Fearon, drawing on the work of the Dr Edward Mellanby 
of the British Ministry of Health, noted that flour of a high extraction rate had the 
potential to inhibit calcium absorption due to its high phytic acid content.
189
 This 
material was not the sole purvey of the medical community but was also discussed in 
The Standard, a newspaper which reflected the attitudes of the Catholic Church.
190
 
Between September 1940 and February 1942 the extraction rate of flour had been 
increased from its pre-war level of seventy percent to one-hundred percent. At the same 
time more concentrated types of vitamin D became more expensive.
191
 However the 
majority of the mothers of the children diagnosed with rickets were ‘emphatic that the 
child concerned had received the same diet as his elder brothers and sisters who had 
shown no sign of the disease.’192 This suggests the increased incidence was related to 
the extraction rate of flour as opposed to a reduced dietary intake of vitamin D. Prior to 
the war, the British Ministry of Health recognised the problem that the loaf of a high 
extraction rate posed, and as early as June 1939 had ordered the fortification of bread 
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with calcium as a preventative measure.
193
 In mid 1944, following consultation with 
British experts, the Department of Local Government and Public Health recommended 
the fortification of Irish flour with calcium carbonate to the sum of seven ounces per 
sack.
194
 While the extraction rate of flour was reduced to eighty-five percent in 
December 1943, official fortification of flour did not begin until June 1946.
195
 
Figure 5.11 The merits of the ‘new bread’, June 1946 
 
 Source: Dublin Opinion, June 1946 
 
In Ireland’s limited pre-war plans, nutritional considerations played no part. As 
an agricultural country whose produce was considered vital to Britain, it was assumed 
that the war would actually revitalise the Irish economy negating the need for a 
rationing framework. Instead the economy suffered and as the war dragged on and 
prices rose, it became necessary to institute rationing. Nutritional considerations 
however, were of little consequence in the development of these controls. The amount 
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of rationed food one could receive depended on the total available supply of the 
particular foodstuff. In Britain, welfare rations were made available for expectant and 
nursing mothers, children, and the necessitous classes. The communal feeding 
infrastructure was greatly expanded. Industrial canteens gave more fats, meat, and sugar 
per meal than in the public ‘British Restaurants’ and a rural pie scheme was initiated for 
agricultural workers.
196
 In Ireland, it was argued that the availability of adequate 
supplies of the ‘protective foodstuffs’ (foods considered rich in vitamins and calcium) 
annulled the need for a similarly comprehensive system. In reality, rising prices put 
these foodstuffs beyond the reach of the poorest sections of the population and the 
shortage of fuel made their preparation difficult. In Britain, nutritionists rose to 
prominence during the Second World War. Parallels can be seen in Ireland, especially 
in the appointment of the socially and nutritionally conscious Dr James Deeny to the 
position of chief medical advisor to the Department of Local Government and Public 
Health in 1944. The fortification of Irish flour in light of the high incidence of rickets 
also mirrored developments in the UK. Although introduced seven years later in 1946, 
this was a reactionary as opposed to a preventative measure.  
The impact of the Emergency upon public health and the initiation of the 
National Nutrition Survey are two interrelated issues. Shortages and rising prices 
definitely had an impact on health with both infant deaths and deaths from tuberculosis 
increasing. While the censors may have prevented overtly negative public debate on the 
issue of health (and other sensitive issues) in order to ‘keep temperatures down’, in this 
case, the statistics do not lie.
197
 In light of the declining health among the poorest 
sections of the Irish population, socially and nutritionally conscious doctors such as 
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Deeny and Robert Fearon extolled the virtues of proper nutrition. As the Emergency 
progressed increasing attention was paid to the subject, and this had much to do with the 
fight against tuberculosis which became highly politicised during the period. Crucially, 
there was a growing recognition of the links between malnutrition and illness. As TB 
became news, nutrition became news. Information on nutrition was no longer the 
preserve of the medical journals and the problem was addressed officially, in the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health’s 1942 pamphlet, A simple guide to 
wholesome diet. The findings of Charles Clancy Gore’s 1944 paper, ‘Nutritional 
standards of some working-class families in Dublin, 1943’ caused consternation. Where 
the problem lay was in the fact that no one really knew how good or bad the national 
situation was. Thus following the example set in the UK and elsewhere, and drawing on 
the expertise of Ministry of Health officials, Ireland’s National Nutrition Survey was 
put into motion.  
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Chapter VI  
 
The Long Emergency 
 
As far as our work is concerned, it will be a very long time before the 
Emergency is over. 
Irish Housewives’ Committee, annual report, June 1946, p. 7 
 
The 8 May 1945 marked VE Day or Victory in Europe Day for the Allies, while 
the surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945 officially brought the Second World War to 
an end. In Ireland, exactly one year later on 2 September 1946 the Emergency Powers 
Act was revoked. This, suggests Bryce Evans, marked the end of the period of 
emergency in Ireland.
1
 The end of the war was looked forward to with high hopes and 
the desire for a return to normality was strong. In spite of the Second World War’s 
conclusion, Ireland continued to face supply difficulties and as a result many of the 
controls introduced under the Emergency Powers Act remained in force well after the 
act itself was repealed. This chapter will therefore extend the analysis of rationing in 
Ireland to the immediate post-war years of 1945-48 or the ‘Long Emergency’. It will 
attempt to place Ireland’s supply difficulties within the international context and will 
test the hypothesis that the Emergency, although concluded diplomatically and 
militarily, actually continued in a popular sense. 
Post-war Europe 
The post-war world was a torn and hungry place. The conclusion of hostilities 
did not bring about a sudden end to the suffering and starvation faced by many and in 
fact in some places, privation actually increased. In addition to the massive loss of 
human life in Europe – an estimated thirty-five to forty million people died in Europe as 
a direct result of the Second World War – huge material and infrastructural destruction 
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crippled the post-war continent.
2
 Throughout Europe, hundreds of cities had been 
entirely or partially devastated. In Germany around one in five living spaces in the 
country had been destroyed, Berlin lost up to fifty percent of its habitable premises and 
throughout the country an estimated eighteen to twenty million people were rendered 
homeless.
3
 The mounds of rubble that remained were devoid of essential services, there 
was no water, gas, electricity or sanitation. One American columnist writing in the New 
York Times suggested that Europe’s population had been reduced to living in: 
Medieval fashion surrounded by the broken-down machinery of the twentieth 
century.
4
 
 
Roads, bridges, railways, telegraph and telephone communications had been destroyed, 
damaged, and had fallen into disrepair. The bombed-out cities served by hamstrung 
networks were then inundated by millions of refugees and POWs seeking either their 
old homes or new ones. Europe’s rural infrastructure was also shattered. Farmhouses 
had been burned down, farmland flooded and neglected. Farms had been plundered, 
crops destroyed, livestock slaughtered, machinery requisitioned and throughout the 
continent labour had been lost to the war effort. Food production in Europe for 1945 
was reduced to thirty-six percent of its pre-war level.
5
 This had serious dietary 
consequences. In Germany, at the start of the war, average food consumption equated to 
2,507 calories per head, but this figure had diminished to just 1,124 calories in 1945; 
this translated to two thin slices of bread spread thinly with margarine, a spoonful of 
porridge, and two small potatoes.
6
 Throughout Europe many millions were consuming 
less than half the amount of food they would have eaten prior to the war. The standard 
diet was woefully short of fats and protein and diseases associated with malnutrition 
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increased while transport difficulties hampered the distribution of food relief supplies 
and building materials. 
The extent to which the average Irish person was capable of appreciating the 
gravity of the situation in Europe is hard to tell. Following the lifting of censorship, 
reports of the massive loss of life, the material destruction, the atrocities, and the 
shortages were disseminated through Ireland’s press. The sheer scale of the calamity, 
however, would have been hard to comprehend. Others who remembered the anti-
German propaganda of the First World War may have found the information coming 
out of Europe hard to trust, or felt that it was exaggerated.
7
 At the same time, the Irish 
people had grown weary of the war and its impact upon Ireland. By the conclusion of 
the war in Europe on 8 May 1945, the Irish population had been subjected to 
government controls of one sort or another for almost six years. A statement made by 
Minister for Supplies, Seán Lemass, published in the Irish Press in February 1944 and 
entitled ‘A dangerous attitude’, alludes to the complacency which even then appeared to 
be setting in amongst the public. According to the article, Lemass noted: 
The idea that a period of peace and plenty is just around the corner, has taken a 
firm grip in many minds. The inevitable result is to cause a slackening of effort 
in every sphere of activity... Suppose the war in Europe does end this year; what 
then?…we will not have enough bread next year unless we have sufficient wheat 
ourselves, or enough sugar unless we grow sufficient beet, or enough butter 
unless we produce the milk. Europe will be desperately short of food and the 
countries which are unable to feed themselves will have first claim on whatever 
supplies can be bought from overseas.
8
  
 
Following the end of the war, the importance of maintaining economic controls was 
stressed by the government. The post-war world was full of uncertainties, Lemass knew 
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this, but he also looked to the past, referencing the massive inflation experienced in the 
wake of the First World War.
9
 
In the Department of Supplies’ estimates for 1945-46, Lemass cited export 
restrictions in countries upon which Ireland was dependent for supplies, the lack of 
shipping and the prosecution of the war in the east as reasons for Ireland’s continued 
supplies difficulties. There had been no appreciable improvement in the supplies 
situation in the previous twelve months; the Irish government continued to make every 
effort possible to secure additional supplies; representations were made by Irish 
diplomats in the countries concerned; John Leydon, Secretary of the Department of 
Supplies even visited Britain, the USA and Canada with a view to increasing trade 
while Irish Shipping Ltd also continued to seek additional tonnage.
10
 The Irish 
Housewives’ Association (IHA), established in May 1942 to campaign for fair prices 
and equitable distribution (among other things) also recognised the problems Ireland 
faced. The organisation’s 1945 annual report noted that although the war was over, 
conditions would not be normal for a long time adding: 
We do not feel that our work is over, or our usefulness ended.
11
 
 
The IHA felt the need to persist with its campaign for fair prices and equitable 
distribution. As illustrated in Table 6.1, created using data from the IHA’s magazine, 
the Irish Housewife, the price of everyday items had increased dramatically in Ireland 
during the Emergency. 
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Table 6.1 Price comparison of everyday items sold in Ireland at their 1939 and 
1946 prices 
  1939 prices 1946 prices Range Percentage 
increase   £ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. 
  
         
  
Corned beef 
  
7 
 
1 2 
  
7 100 
Liver 
  
10 
 
1 10 
 
1 
 
120 
Mutton (breast) 
  
9 
 
1 4 
  
7 55 
Rashers (streaky) 
 
1 9 
 
3 
  
1 3 71 
Pork sausages 
 
1 3 
 
2 2 
 
1 1 73 
Herrings (doz.) 
 
1 
  
3 
  
2 
 
200 
Rabbits (each) 
  
6 
 
2 
  
1 6 300 
Eggs (doz.) 
 
1 11 
 
3 
  
1 1 56 
Butter 
 
1 6 
 
2 4 
  
10 55 
Cheese 
 
1 4 
 
1 9 
  
5 31 
Margarine 
  
8 
 
1 8 
 
1 
 
150 
Lard 
  
7 
 
1 2 
  
7 100 
Dripping 
  
6 
 
1 
   
6 100 
Sugar 
  
3 
  
5 
  
2 66 
Tea 
 
2 
  
3 8 
 
1 8 83 
Flour (stone) 
 
2 6 
 
4 
  
1 6 60 
Oatmeal (stone) 
 
3 4 
 
7 
  
3 8 110 
Salt (stone) 
 
1 
  
2 
  
1 
 
100 
Potatoes (stone) 
 
1 
  
2 
  
1 
 
100 
Apples (each) 
  
3 
  
6 
  
3 100 
Shoes (men's) 1 5 
 
2 2 
  
17 
 
68 
Shoes (women's) 1 2 6 1 15 
  
13 6 55 
Shoes (children's) 
 
15 
 
1 1 
  
6 
 
40 
Male suit 5 5 
 
12 12 
 
7 7 
 
140 
Female costume 3 10 
 
7 19 
 
4 9 
 
127 
Coal (one ton) 1 18 
 
5 8 
 
3 10 
 
184 
Turf (two tons) 2 5 
 
5 8 
 
3 3 
 
140 
Soap 
  
6 
  
11 
  
5 83 
Saucepans 
 
3 9 
 
10 
  
6 3 166 
Cup and saucer 
  
6 
 
1 9 
 
1 3 250 
Kitchen dresser 1 19 6 7 
  
4 
 
6 250 
Bed sheets 
 
14 
 
2 2 
 
1 8 
 
200 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from ‘going up’ in The Irish Housewife (1946), p. 52 
 
The average increase for the thirty-two items contained in Table 6.1 is almost 110 
percent. In the IHA’s annual report for 1946 it was noted that: 
As far as our work is concerned, it will be a very long time before the 
Emergency is over.
12
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For the average Irish person however, the reduction of the flour extraction rate to a more 
palatable eighty percent in November 1945, its lowest level since late 1940, was 
indicative of improving times.
13
 Supplies of wheat, agricultural inputs and spare parts 
also became more available. While just thirty tractors and 106 tractor ploughs were 
imported in 1941, the figures for 1945 increased to 600 and 300 respectively.
14
 The turf 
drive was also relaxed; the Department of Industry and Commerce reduced County 
Council Scheme’s target for 1946 from 400,000 to 350,000 tons.15 In June 1946 the tea 
ration was increased from a half ounce to one and a half ounces per head per week.
16
  
As Mary Daly points out, ‘this was something of a false dawn.’17 In the following years 
various factors would conspire to knock the wind out of the sails of Irish people’s post-
war optimism. 
World food shortage 
 
Ireland’s supplies situation may have improved slightly during the immediate 
post-war months, but by early 1946 it was becoming clear that the world was facing a 
massive food crisis. The depressed state of global agriculture meant that the world was 
short of milk, meat and fats; this however came as no great surprise. What was not 
anticipated was the deficit in the global cereals supply. A two-sided problem, the 
expected global yield had been overestimated and actual requirements had been 
underestimated. At a meeting of the United Nations on 13 February 1946, a resolution 
urging food economy was passed. Speaking at the meeting, Britain’s foreign secretary, 
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Ernest Bevin, stressed that the position was ‘really alarming’ and went so far as to say 
that:  
The war is still on, and we must beat the enemy, famine.
18
  
 
But it was not until the meeting of the Combined Food Board Cereals Committee in 
London on 3 April 1946 that the true gravity of the situation became clear.
19
 The crux of 
the problem lay in the abnormally high requirements that were requested by countries 
which normally produced a surplus or had been largely self-sufficient. Droughts in 
Southern Europe and North Africa in 1945, followed by more droughts in the Americas, 
Australia, Asia and parts of Southern Africa in 1946 lowered yields.
20
 In India the 
catastrophic crop conditions resulted in a rice deficit of almost 2,000,000 tons.
21
 
Altogether this created an unprecedented demand for imports of cereals. During the 
years 1935-39 the global trade in wheat and flour had averaged at 15,000,000 tons.
22
 
For the six months of January to June 1946, stated requirements were in the region of 
20,000,000 to 21,000,000 tons. This was against a supply of wheat and wheat 
substitutes of approximately 13,000,000 tons, a deficit of about 7,000,000 to 8,000,000 
tons.
23
 The estimated availability therefore represented about sixty percent of the stated 
requirements and so the committee recommended that both exporting and importing 
countries institute grain economising measures. In the end a total of 28,000,000 tons of 
grain were imported into deficit areas during 1946-47.
24
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 In Ireland, proactive measures were taken by the government to help alleviate 
the distress in Europe. One such action was the establishment of the European Relief 
Scheme in 1945.
25
 £3,000,000 was voted for the relief of distress in Europe to purchase 
food aid such as sugar, butter and condensed milk which was distributed through the 
International Red Cross.
26
 When the Irish Cedar of the Irish Shipping Ltd was returned 
to her Italian owners she was laden with a cargo of 2,000 tons’ worth of relief goods. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva described this as being ‘a 
most beautiful example of charity.’27 Particular appreciation was reportedly shown for 
Irish sugar as sugar was one of the first commodities to disappear on the continent 
following the outbreak of the war.
28
 The Irish Press described how in a home for old 
people in Berlin the ‘inmates’ ate their 40g daily ration of sugar with a spoon, it being 
‘undoubtedly the most nourishing item on their meagre menus.’29 
Figure 6.1 ‘Irland Spende’ or ‘Irish Gift’ being unloaded in Berlin, 1946 
 
 Source: Irish Press, 10 July 1946 
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Some promises proved harder to keep. In 1945, France, Belgium, Holland and Italy 
were each allocated 2,000,000 lbs. of canned meat but delivery proved impossible due 
to lack of tin cans and shipping.
30
 Organisations such as the St John’s Ambulance 
Brigade and the Catholic Social Service Conference also contributed to the European 
relief effort. In January 1946 the St John’s Ambulance Brigade donated its mobile 
canteen to the International Red Cross; during the war years the canteen had been used 
to administer cheap food in areas such as Crumlin and Cabra.
31
 In the minutes of the 
Sodality of Our Lady, St Joseph’s, High Park, it was noted that the sodalists planned to 
respond to an appeal ‘for the gift of old clothes for the suffering people of Hungary.’ 
The clothes would first be sent to the CSSC’s central clothing guild, City Quay, for 
onward distribution.
32
 
From early 1946, as the repercussions of the poor harvests began to be felt 
around the world, there was a shift in Ireland’s food policy as the controls around flour 
and bread were tightened once more. These developments were in line with ones 
instituted elsewhere and were a direct response to the United Nation’s recommendations. 
For example, in January 1946 the US government, one of the principle exporters of 
wheat, raised the extraction rate for flour to eighty percent.
33
 On 10 February 1946, de 
Valera announced that the extraction rate of flour would be increased to eighty-five 
percent; Ireland would have ‘the same loaf as Britain.’34 De Valera explained: 
Conditions have turned out to be definitively worse than anticipated. A series of 
natural calamities have been superimposed on the calamities due to the war... 
War-ravaged Europe, disorganised without farm equipment or fertiliser or 
proper transport, is quite unable to provide for its own needs. 
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De Valera urged ‘the greatest effort’ yet made to be put into the production of wheat for 
the coming year for: 
The more food we produce, the safer will be our own position and the more we 
shall have for those who are in need.
35
 
 
Three days later the UN passed its resolution urging food economy. The Irish 
government’s response to the recommendations of the Combined Food Board Cereals 
Committee was also swift. On 4 April 1946, the day following the conference, then 
Tánaiste and Minister for Industry and Commerce, Seán Lemass, who had been in 
attendance, announced that the extraction rate would be raised to ninety percent.
36
 
Reports detailing the suffering in Europe were widely disseminated in the Irish press. 
An article published in the Connacht Sentinel on 16 April 1946 suggested that: 
Famine stalks Europe just as terribly as it stalked this country one hundred years 
ago. 
 
Adding: 
 
Our ninety percent wheaten loaf, when it comes, will be a small sacrifice to 
make to assist starving millions.
37
 
 
In Ireland the memory of the Great Famine was regularly evoked, as was the idea that 
continued rationing was about more than just national food security. The Irish 
Housewives Association also launched a campaign against waste, particularly of bread 
and urged the use of flour substitutes such as oatmeal and potato. It was the IHA which 
suggested that the government reintroduce the ban on the serving of wheaten meals in 
catering establishments which they did on 21 May 1946. Boland’s Ltd published 
advertisements encouraging bread economy and recommended recipes for the use of 
stale bread.
38
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During the war the Irish government supplemented the domestic wheat supply 
with imported wheat sourced mainly from North America. Grain Importers (Éire) was 
in fact able to purchase grain in quantities to the extent of Irish Shipping Ltd’s shipping 
capacity. At this point, transport rather than supply was the problem. Following the 
cessation of hostilities in Europe, the shipping position immediately improved. The net 
tonnage of vessels with cargoes that entered and cleared from Irish ports in 1946 
amounted to 2,956,000 tons as compared with 1,396,000 tons in 1944.
39
 Wheat was one 
of the commodities which began to flow more freely into Ireland with the result that 
extraction rate for flour was lowered to eighty percent. As Lemass admitted himself, it 
was expected that there would be no further difficulties.
40
 With the realisation of the 
grain shortage however, supply now became the issue. From August to December 1945, 
103,305 tons of wheat was imported into Ireland, in comparison just 66,797 tons were 
secured during the whole of 1946.
41
From July 1946 the Irish government made 
representations to the International Emergency Food Council to increase Ireland’s wheat 
allocation.
42
 However, the exporting countries drew comparison with Ireland’s overall 
availability of food with that of other countries and also noted the lack of bread 
rationing; that same month bread rationing was introduced in the UK
 
.
43
 This situation 
was problematic for Ireland as flour consumption increased considerably during the 
Emergency. Average pre-war weekly consumption stood at 52,000 280lbs sacks, which 
had increased to 65,000 280lbs sacks by the summer of 1944; a level which was 
maintained thereafter.
44
 Flour assumed an increasingly important position in the Irish 
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diet during the Emergency, especially for the urban poor who found cooking difficult 
due to the nature of the fuel supply. Government subsidy also meant that it was cheaper 
than alternative foodstuffs. The reduced imports of wheat aside, there was cause for 
optimism going into the harvest of 1946. Some 642,595 acres of wheat were sown that 
year, just 20,000 less than in 1945.
45
 As the war was over and with imports expected to 
improve this was considered a satisfactory effort. Unfortunately though, Ireland was 
about to enter a period of acute difficulty. 
Battle for the harvest 
 
 During the late summer of 1946 Ireland experienced atrocious weather 
conditions. Early August was a deluge with the latter half of the month marked by 
almost incessant rains.
46
 It was described as the ‘worst August in living memory’ by one 
‘old and experienced’ West Limerick landowner.47 Throughout the country rivers burst 
their banks, bridges were downed and there was considerable flooding. Fields were 
waterlogged, crops were flattened, and animals were drowned. Turf was past saving. At 
Dromore, Bailieborough, Co. Cavan, farmers used a boat to get from one part of their 
lands to another.
48
 It was reported that forty percent of the crops on the Mount Street 
Club’s 225 acre farm in Clondalkin had been destroyed.49 The material in the press 
readily conveys the sense of fear and foreboding that swept over the country in early 
September. An article in the Irish Independent declared: 
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Nothing in this country is now of greater urgency... than to save what remains of 
the harvest... If calamity is not prevented it will bring suffering into every 
home.
50
 
 
Another article in the Irish Independent worried: 
 
It is very much to be feared that such privation as this country has not known 
since Black ’47 may overwhelm our people in the next eight or nine months.51 
 
Now it appeared as though Ireland like many other parts of the world was also facing 
famine. While the incessant rains had broken by early September, the harvest was 
seriously delayed. On 4 September the Irish Farmers Federation thus requested that 
labour be made available to save the harvest. The following day the Minister for 
Agriculture, James Ryan, appealed for volunteers to do just that. He suggested the 
establishment of ‘clearing centres’ throughout the country by ‘responsible citizens’ for 
the registration of volunteers, as a point of contact for the farmers, and for the overall 
organisation of the effort.
52
 Dublin was thus organised into four bureaux for recruitment 
purposes. The central bureau was established at 11 Parnell Square; the Rathfarnham and 
Dun Laoghaire bureaux for the south of the county, and the Swords bureau for the north 
of the county.
53
 Owners of private motorcars were also requested to offer them for 
harvest work.
54
 
Throughout September and early October 1946, thousands of volunteers, both 
men and women hailing from all walks of life responded to the government’s call to 
save the harvest. Civil servants were released where practical on full pay for volunteer 
work and appeals were made to private business owners to do the same. 
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Figure 6.2 A depiction of a farmer and a white collar worker standing waist deep 
in water during the ‘battle for the harvest’, Oct. 1946 
 
Source: Dublin Opinion, Oct. 1946 
 
The local authorities’ county engineering labour resources normally used for work on 
the roads, bogs and cottage repair were also released for harvest work.
55
 Volunteers 
with farming experience were assigned skilled jobs, but every pair of hands was a 
welcome addition to Ireland’s ‘harvest army’ as it was described as in the press.56 
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Figure 6.3 An Irish Red Cross volunteer leaving the Central Bureau, 11 Parnell 
Square, with sandwiches for the harvesters, September 1946 
 
 Source: Irish Independent, 18 Sept. 1946 
 
This really was a massive voluntary effort. Private car owners who ferried the 
volunteers to the farms were supplied with petrol. The Irish Red Cross established a 
canteen at their HQ on Molesworth Street, Dublin, to provide food for the harvesters. It 
was often the case that the farmers could not afford to feed the volunteers and nor could 
the workers, many of whom were unemployed, afford to bring with them a suitable 
lunch.
57
 A month later the IRC estimated that it distributed approximately 100,000 
rations.
58
 GAA matches were put on hold until the work was completed and in Galway 
children of farming families were advised to stay at home and help with the harvest
 59
 
While there were rumours of farmers neglecting to help their neighbours, businesses 
refusing to let their workers go, and able-bodied unemployed persons snubbing the 
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appeal, for the most part it seems the ‘battle for the harvest’ was taken up with 
enthusiasm.
60
 
By early October most of the harvest was saved. Disaster had been averted and 
reports on the national voluntary effort were largely praiseworthy. Nevertheless there 
was a sharp drop in yields. The 1946 wheat yield of 462,700 tons was twenty percent 
lower than the previous year’s although the total acreage sown was approximately the 
same. Of this sum just 337,000 tons was officially milled, 78,500 tons was retained for 
seed which left 50,000 tons unaccounted for. The Irish Trade Journal suggested that 
this sum was lost at harvest or went to waste in the course of collection, threshing and 
delivery, but it’s also likely that a proportion of the 50,000 tons made its way onto the 
black market.
61
 150,000 would need to be imported to make up the deficit.  The rains 
also reduced the quality of the wheat through pre-harvest sprouting (PHS). PHS occurs 
during periods of prolonged rainfall and high humidity after the grain has ripened and 
before it can be harvested leading to a partial breakdown of starch into sugar which 
results in a flour of poor quality. This in turn affects loaf quality.
62
 Loaves produced 
from this flour were soggy which resulted in wastage. Normally, this problem could 
have been offset by mixing the native wheat with Canadian or US ‘strong wheat’ 
varieties, but these grains weren’t available in sufficient quantities.63  The Canadian 
yield had been lower than expected and despite the fact that the US recorded a bumper 
harvest, internal transport difficulties as well as a maritime strike prevented the 
shipment of US wheat to Ireland.
64
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Bread Rationing 
 
In the context of both the global and national cereals deficit, the government 
introduced the rationing of flour and bread on 18 January 1947 knowing that this 
measure was necessary to secure allocations of wheat from the International Emergency 
Food Council.
65
 The domestic ration was fixed at six pounds of bread, or four and a half 
pounds of flour per head per week. Farmers were permitted to retain one barrel of wheat 
per annum per head of household. Provision was also made to grant supplementary 
allowances at a rate of half the domestic ration for certain classes of employee that were 
engaged in heavy manual work and who owing to the conditions of their employment 
were unable to return home for a mid-day meal.
66
 Agricultural workers who resided at 
least two miles from their place of employment, who were not supplied with meals by 
their employer and who were unable to return home for a mid day meal could also 
purchase the additional allowance. The production and sale of flour and bread was 
already strictly controlled with bakers, wholesalers, retailers all needing licences to 
engage in the trade, 33,000 retailers were licensed to sell bread. With the introduction of 
bread rationing, regulation was extended to the consumer as it became mandatory for 
them to register with a single merchant and to submit coupons in return for their bread 
ration. Permits were granted to catering establishments, charitable organisations and 
schools to receive allocations of bread at a rate of four ounces per meal served.
67
 In light 
of the introduction of bread and flour rationing in 1947, the relaxation of the controls 
around wheat in 1945 proved premature. Lemass had stated that it was the: 
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Government’s anxiety... to err on the side of removing controls too soon rather 
than leaving them in force until it is quite certain that they are no longer 
required.
68
 
 
In the case of wheat, a vital constituent of the Irish diet, this turned out to be foolhardy. 
James Hughes, Fine Gael TD for Carlow-Kildare noted that the unpredictability of the 
Irish weather should have been taken into account suggesting Lemass overlooked this 
because he was a ‘city man’.69 
One of the immediate criticisms of the scheme was that no special allowance 
was made for flour confectionary goods. The Confectioners’ Association made 
representation to the government and forecasted that the approximate 800 manufacturers 
concerned would be hard hit as consumers would necessarily purchase essential 
supplies of bread over luxuries. Shortly afterwards a special page was allocated from the 
ration book which permitted the purchase of a half pound of flour confectionary per 
week.
70
 Of a more serious nature was the debate which ensued around eligibility for the 
supplementary bread allowance. In Britain, farmers were permitted extra allowances of 
tea, sugar, and margarine for field workers during harvest, threshing, hay-making and 
sheep-shearing times.
71
 In Ireland the farmers considered it a particular slight that they, 
who were expected to provide the country with food and fuel, were not all permitted 
additional rations. While the supplemental scheme covered turf workers employed by 
Bord na Móna, the county councils and industrial interests; no allowance was made for 
the individual or family who maybe travelled several miles to the bog to provide for 
their fuel needs in the coming year. Lemass reasoned that any extension of the 
supplementary allowances scheme would necessitate either a reduction in the domestic 
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ration or a reduction in the lasting period of the stocks.
72
 Right from the inception of 
bread rationing until its abolition in November 1948, repeated requests were made for 
the widening of the scheme to classes of consumer as varied as fishermen to school 
children. Provision was eventually made to increase the domestic ration for September 
for consumers resident outside the county boroughs of Dublin, Cork, Limerick and 
Waterford and the borough of Dun Laoghaire in order to facilitate the harvest.
73
 
Some initial difficulties were experienced with the bread rationing scheme due 
to panic buying and a glut of last minute applicants. These problems aside the scheme 
ran smoothly with the general consensus being that the domestic ration was a generous 
one. At the same time its introduction was a cause for alarm, at no point during the war 
was this measure taken. As was stated in one letter to the Irish Times: 
Bread rationing after two years of ‘peace’ made us sit up.74 
 
For many it was a shocking development. Bread had become an increasingly important 
stomach-filler, an affordable staple in an otherwise restricted diet. Experience had 
shown that the introduction of bread rationing in the UK was highly unpopular and it 
was even described as: 
 The most unpopular action that her Labour government ever undertook.
75
 
 
That the measure was subsequently taken in Ireland is illustrative of the seriousness of 
the situation the country was facing. The country was short an estimated 150,000 tons 
of wheat and there were no guarantees that shipments would be forthcoming.  Bread 
rationing was just as unpopular as it was shocking. This is evidenced by the attention it 
received in the Dáil. Bread rationing was very much an issue of political significance, it 
was a symbolic sore. 
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The Big Freeze 
 
 The introduction of bread rationing in January 1947 was a bitter pill to swallow; 
however, Ireland was to face still further adversity. From late January until mid March 
1947, the British Isles was gripped by a spell of unprecedented weather. Popularly 
referred to as the ‘Big Freeze’, it represented the British Isle’s most severe and 
protracted spell of bad weather of the twentieth century. In Ireland the really cold 
weather began on 24 January 1947 with temperatures falling to minus six. Dublin had 
its first snow on 28 January and two days later a low of minus thirteen was recorded. On 
2 February 1947, Ireland experienced the first of several blizzards that would sweep the 
country over the course of the next two months as arctic conditions set in.
76
 From 
around the country, reports told of impassable roads, frozen rivers and icy blizzards. 
Fierce gales whipped the country and heavy seas pounded the coast. On 1 February 
1947 the Irish Plane of the Irish Shipping Ltd was driven onto the coast at Ballycotton 
County Cork.
77
 The snow and low temperatures wreaked havoc with essential services 
and communications. It left transport, electricity, water, and telephone services 
disorganised with repair work hampered by transport difficulties. Throughout the 
country deliveries of vital supplies were held up. Flights were cancelled and schools 
closed. Inhabitants of snowbound villages reportedly walked ten and twelve miles to the 
nearest towns in an attempt to secure supplies of rationed goods.
78
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Figure 6.4 A car near Hollywood, County Wicklow during the ‘Big 
Freeze’ of 1947 
 
  Source: Irish Independent, 6 Feb. 1947 
 
The reporting of this exceptional climatic event depicts an almost otherworldly 
landscape which severely tested the limits of the population. 
Cattle struggling through chest-deep snowdrifts to get a small tuft of grass in the 
hedges, one chimney with smoke coming from it, children peering out through 
the windows of fireless cottages, and an almost deserted appearance over the 
countryside.
79
 
 
This was the general impression made on one Irish Press reporter following a twenty 
mile tour of the foothills to the Dublin Mountains made on 20 February 1947. After the 
blizzard of the 25 February 1947 which totally cut of the west of the country, the Irish 
Times reported: 
Blacked-out towns and villages, 1,000 more phones cut off in Dublin alone, 
main roads impassable, passenger bus services suspended, homes without milk – 
some without food and fuel – mountain turf bogs six feet under snow.80 
 
In inland areas snow measuring seven feet deep was recorded. At least one fifty-foot 
drift was reported near Glencree, County Wicklow, while the Hamlet of Moneystown at 
Roundwood was said to be ‘lost in the snow.’81  So desperate was the situation in 
Wicklow that farmers brought their milk to lorries at Avoca on homemade sledges, and 
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plans were formulated (though never put into place) to airdrop supplies to the highland 
villages which had been snowbound for more than a week.
82
 Many farmers suffered 
heavy losses of livestock which perished due to exposure and lack of fodder. There 
were losses of human life also, such as the brothers Alex (69) and Patrick McAndrew 
(76), farmers, who were found several hundred yards away from their home near Evrick, 
Belmullet, County Mayo, with a bucket of turf close by.
83
 Then on the weekend of 15 to 
17 March, torrential rains lashed the country. These combined with warmer 
temperatures to trigger a ‘colossal “quick thaw” of the country’s massive snow-pack’.84 
Vast volumes of water were released and farmland became inundated. Kilkenny City 
was reported to have had the worst floods in living memory.
85
 Unfortunately for Ireland, 
the harshest weather experienced during the twentieth century coincided with a period 
of acute fuel scarcity as supplies of both coal and turf ran short. This combination of 
events caused widespread suffering during the winter of 1947. 
The fuel famine 
 
1946 was a bad year for turf in a number of ways. In mid June, just as the first 
cutting was to be removed from the bog, the turf hauliers, represented by the Irish Lorry 
Owners Association, and subcontracted by Fuel Importers Éire to transport turf from the 
turf area to the non-turf area, went on strike. As the strike didn’t end until 31 July 1946, 
the crop was left lying on the bogs exposed to the elements where it deteriorated.
86
 This 
turf was reported to be in such poor condition upon arrival in Dublin that it was beyond 
satisfactory stacking. It was left in the dumps unclamped and uncovered at the mercy of 
the heavy rains of August and the following months. By January 1947 this turf was in a 
sodden condition and owing to the delay in the removal of the first cutting much of the 
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second crop never made it off the bog.
87
 As depicted in Figure 6.5, the turf the 
inhabitants of the turf-area were expected to burn was ‘honestly wet this time.’  
Figure 6.5 A bellman sells ‘honestly wet’ turf as 
represented in Dublin Opinion, 1947 
    
The battle for harvest also 
took a heavy toll on that years turf 
drive. In the scramble to prevent 
famine, turf was neglected. 
Throughout the country, rural 
labourers and county council workers 
were diverted from the bogs to the 
fields. While Seán MacEntee was of 
the opinion that the aversion of 
disaster had much to do with the 
measures taken by the local authorities, the redeployment of labour helped to precipitate 
fuel scarcity.
88
 Throughout the country turf was left on the bogs for too long and by 
1947, supplies of ‘useable turf’ within the turf area were at an all time low.89 Turf also 
became more affordable in the non-turf area in 1946, its price being reduced from sixty-
four to fifty-four shillings per ton, but Richard Mulcahy made the reasonable argument 
that this resulted in increased demand. Mulcahy explained that reduction in price 
enabled the poorer sections of the community to purchase more turf. Similarly, the 
reduced price meant that cutting turf for private production as was practiced in the 
Dublin Mountains was less remunerative.
90
 Lemass estimated that during the second 
half of 1946 consumption in the turf area increased by approximately fifty percent on 
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1945 levels.
91
 The cumulative effect of the strike, the poor weather, and the reduced 
price was that demand increased while both the supply and quality of the turf available 
decreased. 
Throughout late 1946 and into January 1947 there were murmurs of an 
impending fuel crisis, but the government didn’t act. Indeed, the potential for calamity 
extended beyond Ireland’s insufficient turf supplies. There were some worrying 
developments in Britain regarding its coal industry which should have raised eyebrows 
in Ireland. As early as July 1946, the British Minister of Fuel and Power, Emmanuel 
Shinwell, announced that there might be some curtailment of industry that coming 
winter owing to the shortage of coal.
92
 Shinwell estimated that the stock position at the 
beginning of the winter would be about 11,000,000 tons, or 5,000,000 tons short of the 
normal reserve of 16,000,000 tons.
93
 The comparatively low rates of total production 
and general poor efficiency in British mining were massive problems for the Labour 
government. The industry suffered acute labour problems. The work was underpaid, it 
was dangerous, the hours were long and the working conditions were poor. All of this 
made mining unpopular. Strikes were a regular occurrence and absenteeism was rife. 
The rate of absenteeism at ‘the coalface’ for 1946 was estimated at 19.32%.94 Years of 
mismanagement and neglect meant that average output per man in British mines was 
lower than that attained in North American or European mines. The uncertainty over 
ownership reduced private investment during the preceding years which further 
hampered production. Britain’s mines were nationalised on New Year’s Day 1947.95 
The lack of transport also hampered production, this was public knowledge. The war 
had taken a heavy toll on Britain’s locomotives and rolling stock; approximately one-
                                                          
91
 DD, Mr Lemass, 22 Jan. 1947, Vol. 104, No. 1, Col. 16. 
92
 Hansard, Coal situation, HC Deb, 24 July 1946, Vol. 426, pp 67-8. 
93
 Ibid., pp 60-61. 
94
 C. L. Mowat, ‘The anatomy of British nationalization’ in The Anthioc Review, ix, no. 3 (1949), p. 273. 
95
 David, Kynaston, Austerity in Britain, 1945-51 (London, 2007), p. 185. 
305 
 
fifth and one-seventh were respectively out of action in December 1946.
96
 At the same 
time increasing demands were being placed on the coal supply. In 1946, the 
consumption of coal for gas and electricity production was twenty-four percent and 
seventy-six percent higher than in 1938.
97
 With Britain demobilising both militarily and 
industrially, demand for power was increasing as new industries were established and as 
old industries recreated themselves; Labour’s policy regarding full employment also 
increased demand.
98Indeed Britain’s consumption of coal was insatiable, increasing 
from 179,000,000 tons in 1945 to 185,000,000 million tons in 1946; total output stood 
at just 190,000,000 tons.
99
 By late 1946 industries throughout Britain, including the 
vital ones, were reportedly beginning to ‘see the floor’ of their reserves.100 In the later 
months of 1946 British coal output increased slightly, but the margins were fine. 
Throughout the country politicians, industrialists, and those connected to the coal 
industry expressed their anxiety; regarding the coal position, it was as if the country was 
standing on thin ice, this much was clear. 
When the British Isles became gripped by the bad weather in latter part of 
January 1947, the worst fears of those who had looked anxiously at Britain’s coal 
position was realised. With much of Britain snowbound, the road and rail transport 
infrastructure became dislocated while the strong winds interrupted the coastal shipping. 
Coal distribution was thus brought to a standstill and ‘a state of creeping paralysis’ was 
induced within British industry.
101
 Throughout the county industries were forced to go 
on slow time or cease operations altogether as a direct result of the coal shortage. 
London was said two only have two weeks supply of domestic coal. The Irish Times 
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reported on 4 February 1947 that unemployment in North-West Britain had jumped 
from 8,000 to 36,850 in the previous ten days as industries shut down operations.
102
 
Two days later the Irish Times solemnly noted: 
Now, at a time when some improvement might have been expected, things have 
become even worse than they were at the height of the war.
103
 
 
With coal supplies failing to reach power stations in London, the midlands and the 
north-west, Shinwell announced that the electricity supply to industries and domestic 
users in these areas would be rationed. Householders would have to make do without 
electricity for five hours daily.
104
 Within a week, this provision was extended 
throughout the country.
105
 With an estimated 2,000,000 people idle as a result of the 
cuts, and a population of 22,000,000 residing in the affected areas, British Prime 
Minister, Clement Attlee admitted that the position facing Britain was ‘one of the 
utmost gravity.’106  It was in this context that the British government decided on 6 
February 1947 to ban the export of coal from Liverpool and other north-western ports. 
This meant a ban on exports of coal to Ireland. Although it was stressed that this would 
only be a temporary measure, it had serious immediate consequences. Once again, 
Ireland’s dependence on a favourable trading position with Britain for the inward flow 
of vital supplies was cruelly illustrated. 
At the time of the British government’s announcement of an export ban on coal, 
Dublin was said to have about three weeks supply while some important industries only 
had one, a situation which P. J. McEvoy, President of the Federation of Irish 
Manufactures described as being the ‘the last straw’.107 During the previous weeks Irish 
industries and intensive coal burners like the Electricity Supply Board, the gas 
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companies and Córas Iompair Éireann maintained operations on a reduced quota of coal. 
Still, Britain’s ban on coal exports came as a massive blow to these industries, their 
employees and those who depended on their services. Cuts soon followed. In Limerick 
the gas supply was cut to eight and a half hours daily while Dublin Gas Company 
limited the ‘on’ hours to just five hours per day.108 On 14 February 1947, the need for 
economy in electricity usage was announced. Outside shop lighting was banned and the 
users of electric fires were advised to use them sparingly or risk disconnection.
109
 The 
last of CIE’s main-line passenger trains travelled on the 22 February 1947.110  
In a broadcast on 24 February 1947 Lemass urged economy in the use of gas, 
electricity, and fuel and was reported by the Irish Independent to say that ‘the crisis was 
more severe than anything the country had experienced previously.’111 In the midst of 
the freezing cold and accompanying fuel famine, people reportedly striped wood from 
their homes to make fires while coal was being sold at £8 per ton on the black-
market.
112
 Fuel supplies in the capital were at an all time low. The suffering extending 
beyond Dublin too, the poor in the west of Ireland were said to be having a particularly 
bad experience while fuel shortages were reported in urban areas throughout the 
country.
113
 In rural areas people reportedly used communal fires for cooking and went 
to bed early to keep warm.
114
 Where fuel was available in the turf area it was often dear 
as was the case in Tuam: 
Tuam is, if anything, better off than the rest of the country. Fuel is dear – too 
dear for the poor – but there is a plentiful supply.115 
 
                                                          
108
 Ibid., 11 Feb. 1947; Kearns, Ireland’s arctic siege, p. 6. 
109
 ITJSB (1947), p. 22. 
110
 Irish Press, 22 Feb. 1947. 
111
 Irish Independent, 25 Feb. 1947. 
112
 Ibid., 10 Feb. 1947, 8 Feb. 1947. 
113
 Garda Commissioner, Position in west of Ireland, 4 Mar. 1947, p. 1; Department of Local Government 
and Public Health, Snow bound roads, position, 6 Mar. 1947 (NAI, TAOIS/97/9/749, pp 1-2). 
114
 Irish Times, 19 Feb. 1947. 
115
 Tuam Herald, 1 Mar. 1947 
308 
 
The inconsistencies in the demarcation of the turf and non-turf areas proved a real 
problem. In Cobh which was part of the scheduled turf area, turf was sold for £5 a ton 
while in Cork City, which was part of the non-turf area in spite of the fact that it was 
fifteen miles closer to the bog, turf was sold at the fixed price of fifty-four shillings.
116
 
The price of everyday essentials increased during the wake of the ‘big freeze’ Between 
August 1946 and August 1947 the price of food as represented on the cost-of-living 
index increased by fifteen percent. According to the Irish Housewives Association, from 
January and June 1947 a pound of sugar became 1d. more expensive; the price of a 
pound of butter increased by 4d., and fresh vegetables became two to three times as 
costly. The IHA admitted that since Christmas their efforts had been mainly concerned 
with prices.
117
    
Figure 6.6 A caricature of the cost-of-living as ‘the heaviest figure in the world’, Dublin 
Opinion, 1947 
 
Throughout the fuel crisis 
criticism was levelled at the 
government for its handling of the 
affair. On 27 February 1947, 
Richard Mulcahy put forward a 
motion in the Dáil condemning the 
government’s failure to make 
better provision of fuel for industry 
and the essential services.
118
 
Continued austerity proved a handy 
stick with which to beat the government, but the opposition’s attacks are also indicative 
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of the severity of the crisis and underline its political significance. Deputy Joseph 
Blowick of the Farmers Party who would later be leader of Clann na Talmahan during 
the first interparty government questioned Lemass’ experience of turf as Lemass was a 
Dubliner. Blowick stated: 
The minister is a city man and may not understand the handling of turf, but there 
are many deputies who can tell him about it… the stuff I see at present in the 
hotel where I stay and in other places is not turf, and any farmer down the 
country will tell you that he leaves better stuff on the bog than the stuff the 
Dublin people are asked to burn.
119
 
 
While Blowick didn’t stretch to lay blame with the government for the bad weather, 
Fine Gael’s spokesman for external affairs and future Taoiseach, John A. Costello, 
didn’t hold back: 
We have as many jokes now in this country about wet turf as there used to be 
about Ford cars…we have heard of the man who had been in a collision and said 
he was nearly drowned because he had run into a lorry load of turf. The country 
is full of such jokes about turf. But it is no joking matter to the people who have 
to use it in its sodden condition, and that is all due to the Minister and to Fuel 
Importers Limited.
120
 
 
More turf jokes are captured in Figure 6.7, a caricature of Bord na Móna’s officers as 
from the June 1947 edition of Dublin Opinion. 
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Figure 6.7 The office of Bord na Móna as depicted in Dublin Opinion, June 
1947 
 
 Source: Dublin Opinion, June 1947 
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 The Irish Independent delivered a more balanced appraisal of the handling of the 
crisis pointing out that:  
The government cannot be blamed for the abnormal weather, or for the collapse 
of the British mining industry. What the government must be held responsible 
for is the utter inactivity shown during the past month.
121
 
 
The fuel famine of 1947 crystallised the inefficiencies of the fuel rationing system. 
Deputy Alfie Byrne noted how he had witnessed pregnant women queuing in the 
freezing cold for up to four hours just to get a sack of wet turf.
122
 At the same time 
Lemass readily admitted that the country was facing ‘a first class fuel crisis’ in domestic 
fuel and noted that congestion in the Phoenix Park’s dumps was a particular problem.123 
His admission that there was little to be done except hope for improved weather, caused 
particular disquiet. With supplies of fuel at an all time low, Dublin’s bellmen were 
reportedly absent from their rounds.
124
 Why didn’t the government use the army to clear 
snowbound roads, relieve the congestion in the fuel dumps, transport turf from the turf 
to the non-turf area, and then distribute it within the non-turf area? The fuel rationing 
system also had a glaring flaw, one which the Irish Housewives Association pointed out 
to Lemass during the midst of the crisis. When registering with a fuel merchant, 
consumers weren’t required to produce documentation. As the IHA explained, it was 
left ‘more or less to the conscience of the people not to register with more than one 
merchant.’125 While Lemass argued that this wasn’t an issue as it was illegal to register 
with more than one fuel merchant, the system was clearly wide open to abuse. The fact 
that this problem was flagged by the IHA themselves, whose mission it was to voice the 
grievances’ of ordinary women, implies that this was a credible concern.126 
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In light of the fuel shortage a strong case was made for the opening of Dublin’s 
municipal kitchens (known as the Cooked Meals Service) for communal feeding 
purposes (see Chapter II). Although the city’s communal feeding infrastructure was 
formed in late 1941, the scheme wasn’t put into action. James Hurson, Secretary of the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health cited ‘moral reasons’ and 
government policy which aimed at interfering as little as possible with family life. But 
Hurson also added that the government would sanction communal supply of food 
‘under the compulsion of very exceptional circumstances such as a more drastic 
curtailment of fuel supplies’.127 Surely the fuel scarcity and abnormally cold weather 
that prevailed in early 1947 constituted such ‘exceptional circumstances’. Families in 
Dublin normally severed by bellmem were without fuel; independent deputy Alfie 
Byrne reported witnessing a woman in a tenement area who was normally dependant of 
turf cross the street to another dwelling in order to use the gas-ring there.
128
 These 
problems were widespread but whether or not the authorities were in a position to 
implement the Cooked Meals Service is another matter altogether. Shortly after the 
Catholic Social Service Conference initiated its communal feeding scheme, Dublin 
Corporation supplied the CSSC with both turf and electric boilers.
129
 It stands to reason 
that this equipment was sourced from the corporation’s idle Cooked Meals Service. 
In Dublin and throughout the country the weather and fuel scarcity reduced 
standards of domestic comfort to critically low ebb. The mortality rate in Dublin was 
said to have doubled with most deaths occurring among aged poor people.
130
 The Irish 
Housewives Association certainly felt that the conditions that presented themselves in 
early 1947 warranted action by the authorities. They sent letters to government 
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advocating the use of the municipal kitchens to feed the young and the poor and in mid 
February the Lord Mayor, John McCann, received an IHA deputation at the Mansion 
House to discuss the matter. McCann argued that there was ‘little demand for cooked 
meals’ and he also pointed out the existence of the voluntary schemes run by the St 
John’s Ambulance Brigade and the Catholic Social Services Conference which were in 
receipt of corporation funding.
131
 Dublin Corporation actually requested the CSSC to 
increase output at its food centres and according to the CSSC’s annual report for 1946-
47, the food centres were able to cope with the increased demand without reaching full 
capacity.
132The IHA’s deputation did not agree citing investigations conducted by the 
association in ‘various crowded districts’ which were found to lack facilities for 
cooking; Crumlin was one such area where there existed demand for additional 
communal dining facilities.
133
 The deputation also maintained that communal feeding 
should not depend on voluntary organisations, an opinion which was at odds with that 
of the Archbishop of Dublin, John Charles McQuaid.
134
 Ironically, the SJA’s mobile 
canteen donated to the International Red Cross in January 1946 for the relief of distress 
in Europe would have proved useful during the ‘battle for the harvest’ and the ‘big 
freeze’. 
Butter rationing 
 
The ‘big freeze’ significantly impacted Irish agriculture which in turn had 
consequences for the food supply. Butter rationing is a case in point. Milk production 
fell in 1946, due to limited supplies of fodder which in turn impacted butter production; 
this was a product of the world grain shortage and the increased extraction rate. The 
domestic butter ration was thus reduced from six to four ounces from 1 February 1947; 
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a supplementary margarine ration of two ounces was also made available for domestic 
consumers.
135
 The big freeze further limited the supply. Farmers lost large numbers of 
cattle (and livestock in general) during January to March 1947 with the cattle population 
decreasing by approximately 200,000 that year, an almost five percent reduction on its 
1946 level.
136
 Creamery butter production therefore fell considerably. On 8 March 1947 
the domestic butter ration was fixed at two ounces per person per week while the 
margarine ration was increased to four ounces.
137
 Prior to February 1947, the butter 
ration had never been permitted to fall below the six ounce mark. On 13 March 1947, 
Senator Patrick Baxter declared: 
No decision taken by the government since war was declared has caused a 
greater upset in the homes of the people than its decision to reduce the butter 
ration.
138
 
 
Professor William Fearon, (the Trinity College Dublin based biochemist and senator for 
the University of Dublin) also voiced his opposition citing nutritional considerations.
139
 
Butter constituted an important source of dietary fat, especially for the poorer classes 
who were unable to afford meat. The restriction of fat intake - a key component in the 
human diet which adds satiety and provides flavour to food – at a time of intense cold 
would have increased the feeling of hunger and negatively impacted public health. The 
Butter ration did not again reach the six ounce level until 30 October 1948.
140
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Figure 6.8 Dublin Opinion making light of the butter shortage by showing a man 
cutting turf in the hope of finding a keg of bog butter 
 
    
The tillage battle 
 
Of concern following the 
improvement of the weather in mid 
to late March 1947 was the extent to 
which the agricultural sowing season 
had been delayed. On 19 March 1947, 
the Minister for Agriculture, Patrick 
Smith announced that: 
There is, roughly, somewhat in excess of 2,000,000 acres of land to be ploughed 
if we are to reach the tillage achievement of last year.
141
 
 
As illustrated earlier in the chapter, wheat supplies for the last quarter of the 1947 cereal 
year were uncertain with the deficit estimated at 150,000 tons. The ambiguity 
surrounding grain imports heightened the sense of insecurity. James Hughes, Fine Gael 
deputy for Carlow-Kildare stated that ‘the gravity of our current position is without 
parallel’ and that ‘faith, courage and determination’ would be needed to face up to it.142 
There was widespread talk of possible famine and letters from America to the Connacht 
Sentinel asked if ‘Black 47’ was going to be repeated. 143  According to Hughes 
approximately 75,000 acres of wheat had been sown as of 19 March 1947.
144
 This 
figure amounted to just eleven and half percent of the total acreage sown for 1946 
whereas in a normal year the majority of the crop would have been in by mid March.
145
 
The Irish Press noted: 
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The security of the country now lies where it has lain during all the Emergency 
years – in the hands of the ploughman.146 
 
Farmers were generously supplied with fuel and tractors were fitted with headlamps to 
aid around-the-clock ploughing. Just as there had been a ‘battle for the harvest’ in 1946, 
the farmers were called to arms once again in the ‘tillage campaign’. In the April 1947 
edition of Dublin Opinion, this battle was represented by two grappling figures, one 
being the farmer and the other the weather, also note the headlamps displayed on the 
tractor (see Figure 6.9). 
Figure 6.9 A portrayal of a farmer wrestling the weather in 
Dublin Opinion, 1947 
 
Source: Dublin Opinion, Apr. 1947 
 
The farmers made progress fast; within a month somewhere in the region of 350,000 
acres had been sown with wheat.
147
 In total, 579,646 acres of wheat were sown, just ten 
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percent less than the previous year.
148
 1947s wheat yield however of 313,000 tons was 
approximately thirty-two percent less than the previous years and forty-five percent less 
than that attained in 1945.
149
 By the time of the harvest however, the anxiety had eased. 
Cargoes of wheat allocated by the International Emergency Food Council began to 
arrive in Ireland in June 1947.
150
 While bread rationing was maintained into 1948, 
foreign wheat was available to make up the deficit in domestic supplies. 
Table 6.2 Ireland's extent and estimated yield of wheat, 1945-47 
Year 1945 1946 1947 
Total area (acres) 662,498 642,595 579,646 
Total Yield 573,100 462,700 313,000 
Table compiled by Ciarán Bryan using data from the Irish Trade Journal and Statistical Bulletin, 1945-47 
After the arrival of the thaw in mid March 1947, Britain’s coal position began to 
improve. The warmer temperatures not only melted the snow and ice but also lessened 
the demand for gas and electricity which reduced the consumption of coal at the 
gasworks and power stations. This easing of the fuel position allowed the Ministry of 
Fuel to loosen the belt a little and the ministry even felt able to agree to the export of 
coal.
151
 On the night of 8 April 1947 it was announced that Britain would grant Ireland a 
weekly allocation of 11,000 tons of coal and 500 tons of coke. While the new ration was 
far from satisfactory – 25,000 tons of coal was received weekly during 1946 while some 
50,000 tons of high quality coal used each week in Ireland prior to the war – it was 
enough to maintain the essential industries and utilities.
152
 For over two months Ireland 
had been starved of coal. A critical breakdown of the coal dependant industries and 
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utilities was just around the corner. It was reported that for Dublin Gas Company the 
supplies came at almost the last minute.
153
  
In June 1947 imports of higher quality coal from the US began to arrive in 
Ireland; some 500,000 tons were reportedly received by 11 September 1947.
154
 The 
improved coal supplies were a great boon to industry and allowed the government to 
establish a national reserve at depots in Dublin and Cork. The US’s coal did not come 
cheap and the shipping costs added to the expense. Almost $20,000,000 was spent on 
US coal in 1947.
155
In light of the convertibility crisis, this draw on the Sterling Area’s 
dollar pool was not looked upon favourably by the British government.
156
 During trade 
talks held in late 1947, the Irish government was encouraged to limit its dollar spending 
in return for trade inducements, but as a memorandum on the trade talks dated 19 
September 1947 noted: 
Any vague or indefinite assurances regarding supplies, etc., from the British side 
would not be enough. Experience shows that they have not been helpful in the 
past, nor have fulfilled undertakings.
157
 
 
Lessons had been learnt from the breakdown in trade between Britain and Ireland 
during the early years of the Emergency, ‘gentlemen’s agreements’ could not be relied 
upon. As the Irish government became assured of its coal position for 1948, the controls 
around coal were relaxed. On 1 October 1947 a half ton coal was put on the domestic 
ration in the non-turf area.
158
 In view of the improved supply position, the controls 
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relating to the distribution and price of coal for retail sale were completely removed 
from 1 January 1948.
159
 
On 13 March 1947, several days before the thaw began, and almost a month 
prior to resumption of British coal deliveries, Lemass declared ‘this is a crisis year.’160  
Indeed, the country’s economic position looked bleak and the experience of fuel 
scarcity during the ‘big freeze’ lent urgency to the question of fuel provision and 
distribution for the coming year. On 9 April 1947, a conference of county engineers 
attended by the Taoiseach, Eamon de Valera and the Minister for Local Government 
and Public Health, Seán MacEntee, was held in the Customs House to discuss turf 
production. The position was grave; turf reserves throughout the country had been 
severely depleted; Britain’s coal allocation could not be taken for granted and owing to 
the bad weather and the necessity to concentrate on the tillage drive the turf cutting 
season was delayed by about two months. The need for increased production by the 
county councils and private producers was stressed. Fuel Importers Éire’s requirements 
for 1947 were set at 612,500 tons, a figure that was seventy-five percent greater than 
that attained in 1946.
161
 Labour problems in the turf cutting industry persisted. Morale 
among the county council workers was low, and many had been lured away by private 
producers with offers of bread and sugar rations. By May 1947 turf production was 
running at one-third its May 1946 rate, but in the end, the local authorities produced 
420,000 tons, just 10,000 tons less the total for 1946.
162
  
Turf rationing 
 
 During the midst of the big freeze Richard Mulcahy accused Fianna Fáil of 
suffering from turf fanaticism, arguing that nothing was done in regard to coal in 1946 
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because Lemass was himself a ‘turf fanatic’.163 The case can be made that Ireland’s coal 
stocks were mismanaged during 1946 when weekly deliveries averaged 5,000 tons 
above the ration.
164
 Córas Iompair Éireann put on extra trains operating excursion trains 
right up until Christmas and supplies were also allocated to hotels and other institutions 
which facilitated tourists.
165
 In spite of Fine Gael’s criticisms, without the massive 
expansion of turf cutting operations the country would have been in far worse state 
during the years of coal scarcity. The governments turf policy was for the most part a 
success, although the big freeze demonstrated its flaws. The mode of distribution was 
often identified as a factor which precipitated shortages. As discussed earlier, the fact 
that turf wasn’t put on the same basis as other rationed essentials, the procurement of 
which depended on the exchange of coupons, was indeed a critical oversight. From 1 
October 1947 the fuel rationing scheme was altered making mandatory the surrender of 
coupons to obtain fuel (turf, coal and wood) in the non-turf area. A new fuel ration book 
was distributed to households for this purpose.
166
 This development can be seen as 
acknowledgement of the former schemes inadequacies; it also demonstrates how 
lessons were learnt and is symptomatic of the grave view of the fuel position at that 
time. 
From the end of the war into 1946, Ireland enjoyed improved levels of imports. 
At the same time, various controls introduced during the Emergency were relaxed; the 
future was looked forward too with optimism. This happy situation - as maintained by 
Mary Daly - proved to be ‘something of a false dawn’, a point which is underlined in 
this chapter. 
167
 This is best displayed in respect of grain imports which owing to the 
global cereals deficit were lower in 1946 than they had been in 1945. As argued by 
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Bryce Evans, Ireland during the war was at the mercy of geopolitical and economic 
currents; this was also demonstrated to be case during the post-war years especially in 
respect of wheat and coal.
168
 The abnormal weather of 1946-47 impacted the nature of 
the supplies situation, but the government was not without blame. When murmurs of a 
potential fuel crisis were emanating from Britain, Ireland’s fuel supplies were 
mismanaged. The reasoning behind continued rationing was multifaceted; it was 
understood to be about more than ensuring equitable distribution at home, it was also 
seen as Ireland’s contribution to the relief of suffering in Europe. It had been hoped that 
the end of the war would bring about an end to rationing, but the reality of bread 
rationing (which at no point had been introduced during the war years), the austere 
butter ration, the fuel famine and the rising prices must have been a hard pill to swallow. 
The threat of the war spilling over into Ireland was gone, but the way the Emergency 
was experienced on a day to day basis by the average Irish person continued beyond the 
cessation of hostilities; in this sense it was business as usual. 1947 was a crisis year, the 
privation was acute which is evidenced by the infant and tuberculosis mortality rates 
which spiked in that year (see Figure 5.2). One can say with confidence that the 
hardships experience by the Irish population in early 1947 were worse than those faced 
at any time during the war, a sentiment which was regularly expressed by 
contemporaries of the period. Owing to the absence of censorship, mistakes made by the 
government in the post-war years were amplified and more freely discussed. The issue 
of continued austerity proved a handy stick with which to beat the government and was 
used as confirmation of the government’s failings. The success of the social democratic 
republican party Clann na Poblachta in the 1948 general election can be viewed as a 
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popular expression of opposition to continued austerity and government control. The 
end of the war most certainly did not bring about an immediate return to normality. 
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Conclusion 
By viewing the Emergency through the lens of food, rationing, and supplies, this 
thesis demonstrates the extent to which everyday life in Ireland during the years 1939-
48 was affected by the Second World War and the socio-economic fallout from that 
conflict. It therefore stands in opposition to F.S.L. Lyons’ contention that life in 
Emergency was akin to ‘Plato’s Cave’, is distinct from the largely high-political 
histories which followed, and can be aligned with more complex narratives of the 
Emergency. Through the use of a bottom-up approach, public, medical, organisational, 
clerical, and governmental responses to shortages have been explored. By investigating 
the multifaceted relationships between various actors, and by demonstrating how 
privation fostered engagement, cooperation, and conflict, the complexity of the period 
has been illustrated. 
As demonstrated in Chapter I, the nature of the supplies position and how it 
affected everyday life in Ireland was very much a product of the international 
geopolitical climate. The most striking example of this is the extent to which Ireland’s 
supplies position began to deteriorate following the fall of France in June 1940. The 
impacts of this can be seen in Chapter II which explores the principal shortages and the 
Irish government’s efforts to combat them and Chapters III and IV which demonstrate 
the growth of poverty in Ireland and the various responses this elicited. In relation to 
imported supplies, the Emergency exhibited the extent to which Ireland was at the 
mercy of Britain, but it also showed how Britain’s difficulty was Ireland’s difficulty. 
Decisions were taken at the highest level of the British government to wage covert 
economic war against Ireland in an attempt to bring it into the war. Diplomatic motives 
however, were not the only factors at play; the wartime geopolitical environment was a 
complex one. The fall of France left Britain reeling; militarily it was a disaster and it 
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was a severe blow to morale; it was also of significant economic consequence. Britain 
lost access to European markets and for various reasons discussed in Chapter I, the 
shipping situation became acute. These issues should be taken into account when 
assessing Britain’s wartime trading relationship with Ireland. At the same time, the Irish 
government exhibited a lack of foresight and failed to read the implications of the 
international situation. The Munich Agreement of 1938 led some to believe that war 
could be avoided. Even those who expected war thought it would remain distant from 
Ireland and would be concluded quickly. Informed by the experience of the First World 
War, it was also thought that Irish agricultural produce would be vital to Britain’s war 
effort. These misinterpretations led the government to take a complacent attitude 
towards the stockpiling of supplies; this was a critical failure. In The taste of war 
(London, 2011), Lizze Collingham illustrates how during the Second World War 
questions of food production and distribution became issues of strategic significance for 
the belligerents. This was also the case for neutral Ireland. 
Due to shortages, the cost-of-living increased by approximately seventy percent 
and as wages were not permitted to increase at a comparable rate there was an 
appreciable decrease in the standard of living experienced throughout the country. For 
some, the level of comfort was reduced to a critically low ebb. A ‘new poor’ or what 
one might term an ‘Emergency poor’ was created among fixed low-income families and 
those employed in industries that were susceptible to shortages. The long-term 
unemployed and underemployed were plunged even deeper into poverty. Personal 
savings were eroded, possessions pawned, mobility reduced, and choice limited. The 
experience of everyday life in Ireland however was not a uniform one. Worst affected 
were the urban poor – concentrated in Dublin – and the rural landless labouring classes. 
For these sections of the community, austerity was exacerbated by inequitable 
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distribution of supplies and the government’s failure to institute a coherent rationing 
system from an early stage in the Emergency. At the same time, the experience of 
rationing in Ireland showed that there were severe limitations to the effectiveness of 
rationing in an agricultural country. Britain relied heavily on imported foodstuffs thus 
greater control could be effected at the point of entry, the ports. Domestic agricultural 
produce on the other hand was harder to manage; crops produced on smallholdings by 
farmers resistant to government control even more so. Although often flawed, the 
government’s rationing schemes maintained the country through the war and post-war 
years with the shortage and increased price of foodstuffs never so critical as to threaten 
the wellbeing of the majority of the population. The fuel shortage on the other hand was 
much more severe. Transport was curtailed throughout the country, and in urban areas 
home cooking and heating became particularly difficult. Fortunately Ireland possessed a 
domestic turf supply which was used as a substitute for coal; this took the edge of 
Britain’s trade squeeze. 
For necessitous families, the inability of rationing mechanisms to keep prices 
down exacerbated food, fuel and clothing poverty. This heightened the importance of 
welfare provided by both the government and voluntary organisations. Examination of 
these schemes reveals how the socio-economic impacts of the Emergency affected some 
of the most vulnerable members of Irish society. Voucher and food welfare schemes 
existed in Ireland prior to the war, but these were greatly expanded from early 1941. 
These new and improved welfare schemes went some way to making up for the 
inadequacies of the rationing system by providing the needy with supplies they 
desperately required. Enacted in response to Emergency conditions, these supply 
specific welfare schemes may be compared to Britain’s ‘special rations’ introduced for 
certain classes of consumer such as expectant mothers and young children. For 
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proponents of Catholic Action, the provision of food as welfare meant it assumed moral 
significance. In contrast, non-denominational interests felt it was a concern that was too 
important to be left to philanthropy. While fuel was less emotive, this thesis shows how 
food had the potential to unite and divide opinion. It emerged as an ideological 
battleground within neutral Ireland and one that offers insights into the relationships 
between the church, state, and various interested parties. This is particularly true of the 
debate on communal feeding. In Britain, communal kitchens formed a key part of the 
state’s rationing framework. In Ireland communal feeding was left to charitable 
endeavour. This was most cost-effective for the government, but the evidence suggests 
that a government operated scheme less associated with pauperism would have been 
more popular. At the same time, the debate on communal feeding is revealing of the 
contradictions in government policy. The government preached economy but would not 
sanction communal feeding on moral grounds but enacted a food voucher system that 
precluded the liberty of choice for its recipients. This is demonstrative of the 
government’s willingness to evoke Catholic social principles as it suited. 
During the Emergency, the Irish government applied rationing and price control 
mechanisms to various commodities in an attempt to ensure equitable distribution and 
prevent inflation. In spite of this, prices increased putting many goods – even rationed 
ones – beyond the means of those on meagre incomes. Poverty thus increased in Ireland, 
especially in Dublin. This necessitated a response. In the capital, the newly-established 
Catholic Social Service Conference, a voluntary organisation, stepped in to fill the void. 
Created first and foremost in response to Emergency conditions, it is clear that the 
desire to stem secular influences in welfare and the spread of communism were also 
motives. The CSSC’s biggest contribution was in the areas of communal feeding and 
clothing provision, fields suited to the skill set of its volunteers and voluntarism in 
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general. This was the CSSC’s biggest asset, its ability to call on volunteers from every 
Catholic parish and voluntary subscriptions, both financial and material. The 
willingness of the volunteers in organisations like the CSSC and the St John Ambulance 
Brigade to make sacrifices by engaging in philanthropic endeavour, or ‘stepping 
together’ for the betterment of the community offers a different narrative to that of 
compulsion, opposition, and the black market as outlined in Chapter II. In spite of its 
voluntary ethos, the CSSC was efficient and highly organised. Its establishment and 
rapid success is remarkable considering it was composed of approximately forty 
Catholic charities and organisations which were traditionally fiercely independent. The 
CSSC’s approach was underpinned by the ideology of Catholic Action and was 
informed by Catholic social teachings. This was borne out in the way it delivered its aid 
such as through the provision of take-home meals. The CSSC was very much a Catholic 
response to rationing and shortages. The aid provided by the CSSC was also effective. 
When formulating the menus for the food centres, dieticians were consulted. This 
relatively novel approach ensured the meals were of the maximum nutritional benefit 
and as such they were a massive boost in the largely deficient diets of Dublin’s poor 
that relied on them. Instruction in nutrition was also provided and in this respect the aid 
provided by the CSSC was in advance of the state. The CSSC provided a vital service in 
Dublin the existence of which relieved the state of the responsibility. 
In comparison with other countries, Ireland’s pre-war engagement with the 
subject of nutrition was limited, but as demonstrated in Chapter V, the Emergency 
changed this. Ireland’s food rationing and price control schemes – unlike Britain’s – 
demonstrated little awareness for the principles of human nutrition. The availability of 
‘protective foodstuffs’ in Ireland were cited by the government as reasons as to why no 
Irish person should suffer from malnutrition, but just because these foods were available 
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didn’t mean they were affordable. For the poorer classes, the Emergency was more 
apparent than the richer classes. Rising prices restricted budgets which reduced dietary 
intake. This increased the prevalence of the ‘bread and spread’ culture. In the absence of 
adequate ‘special rations’ or a more widespread and amenable communal kitchen 
network such as that which existed in Britain, malnutrition increased. Medical 
professionals, social workers and politicians all referred to its growth, the hardest 
evidence for which lies in the increased rates of infant and tuberculosis mortality which 
are both now known to be associated with malnutrition. At the time this link was not so 
certain, and although it was increasingly made the government was loath to 
acknowledge that a section of the population were malnourished. Yet nutritional 
concerns prompted the development of philanthropic communal kitchens and led to 
demand for greater state involvement in the area. The virtues of proper nutrition were 
also increasingly extolled. The increased prevalence of TB, a black spot on the nation’s 
health was a significant factor in the growing awareness of the connection between poor 
nutrition and illness. During the Emergency TB became Ireland’s most pressing health 
concern and as it became politicised it became news, and as a result nutrition became 
news. As pressure mounted on the government to tackle TB it was forced to address the 
issue of nutrition. The appointment in 1944 of James Deeny, the socially conscious 
doctor with an interest in nutrition to the position of Chief Medical Adviser to the 
Department of Local Government and Public Health and the carrying out of the 
National Nutrition Survey between 1946 and 1948 is indicative of a growing 
appreciation within government for the importance of human nutrition. Although borne 
out privation, the way in which the Emergency stimulated a new way of thinking – 
Ireland’s nutritional discourse – was very much a positive development. 
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By extending the analysis of rationing from the end of the war to 1948 or to the 
‘Long Emergency’, this thesis confirms the hypothesis that the Emergency, although 
concluded diplomatically and militarily, actually continued in a popular sense. What 
emerges from this thesis, especially when comparing Chapter II on wartime rationing 
and Chapter VI on post-war rationing, is the extent to which post-war rationing was 
actually more severe. The best example of this was the introduction of bread rationing 
in January 1947, a hardship which was a no point previously inflicted upon the Irish 
population. Add to this the fuel famine of early 1947 which almost brought the country 
to a standstill along with the austere butter ration introduced in March 1947 and the 
scale of the deterioration is evident. It is true that these shortages had much to do with 
abnormal climatic conditions experienced both nationally and internationally between 
1946 and 1947; droughts caused crop failures throughout the world; Ireland experienced 
one of the wettest Augusts in living memory which threatened the harvest; this was 
followed by the ‘Big Freeze’, one of the coldest winters in living memory which 
delayed the sowing season and was followed by some of the worst flooding in living 
memory. However the consequences of these climatic conditions were exacerbated by 
the dislocated nature of the post-war global economy. As was the case during the war, 
Ireland continued to be at the mercy of global geopolitical and economic currents. This 
prevented Ireland from securing imports of grain and fuel to make up for domestic 
shortages. The way in which the Emergency was experienced on a day to day basis 
therefore persisted beyond the conclusion of the war and in 1947 it intensified. The first 
six months of the year – characterised by fuel and food poverty – was a time of crisis 
without parallel. This sentiment was frequently expressed by contemporaries of the 
period. For a time the supplies position was extremely uncertain. With no guarantee of 
imports in the immediate future there were murmurs of Black 47 repeating itself, but in 
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the latter part of the year the supplies position improved as imports of wheat and coal 
were resumed. Just as neutrality was not synonymous with a peacetime existence, the 
post-war world was not synonymous with pre-war ‘normality’. Indeed, the Emergency 
was long. While food and petrol rationing was maintained until 1952, the position in 
early 1948 was considerably improved, the Emergency had passed. 
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